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Abstract 
The thesis focuses on the Vietnamese side of the Vietnam War. Though this 
war is one of the wars best documented, literature about the Vietnamese side is 
much less in comparison with that about the American side. In the war, inherited 
from the long history of national defence and influenced by Marxism-Leninism on 
war and army, North Vietnam applied the Vietnamese strategy of people's war. 
calling all Vietnamese people to participate in national effort to fight against 
American aggression. The North Vietnam's military strategy was not consistent 
with the basic principles of the laws of war as it did not distinguish combatants from 
non-combatants. This strategy put civilian population at risk. However, the thesis 
demonstrates through original archive and interview based research how the 
People's Army of Vietnam (PA VN) was not unrestrained. It had its own rules of 
engagement in fighting as well as in everyday contact with civilian, in order to 
minimize civilian casualties and protect civilian lives and assets. Also, P A VN paid 
great attention to winning and maintaining support of civilian as this support was 
crucial for its own existence as well as its war fighting capability. One implication 
of studying the North Vietnam's way of war is that North Vietnam's war against 
America was not immoral. It also has implications on the debate about the morality 
of American war in Vietnam and reflection to the American's current counter-
insurgency doctrine - the Petraeus Doctrine. 
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Chapter I: Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
Why l"ietnam War and the Zm\' a/Hoar? 
Firstly, why Vietnam War? The Vietnam war IS one of the wars best 
documented (DeGroot, 2000, p.2). However, Western literature about this war is 
unbalanced. Books, papers about American side of the war are much more extensive 
than those about the Vietnamese side. The war ended four decades ago, but \vhat is 
known about the Vietnamese side of the war is still too little in comparison with that 
of the other side. My thesis, using a great deal of sources in Vietnamese language, 
focuses on the Vietnamese side of the war. aiming at increasing the understanding 
about war on the Vietnamese side and lessening the unbalance in the literature about 
this important war in the twentieth century. 
Why North Vietnam's military strategy and the laws of war? This is a gap in 
literature about the Vietnamese side of the war. We already know that North 
Vietnam employed guerrilla tactics in fighting against America and that guerrilla 
warfare was not consistent with the laws of war and put civilian population at risk as 
guerrilla fighters did not distinguish themselves from civilian. We also know that 
the support of civilian population was crucial for guerrilla force to survive, not to 
mention to fight against such an asymmetrically powerful enemy like America. 
However. we don't know how North Vietnam managed to resolve this contradiction. 
On the one hand, North Vietnam waged a guerrilla war against America, which \\'as 
inconsistent with the law of war and put their civilian population at risk. On the 
other, it managed to win enough support from civilian to survive and tight against 
America and eventually won the war. Mv thesis \vill examine North Vietnam"s 
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compliance with the laws of war and then discuss North Vietnam's rule of 
engagement and the way North Vietnam won support from civilian population. 
In addition. studying North Vietnam's military strategy and its compliance 
with the law of war not only reveals the morality of the Vietnamese side but also 
shed light on the debate about the America's morality in the Vietnam \\'ar. Michael 
Walzer argued that the American war in Vietnam is 
"The war cannot be won, and it should not be \\on. It cannot be won, because 
the only available strategy involyes a war against ci,ilians; and it should not be 
won, because the degree of ci1'ilian support that rules out altematiw strategies 
also makes the guerrillas the legitimate rulers of the country" (Walzer, 2006, 
p.195). 
However. Walzer himself did not discuss in detials how North Vietnam won 
that "degree of civilian support" while their strategy actually put that very civilian 
population at risk. This is the gap in the literature that my thesis aims to cover. 
What is the research question and h)pothesis? 
Given the lack of literature about the Vietnamese side of the war and the gap 
in understanding the role of the laws of war in North Vietnam's military strategy, 
my research question is: Did North Vietnam comply with the laws of war in its \\'ar 
against America? If not, did North Vietnam follow any rule of engagement and how 
did North Vietnam win support from civilian? 
The hypothesis I am trying to test is that: North Vietnam did not abide by the 
basic principles underpinning the laws of war. but it was not unrestrained. North 
Vietnam had its own rule of engagement to \vin and maintain support of ci\'ilian 
population. 
In answering these research questions and testing the hypothesis. I will present 
N0l1h Vietnam's official perspective on the Vietnam \\'ar. under that perspective 
North Vietnam initiated its military strategy. I \"ill also present ~orth Vietnam' s 
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justification of the war itself and the way of war and investigate how ~orth 
Vietnam's war is justified under traditional ad bellum criteria. 
Answering the above research question will have following implications: 
The first implication is to judge the morality of North Vietnam's war against 
America. Though North Vietnam's way of war was not strictly consistent with basic 
principles of jus in bello, North Vietnam's war against America \\as not immoral. In 
terms of jus ad bellum, though it was not publicly declared, on balance North 
Vietnam's war was legitimate. In terms of jus in bello, North Vietnam followed its 
own rule of engagement to protect civilian and minimize civilian casualties, even if 
its soldiers had to accept more harm to themselves. 
The second implication is to judge the morality of America's \\ar in Vietnam. 
The thesis fills in the missing point of Walzer's argument about America's morality 
in the Vietnam war by showing how North Vietnam won support from civilian 
population even though its way of war put civilian population at risk. Thus, the 
thesis confirms Walzer's argument that America's war was "doubly untenable" as it 
was "the war cannot be won and should not be won" (Walzer, 2006, p.195). 
The third implication is regarding current America's counter-insurgency 
doctrine. The research shows that winning hearts and minds of people is pivotal in 
winning an insurgent/counter-insurgent war. In the Vietnam War, North Vietnam 
was very much weaker than America militarily, however, it could still win the war 
as it got the support from civilian population. 
TVhat are main arguments of my thesis? 
The main argument of my thesis is that though North Vietnam military 
strategy was not consistent with the basic principles of the la\\'s of war, North 
Vietnam had its own rule of engagement to protect civilian and minimize civilian 
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casualties and together with the just cause, North Vietnam managed to WIll and 
maintain enough support from ci\'ilian to eventually win the war against America. 
North Vietnam's military strategy in the \\-ar against America \\-as not 
consistent with the basic principles of the laws of war. The strategy was inherited 
from the long Vietnamese history of fighting against foreign aggressors. In the 
fighting, Vietnamese people employed the motto of ··the whole nation joining 
forces" and "everyone is a soldier". In the modem time North Vietnam' s military 
strategy was influenced by Marxism and Leninism on war and army. in which the 
end justifies the means. According to Marxism, just war is the war that is 
"waged by a people for the sake of freedom and social progress, for liberation 
from exploitation and national oppression or in defence of its state 
sovereignty against an aggressive attack" (Maxism-Leninism on war and 
military, 1972. p.87). 
And Leninist concept of war is quite straight forward. the war is just if its 
cause is just and waged by progressive class. He wrote that 
'"There are just and unjust wars. progressiYe and reactionary \\'ars. wars 
waged by advanced classes and wars waged by backward classes. wars 
waged for the purpose of perpetuating class oppression and \\-ars waged for 
the purpose of eliminating oppression. Reactionary. aggressiye wars cannot 
be just, and unjust wars retard historical progress. Just wars have progressin 
aims. The political content of a just war is to liberate a people from 
oppression and exploitation, which hold back socio-economic development" 
(Lenin Selected Works, Vol. 29. p.343). 
Influenced by the Vietnamese traditional way of war and Marxism-Leninism 
thought about war, North Vietnam' s military strategy in the \\-ar against America 
was not consistent with the basic principles of the laws of war which demand clear 
distinction between combatant and non-combatant and that even the cause is just 
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wars are still have to be conducted justly. However. contrary to the arguments put 
forwarded by O'Briend (1981. p.123) that North Vietnam deliberately use 
"population as a shield~' ~ I \\'ill argue that the inconsistence between ?\ orth 
Vietnam's military strategy and the principles underpinning the la\\s of \yar was not 
because North Vietnam deliberately violated the 1949 Geneva Conventions, \\"hich 
it signed on 28th June 1957, but because of the difference in the way of fighting 
between Vietnam and Western countries. 
As North Vietnam ~ s military strategy was not consistent \\'ith the laws of war 
and it essentially put civilian population at risk, how did North Vietnam win support 
from the civilian population? North Vietnam's armed forces had its 0\\11 strict rule 
of engagement in relations with civilian population. Given that the support of 
civilian population was crucial for guerrilla force, North Vietnam paid great 
attention to winning hearts and minds of the people. In everyday contact with 
civilian, People's Army of Vietnam (PA VN) had Ten Swears, Twelve Disciplines, 
and other rules regulating relations between armed forces and the people. In 
fighting, P A VN tried to minimise civilian casualties, protect civilian lives and assets 
even though they had to accept more harm to themselves. To monitor and guide the 
job of winning hearts and minds of civilian population, North Vietnam armed forces 
organized a specialised organization- Department of Civilian Mobilisation, belong 
to General Department of Politics ofP A VN. With its strong emphasis on the ci\'ilian 
mobilisation, North Vietnam's armed forces \\'on enough support from people to 
sustain and win over America in the war. 
H01\' H"illl do it? 
To do this research, I use qualitative research method in which I focus on, 
archive research and interview. I use sources both in English and Vietnamese 
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language. Howeyer. as the focus of the thesis is on the North Vietnam's conduct in 
the war, the main sources are from Vietnamese archiyes in Vietnamese language. 
The following Vietnamese military think-tanks and archi\'es are yaluable 
sources of information for my thesis: The Institute of Military History, Ministry of 
National Defense: The Institute of Military Strategic Studies, Ministry of National 
Defense; People Army of Vietnam's Central Library: People's Army Publishing 
House. Besides, Vietnam National Library is a helpful body of knowledge for me. 
Several other think-tanks in Vietnam such as Hanoi Institute for International 
Relations- IIR (now is Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam), the War Re\ie\\ Board ... 
are also good sources of information. 
In the above think-tanks and archives. I found a lot of Vietnamese literature 
about the war. I divide the literature into three kinds, based on the le\el of 
propaganda elements embedded in each kind. 
The first kind of source is the public official Vietnamese literature about the 
war against America, including the "History of the Resistant rVar againsl America" 
(7 volumes): "Hist01:1' of People '51 Army of rrietnam" (3 volumes); "Reriew of 
Resistant )1'(/rs against French and America: Reasons for Success and Lessons 
Learned" (2 volumes) etc. This kind of literature is published for popular readers 
and is the Vietnamese official account of its resistant war against America. This 
kind of literature usually embeds a degree of propaganda following the will of 
Vietnamese Communist Party. This kind of literature tends to emphasize the 
achievements of the Communist side, describes the \'ictory in more details while 
minimizes or even ignores the setbacks. However, this does not mean that this kind 
of literature is totally propaganda and has no \'alue for research. The literature has 
certain percentage of truth in itself. It pro\'ides a broad overyiew of the \Tietnam' s 
\\'ar against America for example when the struggle started, how North Vietnam 
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defined its main opponents in the war, how North Vietnam justified the \\'ar toward 
its own people etc. It also shed light on how North Vietnam \'iews the evolvement of 
the war through five phases, what were the main characteristics and strategy of each 
phase. Generally, the Vietnamese official and public literature about the history of 
the war embeds some elements of propaganda, but it is still useful in providing 
information about the overarching issues of the North Vietnam's war against 
America. 
The second kind of sources of my thesis is the Party's Documents. The 
Vietnamese Communist Party's Documents are recently published in many 
volumes, each volume covers all the documents of the Party in one year. During the 
years of war against America. The Party's Documents include not only the 
documents of Vietnamese Worker Party (the official name of Vietnamese 
Communist Party in that period) in the North Vietnam but also documents of the 
Party's Central Office in the South Vietnam. the exchanging letters, notes of leaders 
in the North and in the South Vietnam regarding the strategy debate and the way to 
lead the war in South Vietnam forward. 
This kind of documents, according to David Elliott (2008). is carefully 
censored before publication, meaning that not all the documents are published, 
especially those hostile to China because now Vietnam and China are friends. 
However, in comparison with the first kind of literature which is the official 
Vietnamese history account of the war. this kind of literature is much less 
propaganda. The Party's Documents are resolutions, directives, decrees etc. of the 
Pat1y in the North Vietnam and the Party's Central Office in the South Vietnam to 
direct the war in South Vietnam. Party leaders wanted the subordinates in the South 
Vietnam to understand these documents as faithfully as possible so that they can 
apply them correctly in reality. These documents targeted at local leaders and heads 
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of military units during the war time, those who \\'ere responsible for carrying out 
the strategy. Thus, the purpose of these documents was not for propaganda. This 
kind of documents point out the North Vietnam's 2:rand strate2:Y in the war. the 
~ ~. 
military strategy for the war. the military strategy for each period of the war. etc. 
The third kind of sources for my thesis is the training materials of People's 
Army of Vietnam for example the series of Manual for Political \\'ork in People's 
Army of Vietnam regarding the civilian mobilization including "Some Basic Issues 
of Cil'ilian Mobili=ation in People's Armed Forces" (1971): "Winning Back {he 
People" (1958); "Cirilian Mobili=aliol1- Textbook for Army and Reserred Forces" 
(1968); "The HistOlY of Department of Civilian Mobili=ation fi'om 19../ 7 to ~()07" 
(2007) etc.: the training materials about Vietnamese People's War such as "The Art 
of Military Fighting of Vietnam in the War of National Liberation and S({ieguarding 
the Fatherland" (2004); "Local People's War in the Resistant War against Amcrica 
1954-1975" (1996) etc.; the battle plan of important battles in the war against 
America recorded in "Slimmmy of j\1ilitary Campaigns in the Resistant War against 
America 1954-19'""'5" (2001). 
This kind of sources is not for public access in the Central Military Library in 
Hanoi. The purpose of these sources is for training soldiers/army officers, for the 
later generation of soldiers to learn from the experience of the previous generation. 
The targeted audience of these sources is soldiers and army officers. These sources 
are usually the products of group or specialized organizations including the 
individuals having actual experience in the fields. This kind of sources aims at 
giving the soldiers and army officers of the People's Army of Vietnam the accuracy 
of what happened in the past and for them to learn the lessons and apply these 
lessons in future. With this aim, this kind of documents has \"ery little propaganda. 
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The training materials of the Vietnamese people's \\-ar point out the strategy 
and tactics of the people's \\'ar in the war against America, the role of civilian, 
people in the North Vietnam's military strategy. It also provides insight on the 
reasons why Vietnamese military leaders appreciate the role of people and \\'hy they 
care for people's lives and assets in the war. The series of manual for political works 
in People' s Army of Vietnam regarding civilian mobilization help to understand the 
way People's Army won support from civilian. It points out the tactics and concrete 
measures of People's Army of Vietnam to can: out the civilian mobilization work 
in army unit at different levels such as what should be done when station near a 
village, what should be done, what should be avoided when soldiers stay in people's 
house etc. The battle plans of important battles in the war against America reveals 
the People' s Army of Vietnam's Rule of Engagement in its actual fighting during 
the war against America. For example, every battle plan had a part about civilian 
situation sunounding the battle field and this is one of factors to be considered in 
planning the battle. This is the main source of the thesis helping me to answer the 
original research questions. 
To complement what might be lack in archive research, I also did interviews. I 
did totally 19 intervie\\'s, in which 12 were the interviews of People's AnDY of 
Vietnam veterans and 7 were the interviews of Vietnamese scholars about the war. 
The interview materials help me to find out things that I cannot get from archive 
research. For example, intervie\\' materials help me to see how the North Vietnam's 
policy and strategy translated in reality, specifically how the work of civilian 
mobilization was actually carried out by soldier during the war; hO\\' soldiers were 
trained about the rule of engagement; how soldiers abided by the rule of engagement 
of protecting civilian and minimizing civilian casualties in their fighting etc. 
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I chose to do interview with both \'eterans and scholars because \'eterans had 
the experience of what actually happened but usually lack the broad view about the 
war in general. or even the battle that they actually participated in. They usually 
know what happened with their unit and close units, but not the whole battle. 
Moreover, given that the war ended nearly 40 years ago. most of veterans now in 
their seventies, so sometime they cannot remember exactly \vhat happened or 
misremember. The researchers about the war can help on these issues even though 
they did not participate in the war. 
Among the veteran I interviewed, I tried my best to have the diversity. I chose 
interviewees who participated in important battles such as Ap Bac battle, Van 
Tuong battle, Khe Sanh battle. I chose to interview people who participated in the 
battles in different strategic areas according to the strategy of North Vietnam Ap 
Bac battle in rural and delta area; Khe Sanh battle in forest and mountainous area; 
Hue battle in the town and city area in Tet Offensive 1968. I also chose battles with 
different tactics, Ap Bac was defensive battle: Van Tuong was also the defensive 
battle but the People's Army was in surprise; Gia Huu, Binh Dinh battle was an 
ambush battle. I would like to see whether the rule of engagement to protect civilian 
and minimize civilian casualties was consistent in the different circumstances. The 
people chosen for interview and the battles chosen for example are reasonable 
representative. 
The interviewees are people I know personally and I am trusted for them to 
share their stories, which they might be less willing to talk with a foreign 
interviewer. Before any interview, I always made sure that the interviewees \\'ere 
aware that the materials would be used for doing a PhD research in the UK and the 
interviewees could refuse to answer questions that they thought not appropriate. 
Howe\er. I found out that interviewees were quite willing to tell their stories. and 
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most of the interviews were longer than I expected. In the interyiews, the Yeterans 
talked about their experience and I asked them specific questions regarding how 
they were trained, how they treated civilian in everyday contact as \\'ell as in 
fighting, how they carried out civilian mobilization, why they participated in the 
People's Army, how they saw the justification of the war etc. 
Also, the thesis is about the Vietnam War and the laws of war Western , 
literature about the war and about the laws of war cannot be underestimated. Books, 
papers about the Vietnam War in English are extensiye and very helpful for my 
research. 
1.2 Project background 
In the Cold War, due to nuclear deterrence, the US and Soviet Union dared not 
risk an all-out war. Thus, the contest between the two superpowers was fought in the 
form of arms races, covert actions, ideological campaigns, economic embargoes, 
and proxy wars in peripheral areas. Among the three wars that are often referred to 
as 'proxy wars' (Korean, Vietnam and Afghanistan), in which one of the two 
superpowers sent hundreds of thousands of its own troops into battle against clients 
of the other side, the Vietnam war arguably had the most impact on public opinion 
in the West on US interventions abroad. Vietnam became the place to test the 
strength of two contesting superpowers because "in other places \\'here the 1\\0 
superpowers confronted one another they were frozen in a stalemate that could not 
be broken without the risk of general war', in other words, "Vietnam was strategic 
because it was peripheral'. (Lind, 2003, p.9). 
Thus, the Vietnam War was not simply a struggle of Vietnamese people for 
national reunitIcation and independence but it also demonstrated the military and 
political struggle between the Communist and non-Communist \Hwld during the 
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Cold War. Understanding about the Vietnam War would help to understand more 
about the Cold War, especially the relations between America and Soviet Union in 
1950s, 1960s and early 1970s. 
1.2.1 The unbalanced literature about the Vietnam war. 
Since the end of the Vietnam WaT. there has been voluminous literature 
discussing almost all aspects of this war. Gerard J. DeGroot proposes an experiment: 
Get on the World Wide Web, choose a search engine and key in 'Vietnam \\ar". 
Press return and thousands of matches will be brought forward. Or, another way, log 
on to the website of a major online bookseller and again key in 'Vietnam war'. If the 
bookseller is a big one, the results will eventually number in the thousands 
(DeGroot, 2000. p.l). While DeGroot admitted that 'the results defy categorization'. 
he did try to categorize the authors of Vietnam war literature 
'Some seek explanation- of America's involvement in the war. or of the reasons 
for her defeat. For others, writing about the war is a necessary act of closure in 
response to the pain it has caused. Others still are keen to use the \"ar as a 
morality tale through which to peddle a particular \ision of America. And then 
there are those for whom the war offers an opportunity to make money in a book 
market which has yet to reach saturation' (DeGroot, 2000, p.l). 
The issue which troubles academic writers the most, is the explanation why 
America got involved in Vietnam and why it lost the war. Some authors explained 
America's involvement as a gradually evolving problem exacerbated by America 
mistakes, misconceptions and hubris. These authors include Lloyd Gardner with 
Approaching l'ietnam: George McT. Kahin with Inten'clltion: Arthur Schlesinger 
with The Bitter Heritage: Vietnam and American Democracy, 1941-1966: and 
Anthony Short with The Origins of the Vietnam War. Other authors seek the 
explanation of the America's involvement in Vietnam by analysing the policy of 
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each consecutive administration. Among these authors are Melanie Billing- Yun 
with Decision Against War: Eisenh01\'er and Dien Bien Phu 1954: Dm"id Anderson 
with Trapped b:v Success: The Eisenhower Administration and Vietnam. 1953-1961; 
John Newman with JFK and Vietnam; Jeffrey Kimball with Nixon's Vietnam Trar. 
Many authors focus their study on the Johnson years, for example, Larry Berman 
with Planning a Tragedy and Lyndon Johnson's Trar: George Herring with LBJ and 
Vietnam; Brian VanDeMark with Into the Quagmire and Gardner with Pa:v Any 
Price etc. 
Robert A. Divine has noted that there are three broad views on explaining the 
origins of America's involvement in Vietnam. The first interpretation can be 
labelled the liberal internationalist perspective, which held that 
'American leaders from Truman to Johnson had undertaken a senes of 
incremental steps in Indochina which ended in disastrous U.S involvements. This 
came about by chance, not design, and if any president had known where his 
policies were leading the nation, he never would have approved them' (Divine. 
1988, p.8l). 
The second view is called • stalemate' concept. which argued that America 
presidents had taken a series of steps with full knowledge that none was likely to 
achieve the desired result. Leslie Gelb and Richard Betts explain this view in their 
book The Irony of Vietnam: The System Worked by the 'good doctor' analogy: e\en 
though the patient, South Vietnam, is likely to expire, the world would see the 
United States as the good doctor who did everything possible to prevent this 
calamity. 
The third \iew holds that the America's involvement in Vietnam resulted from 
the flawed grand strategy of containment. In this "iew, George Kennan became the 
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scapegoat by 'portraying Vietnam as the logical culmination of the Cold "'ar effort 
to contain communism~ (Diyine~ 1988, p.83). 
Authors about the Vietnam War are also diyided on other issues. Recently 
Max Boot wrote that 
"Among historians, the biggest di\ision has pitted those who think that the 
Vietnam war was immoral and unwinnable against those who think it \"as a 
- . 
worthy effort that could have been won \\ith different tactics and strategy" 
(Boot, 2011, p.l). 
In the initial American literature about its inyoh'ement in the Vietnam \Yar. 
the anti-war view was a dominant voice. Robert A. Divine pointed out that 
"The initial interpretation \vas an)thing but supportive of American policy: to a 
greater or lesser degree, nearly all the early writers on Vietnam were highly 
critical of America intervention ..... Virtually all contemporary historical analysts 
of the Vietnam War shared a strong distaste for America intervention and a 
fervent belief that U. S policy \\as seriously mistaken" (Divine. 1988. p.81) 
The anti-war authors were highly critical of the America involvement In 
Vietnam. Among the famous books of these authors are France FitzGerald's "Fire 
in the Lake" (1972). David Halberstam's "The Best and the Brightest" (1972), 
Michael Herr's "Dispatches" (1977), Stanley Kamow's "Vietnam: A hi.\t07:1·" 
(1983), Neil Sheehan' s "A Bright Shining Lie: John Paul T 'ann and America in 
T'ietnam" (1988) etc. 
Then, in late 1970s and early 1980s, there was a trend of revisionism in 
literature about Vietnam War. with authors holding more sympathetic \'ie\\' on the 
America's inyolvement. One of the central points of the revisionist authors is the 
argument that the war could have been won if the United States fought in another 
way, though there is still no agreement on \\'hich way the America should tight. In 
his article last year, James McAllister stated that 
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"Despite the passage of four decades and the declassification of millions of pages 
of documents. diplomatic and military historians still haw not reached a 
consensus as to why the United States pursued a flawed military strategy in 
V ietnam. Indeed, historians continue to argue about which elements of the 
strategy was flawed and whether any strategy could haw led to success in 
Vietnam" (McAllister, 20 I 0, p.95). 
Within the revisionist view, some authors 1 argue that America should have 
fought a counterinsurgency war rather than pursuing the search and destroy mission 
and conventional use of forces. The nature of the Vietnam War was a guerrilla war. 
Thus Westmoreland and the US army fought ineffectively because they ··applied a 
concept of warfare unsuited to their adversary". Others2 argued that the US lost the 
war in Vietnam because the military "waged a counterinsurgency campaign against 
the Vietcong instead of conventional \\"ar against North Vietnam's main forces" 
(Divine. 1988, p.8S). According to this school. America should wage a conventional 
war and let the pacification operation for South Vietnam's armed forces to carry out. 
But if the Vietnam War was not an insurgency \var, it was not a con\'entional war 
either. McAllister pointed out that 
"Vietnam ,,'as neither a standard conventional nor a standard insurgent war, It \\"as 
both at the same time" (McAllister, 2010, p.97) 
Revisionist authors also challenged the "ie\\" that America's war effort \\as 
immoral. 
I George C. Herring (1982); Andrew F. Krepinevic Jr. (1986): GuenterLe\\)' (1978): Le\\'is Sorley 
(1999); John A. Nagl (2005). 
2 Harry G. Summers Jr. (1982): John M. Carland (2004); Dale Andrade (2008): Andrew 1. Birtle 
(2008). 
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'While they admit that the use of chemical defoliants. the free-fIre zones. and the 
heavy air bombardments killed many civilians, they claim that this war was no 
worse in that respect than other twentieth ---century conflicts' (Divine. 1988. 
p.86). 
Among these authors, there are Guenter Lewy with America in T'ietnam: 
Nonnan Podhoretz with Why We Were in Vietnam; Michael Lind with r'ietnam: A 
Necessary War. 
There are also many authors who choose to focus on other aspects of the \\'ar. 
For example, Charles DeBenedetti (An American Ordeal). Tom Wells (The TVa,. 
Within), Kenneth Heinemann (Campus Wars). Terry Anderson (The M01'ement and 
the Sixties) .... wrote about the anti-Vietnam war movement in 1960s. Or Daniel C. 
Hallin (The Uncensored War) and Kathleen Turner (Lyndon Johnson's Dual War) 
focus on the media covering during the time of war. 
However. all the above authors actually wrote about the America's experience 
in Vietnam War rather than about the war itself. Tai Sung An wrote that 
'The overwhelming majority of these books (and current teaching of the 
Vietnam war at universities and colleges) have tended to concentrate heavily, 
if not exclusively, on the America dimension of the Vietnam war drama; that 
is to say. they are not about the Vietnam war or Vietnam but about the 
America experience in Vietnam, as if it were the crucial one that decided the 
course and the outcome of the war' (Tai Sung An, 1998, p.l3). 
Scholarly writing about the Vietnamese side of the war has been much less in 
comparison with the writing about America side. According to Ang Cheng Guan, 
there are two explanations for this disproportion. The first is that in 1950s and 
1960s, most scholars did not view Hanoi as an independent entity. The pre\'alent 
assumption at that time was that the Vietnam War was a part of the machination of 
Beijing and/or Moscow to control the non-communist \\'orld. Thus, North Vietnam 
- 25 -
communist perspective \\as not \\'orth studying on its own tenn. Howe\er. ·the 
realization that this assumption was too simplistic. if not altogether mistaken. only 
came about gradually in 1970s' (Ang Cheng Guan, 2003. p.l). Because the \Tietnam 
war first and foremost was the struggle of Vietnamese people for national 
independence and reunification. 
The second explanation for the imbalance in the literature is ··the relative 
difficulty of access to the archives of communist governments" (Ang Cheng Guan. 
2003, p.1). It is because of this difficulty that authors writing about Vietnam War 
tend to focus on America's experience in the war, this \\-idens the gap between \\"hat 
one knows about American decision-making with regard to the war on the one hand, 
and that of the Vietnamese communist on the other. 
R.B Smith divided the literature about Vietnamese side in the Vietnam War 
into three broad phases. The first generation of writings relied mainly on official 
media materials. The works of second generation were largely based on documents 
seized or collected during the war. Notable authors in this generation are Carlyle A. 
Thayer (the author of The Origins of the National Liberation Front for the 
Liberation of South Vietnam. and War by Other Means: National Liberation and 
Revolution in Vietnam 1956-1960); William J. Duiker (the author of The Communist 
Road to POH'er in Vietnam and Sacred TVar: Nationalism and Revolution in a 
Divided Vietnam): and William Turley (the author of The Second Indochina H'ar: A 
Short Political and Military History. 1954-1975). The third generation of literature 
about the Vietnam War came after the end of the Cold War. The authors of this 
generation ha\'e more chance to access communist materials which had been 
unavailable to the Western academics. These authors includes Chen Jian (Jlao's 
China and the Cold 1\'([1'). QiangZhai (Be(jing and the Vietnam Peace Talks / 965-
1968: SCH' Evidence From Chinesc Sources: and China and the ViL'tnam Wars. 
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1950-1975). Ronnie Ford (Tet 1968: Understanding the Swprise). IlyaGaiduk (The 
Soviet Union and the Vietnam War; and COl~fi-onting TTietnam: Soviet Policy Toward 
the Indochina Conflict, 1954-1963), Robert K. Brigham (Guerrilla Diplomacy: The 
XLF's foreign relations and the rrietnam war) .. . Howeyer. these authors mostly 
based their research on Russian and Chinese archives. while not many work on 
North Vietnam archives. 
There are authors that acknowledge the fact that writing about the Vietnamese 
side of the war is much less in comparison with literature on America side. Ang 
Cheng Guan, when writing the book 'The Vietnam 11'01' fi'om the other side .~ noted 
that 
'The literature on the Vietnam war in the English language is voluminous and 
continues to grow. The writings have howeyer focused predominantly on the 
decisions of the United States and its role in the war. Scholarly \\Titings that 
present the communist perspective of the \\ar are meagre by comparison'. (Ang 
Cheng Guan, 2003, p.l). 
DeGroot also share this view 
. Analvsis of the war is too often excessiwlv American-centred, implying that it 
. . 
was within the power of the United States to shape the fate of Vietnam, as long 
as she chose the proper war to do so' (DeGroot, 2000, p.5). 
Thus, there exists an unbalanced understanding about the Vietnam War. \Vhile 
the knowledge on America side of the war has been voluminous. the literature on 
the Vietnamese side of the war has been lacking. 
1.2.2 The Vietnam War from the North Vietnamese perspective. 
From North Vietnam's perspecthe, the Vietnam war was the anti-American 
war in which the Vietnamese people under the leadership of Vietnam Communist 
Party (then called Vietnam Worker Party) struggled for national independence and 
reunification. This struggle started as early as in 1954. after the defeat of France in 
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Dien Bien Phu and the conclusion of Gene\a Agreement. Ang Cheng Guan 'Hote 
that 
'Whereas most US-centric accounts of the Vietnam war begin in 1965, from 
the perspecti,·e of the Vietnamese communists, July 1954 marked the 
beginning of a new phase in the Vietnamese struggle for reunification' (Guan. 
2002. p.6). 
The Indochina phase of the Geneva Conference convened on May 8. 1954, just 
one day after the France's defeat in Dien Bien Phu. In addition to four major powers 
(the United States, France, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union) that had 
convened the conference, Laos, Cambodia, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, 
the State of Vietnam and the People' s Republic of China were represented at this 
phase of the conference. The Geneva Conference concluded an Agreement on the 
Cessation of Hostilities in Vietnam signed on July 20. 1954 between France and 
Democratic Republic of Vietnam. No other members of the Conference signed the 
Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in Vietnam. 
The Geneva Conference also adopted a Final Declaration endorsing the main 
points of the Agreements on the Cessation of Hostilities in Vietnam. The Final 
Declaration was not signed, but was accepted orally by Britain, France, the Soviet 
Union, the China People's Republic and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. The 
Final Declaration was not accepted by the United States or by the State of Vietnam. 
According to Daniel G. Partan 
"Instead, the United States made a unilateral declaration taking note of the 
Agreement and the Final Declaration and promising that. in accordance with its 
obligations under Article .2(4) of the United Nations Charter. the United States 
would not use or threaten forces "to disturb" these agreements. and declaring 
that the United States ""ould yiew any renewal of the aggression in yiolation 
of the aforesaid agreement with grave concern and as seriously threatening 
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international peace and security. The State of Vietnam refused to accept the 
Final Declaration, but declared that it would not use force to resist the cease-
fire, and that it would "make and support every effort to re-establish a real and 
lasting peace in Vietnam'" (Partan, 1967, p.205). 
Article 14 ( a) of the Geneva Agreement entrusts the 'ciYil administration in 
each regrouping zone' to 'the party whose forces are to be regrouped there' pending 
"the general elections which will bring about the unification of Vietnam' 
[Quotations from the Agreement of the Cessation of Hostilities in Vietnam]. 
Paragraph 7 of the Final Declaration states that 
'In order to ensure that sufficient progress in the restoration of peace has been 
made, and that all the necessary conditions obtain for free expression of the 
national will, general elections shall be held in July 1956, under the superyision 
of an international commission composed of representatiyes of the Member 
States of the International Supervisory Commission, referred to in the 
Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities. Consultation will be held on this 
subject between the competent representatiye authorities of the two zones from 
20 July 1955' (Final Declaration of Geneva Conference, July 1954). 
In the North Vietnam's perspective. the first two years from 1954 to 1956 was 
the struggle for the Geneva Agreement to be fully abided by and implemented by 
Diem government, especially for the implementation of the general elections, which 
North Vietnam was confident that they would win. However, not only had the Diem 
regime refused to hold consultations on national elections with representati \'es of the 
DRV, but Diem's control over the southern provinces was tightening. Thus, July 
1956 passed without general elections being held to bring about the national 
unification as anticipated in the Geneva Agreement. After 1956, North Vietnam 
gradually and reluctantly moved from primarily political to a predominantly military 
approach. William Duiker wrote that 
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·It seems clear that the party embarked on the road to revolutionaf) war in the 
South with some reluctance' (Duiker, 1993. p.34). 
He argued that Hanoi leaders preferred the political option because they were 
convinced that here they possessed a clear advantage over enemy. 
Thus. from North Vietnam' s point of view. the origins of the war was because 
the US, in pursuit of its grand strategy. did not take into account the age-old burning 
aspiration of Vietnam for national independence and unity as it supported the Diem 
regime's violations of Geneva Agreement especially failing to hold the general 
elections. General Tran Van Tra, a high-ranking military leader of Vietnam noted 
that 
'The Geneva Agreements of 1954 fixed July 1956 as the date of nationwide 
elections for the purpose of national reunification. If all parties had respected 
this international commitment and allowed the Vietnamese people to decide 
their fate for themselves. the war would not have been raged for another 
twenty-one years' (Tran Van Tra, 1993, p.235). 
Generally. in North Vietnam's perspective, the US was engaged in an unjust 
war. which did not respect the Vietnamese people's legitimate aspiration. The nature 
of the war was the Vietnamese struggle for national independence and territorial 
unity against the America's aggression. It was a Vietnamese people's war under the 
leadership of the Vietnam Communist Party (then it was called Vietnamese Worker 
Party- Dang Lao Dong Viet Nam). 
However, this official narrative was disputable. On the one hand. North 
Vietnam accused America of violating Geneva agreement, ignoring the legitimate 
aspiration of Vietnamese people, waging unjust war against Vietnam. On the other 
hand, there were counter-arguments (American' s official position in 1966: John 
Norton Moore, 1968) that South Vietnam was not bound by Gene\a agreements. so 
it did not have the obligation to cooperate in holding general election with North 
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Vietnam. Or that North Vietnam was an oppreSSIve regIme. the situation in the 
North Vietnam cannot guarantee a fair and free election~ so South Vietnam was 
justified in rejecting cooperation with the North in holding the general election. And 
North Vietnam and South Vietnam had become two separate international entities 
and North Vietnam was accused of aggression against South Vietnam. American 
intervention was in collective defence of the South Vietnam. I will inYestigate these 
counter-arguments in the chapter VI of the thesis. 
The strategic aim of North Vietnam in the war against America was not the 
direct military defeat of America, but to defeat the political will of the US to wage 
and/or continue the war. David W.P. Elliott noted that 
'The emphasis was not on a military defeat of the United States but, 
rather, on exhausting the strategic possibilities open to it. The key was to 
defeat the 'aggressive \vill' (1' chi :..-alll luoc) of the United States- a 
psychological objective more than a military one' (Elliott, 1993, p. 70). 
In order to achieve this goal, North Vietnam employed strategies and tactics. 
which was summarized by Elliott in the strategic model 'Three types of war; Three 
strategic zones: Three 'points of attack'; Three types of forces'. Three types of war 
were special war, limited war~ general war. The primary goal of North Vietnam was 
'to force the United States to recognize the unviability of each of these 
options, and force a choice between de-escalation leading to e\'entual 
withdrawal, on the one hand, and escalation, which was more costly and 
risky option, on the other' (Elliott, 1993, p.71) 
Three strategic zones were mountain-forest regIons. populated delta 
countryside and cities. Military and political operations in each strategic regions 
support the others. Three 'points of attack' ,,"ere military action. political action and 
military proselytizing. Three types of forces \\'ere main force, local force. and 
guenilla units. These forces were used flexibly in supporting each other. 
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In implementing this strategic model. the battlefield extended to the \\hole 
South Vietnam, the guerrillas intermingled with people, lived among people as fish 
in water. Thus, the distinction between combatants and civilian became blurred. In 
fact the National Liberation Front (NLF) named its paramilitary forces Dan Quan 
(Civilian Soldier), who were considered to be both soldier and civilian. (Walzer. 
2006, p.182). One of the famous slogan of Vietnam People's Army is 'The Army 
and the people are like fish and water'. Peter Paret and John Shy noted that 
'The frequent impossibility of distinguishing [communist] guerrillas and peaceful 
villagers led to inevitable brutality and injustice on the part of the [Saigon] police 
and [America-South Vietnamese} troops' (Cited in Tai Sung An, 1998. p.94). 
However, among the authors writing about the Vietnam War on the 
Vietnamese side, no one ever assessed the role of the laws of war in the North 
Vietnam's military strategy against America. And no one ever raised and answered 
the question if the North Vietnam did not abide by the basic principles underpinning 
the laws of war, what was the rule of engagement of People's Army of Vietnam? 
And when North Vietnam's military strategy actually put the civilian population's 
lives at risk, how did it mobilize the support from these very same people? How did 
North Vietnam justify its way of war to the Vietnamese people? These are the gaps 
in the literature that my thesis will address. 
1.2.3 The Vietnam War and the laws of war. 
The laws of war is originated and developed in Western civilization, so there 
might be an argument that it is only applicable to the war among countries in the 
West. Vietnam belongs to the oriental civilization, and there are many elements 
different between the two civilizations thus the laws of war is not applicable in 
Vietnam. However, in my opinion this argument is not true. 
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It is true that the laws of war were developed in the \\'estern ciyilization but 
we can find many basic ideas of the law of war not only in the \\'est but also in the 
Eastern civilization such as India or China. For example, in China, as early as In 
fifth century B.C, there was a widely accepted rule that 
'No war should be begun without just cause; that enemy should be notified of 
pending attacks; that no injury be done to the wounded; and that the persons 
and properties of innocents be respected' (Christopher, 199-1-. p. 8). 
Moreover, in the modern time, when the laws of war were codified in 
international conventions, the aim of the codification process was not restricted in 
governing the wars among western countries. More importantly~ the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions I, II, III and IV aimed at regulating and lessening the ferocity of the 
war suffered by people all over the world. As a result now there are totally 194 
countries, not just Western ones, have already ratified and become parties to the four 
1949 Geneva Conventions. 
Both North Vietnam and the United States were state parties to the 1949 
Geneva Conventions on 28/611957 and 02/0811955 respectively. And according to 
the Common Article 2 of 1949 Geneva Conventions 
'The present Conventions shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any other 
anned conflict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting 
Parties, e\en if the state of war is not recognized by one of them' (Geneva 
Convention). 
The Vietnam War was obviously subjected to the four 1949 Geneya 
Conventions in particular and to the laws of war in general. In fact, on June II, 
1965, the International Committee of the Red Cross sent a letter to all warring 
parties of the Vietnam War in an attempt to promote full compliance by all parties 
with at least the minimal provision of the 1949 Geneya Comentions. The letter said 
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'All parties to the conflict, the Republic of Vietnam, the Democratic Republic 
of Vietnam and the United States of America are bound by four Geneya 
Conventions of August 12, 1949, for the protection of the \ictims of "oar. 
having ratified them and having adhered thereto. The National Liberation Front 
is bound by the undertakings signed by Vietnam'. (International Legal 
Materials cited in Petrowski, 1969). 
However, writings about the application of the laws of war in Vietnam War so 
far have mainly focused on the America's conduct in the war, while the North 
Vietnam's conduct has not been appropriately discussed. 
Paul Ramsey was one of the first authors to discuss the issue of the laws of 
war and the Vietnam War. In his book The Just War- Force and Political 
Responsibility, Ramsey discussed the question: how shall counter-insurgency war be 
conducted justly? And then he applied the answer to the case of the Vietnam War. 
Ramsey argued that, in counter-insurgent war, the insurgents failed to distinguish 
themselves from civilian. Thus, they enlarged the targets that are legitimately 
attacked by the counter-insurgent forces. And they also enlarged the collateral 
damage as a result of these legitimate attacks. So, according to Ramsey, the conduct 
of counter-insurgency war will mainly be governed by the principle of 
proportionality. This means that as long as the counter-insurgent forces do not 
deliberately and directly attack against civilian, their attack would be just if it does 
more good than evil as regulated by the proportionality principle. The insurgent will 
be responsible for the loss of civilian lives as a result of counter-insurgent attack 
because it was the insurgent who enlarged the legitimate target and the collateral 
damage. Then Ramsey applies his argument in the Vietnam War. In this case, 
according to Ramsey, the American conduct in the war was not indiscriminate. He 
wrote that 
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'J myself have no hesitation in saying that the counter-insurgency in South 
Vietnam in its chief or central design falls within the principle of 
discrimination. It is directed upon combatants as these haye organized 
themselves for war, i.e., among the people like fish in water. No Christian and 
no moralists should assert that it violates the moral immunity of non-
combatants from direct, deliberate attack to direct the violence of war upon vast 
Vietcong strongholds whose destruction unavoidably involyes the collateral 
deaths ofa great many civilians' (Ramsey, [1967],2002, p.503) 
Given that the North Vietnam and Vietcong failed to distinguish themselves 
from the ordinary population, it is the principle of proportionality that the US was in 
peril of violating. On this principle, Ramsey noted that 
'On the matter of weighting the greater and the lesser evil, one can only mean to 
say that present policy is prudentially wrong- which may be disastrous enough-
not that it is inherently' immoral'. (Ramsey, 2002. p.504). 
Thus, according to Ramsey, 'no assembly of churchmen should pronounce- as 
did the 1966 Geneva Conference on Church and Society- that recent U.S actions in 
Vietnam 'cannot be justified' (Ramsey, 2002, p.51 0). 
Lawrence C. Petrowski was the next author discussing the America's conduct 
in Vietnam War under the laws of war. In the article 'Law and the conduct of the 
Vietnam l1'ar', he condemned America~s conduct in the war. He wrote that: 
'United States and Allied actions, particularly under the heading of methods of 
warfare, weapons employed and treatment of prisoners, disclose what seems to 
be a persistent, even if not planned, disregard of the basic rules, principles and 
standards governing the conduct of war' (Petrowski, 1969, pA8S). 
Henri Meyrowitz, in the article 'The Law of Trar in Vietnamese C011flicl " also 
condemned America's lack of distinction in its bombing in the North and South 
Vietnam, and its use of chemical weapons. Regarding the treatment of prisoners of 
war. he discussed the way that each side treated the other's captured combatants. 
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However, he noted that 'we do not possess infonnation on the treatment of 
combatants made prisoners in the South by the North Vietnamese anny' 
(Meyrowitz, 1969, p.563). Thus, his discussion also focused on the American side, 
not the Vietnamese side. 
The next author writing about this issue is Michael Walzer who argued that 
America's rules of engagement in the Vietnam War did not satisfy both the principle 
of discrimination and the principle of proportionality. Though, America' s rule of 
engagement seem to be discriminate, in practice, they were not able to separate the 
Vietnamese civilian from combatants because the battlefield in Vietnam war 
extended over much of the country and the struggle was protracted. Even if we 
supposed that these rules of engagement worked in practice, they failed to satisfy the 
principle of proportionality. It cannot be accepted that 'In order to save Vietnam, we 
had to destroy the rural culture and the village society of Vietnam' (Walzer, 2006. 
p.192). 
More importantly, Walzer argued that in the case that the guerrilla cannot be 
isolated from the people, the anti-guerrilla war can no longer be fought 
'not just because, from a strategic point of \'iew, it can no longer be won, 
It cannot be fought because it is no longer an anti-guerrilla war but an 
anti-social war, a war against entire people, in which no distinctions 
would be possible in the actual fighting' (Walzer. 2006, p.187). 
This is where jus ad bellum andjlls in bello come together. And, according to 
Walzer, the guerrilla war in Vietnam did reach the point where guerrilla forces 
cannot be isolated from people and the Vietnam War became a war that "cannot be 
won and should not be \\'on". 
'It cannot be won because the only available strategy involves a \\ ar against 
civilian; and it should not be \\'on, because the degree of civilian support that 
rules out alternative strategies also makes the guerrillas the legitimate rulers of 
- 36 -
the country. The struggle against them is an unjust struggle as well as one that 
can only be carried on unjustly. Fought by foreigners, it is a war of aggression; 
if by a local regime alone, it is an act of tyranny. The position of the anti-
guerrilla forces has become doubly untenable.' (Walzer, 2006, p.195). 
Another author to discuss the laws of war in the Vietnam War was William 
O'Briend. He admitted that the United States~ conduct in the Vietnam War was 
'serious violations of the conditions of the just-war .IllS in bello' (O'Briend, 198 L 
p.122). The United States gravely violated the basic principle of the laws of war in 
its excessive use of firepower, the search-and-destroy strategies and tactics and the 
treatment of Communist prisoners of war. However. O'Briend noted that there are 
other factors that should be taken into account when assessing the US's conduct in 
the Vietnam War. 
Firstly, the violations of jlls in bello principle were not intentional. Actually, 
the US commanders did try to prevent the violations but without success. 
'The violations of the principles of the proportion and discrimination resulting 
from the interrelated practices of overuse of flrepower and search-and-destroy 
strategies and tactics occurred despite the effort of higher commander to prevent 
them. The delinquencies arose as a consequence of inadequate command and 
control efforts, not, as in the case of strategic bombing in World War II, out of 
deliberate policies of using disproportionate an indiscriminate force' (O'Briend, 
1981. p.123). 
Secondly, the United States' violations were due to the deliberate Communist 
policy of 'using the population as a shield' (O'Briend, 1981, p.123) 
Thirdly, the United States' conduct in Vietnam War \vas judged by a 
'different. higher standard than that applied to the conduct ofWW II and the Korean 
War' (O'Briend, 1981. p.124). This \\as because the disagreement mer the just 
cause of the war. 
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Thus, considering the above factors, O'Briend argued that although the United 
States did violate the basic principles of jus in bello, these violations did not amount 
to the level that denies all the justification of the United States' involvement in the 
war. O'Briend wrote that 
'The U.S and allies' violations of the jus in bello, most importantly in the 
matter of abuse of firepower and excesses in the implementation of the search-
and-destroy strategies and tactics, deserve condemnation and a resolve to 
reform. But they do not in themselves invalidate U.S claims to having fought a 
just war in Vietnam.' (O'Briend, 1981, p.125). 
Louise Doswald Beck, another author writing about the laws of war, also 
argued that America's conduct in the war was just. For example, regarding the air 
war against North Vietnam, he wrote that: 
'During the so-called 'Christmas bombings' of Hanoi and HaiPhong 
(Linebacker II), over 15,000 tons of bombs were dropped over a 12-day 
period, but the site were said to be carefully- selected military targets. In the 
event, North Vietnam claimed 1,300 fatalities. which cannot compare with 
those of Hamburg and Dresden. Further, there is evidence that during 
Linebacker I, certain targets were not attacked so as to avoid civilian 
casualties, e.g. dams or dykes' (Doswald Beck, 1987, p.255). 
And according to Doswald Beck, the major problem in Vietnam, as far as the 
principle of non-combatant immunity concerned, was 
'less of that the bombing of the cities than that of guerrilla warfare carried out by 
persons who did not distinguish themselves from the civilian population and who 
operated within villages' (Doswald Beck, 1987, p. 255). 
As we can see, all the above authors focused on judgement of the America's 
conduct in the war, no author has concentrated on examining the North Vietnam's 
conduct and its compliance with the laws of war. This is probably because of 
L:'EDS Uh\~t:h~\1't' UBRARY 
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difficulties in accessing to North Vietnamese archives. This is the gap in literature 
about the Vietnam War that my thesis will deal with. 
1.2.4 The implications of studying North Vietnam's military strategy 
and its compliance with the laws of war. 
* implication to judging the morality a/North TTietnam's 1Far against America 
The first implication of the thesis is that though North Vietnam"s \vay of 
conducting the war was not consistent with the basic principles of jus in bello, North 
Vietnam's war against America was not immoral. In terms ofjlls ad bellum, though 
it was not publicly declared, on balance North Vietnam's war was legitimate. In 
terms of jus in bello, North Vietnamese armed force followed its own rule of 
engagement to protect civilian and minimize civilian casualties. The enormous 
civilian casualties in the Vietnam War cannot be blamed totally on the Vietnamese 
side. If America did not intervene in Vietnam, it might not need a war for North 
Vietnam to reunify the country. Even if the war broke out between North and South 
Vietnam, and America did not help South Vietnam, the war would end very quickly 
and it would be much fewer civilian casualties (Falk. 1969, pA85). 
In fact, it seems that America, with its superior massive fire power. caused 
much more civilian casualties than North Vietnam's armed forces. Lawrence C. 
Petrowski pointed out that "the majority of such civilian casualties are the result of 
air raids and artillery fire" (1969, pA95). So, America should bear a much larger 
responsibility for the civilian casualties in the Vietnam War. 
Moreover. America"s war in Vietnam \vas "doubly untenable" (Walzer. 2006). 
This point is closely related to the second implication of this research. 
* Implication to judging the morality a/the America H'W' ill Vietnam 
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In jUdging America~s war in Vietnam. Paul Ramsey argued that the war \\-as 
morally justified even though it might be wrong (Ramsey. 2002. p.504). Ho\\e\er. 
in late 1970s, Michael Walzer challenged this view, arguing that America' s \yar in 
Vietnam cannot be fought and should not be fought because "it is no longer an anti-
guerrilla war but an anti-social war, a war against entire people in which no 
distinction would be possible in the actual fighting" (Walzer. 2006, p.187). This is 
because the guerrilla forces in Vietnam won "the degree of civilian support"' that 
make only available strategy involves the war against civilian and "'rules out 
alternative strategies and also makes the guerrillas the legitimate rulers of the 
country" (Walzer. 2006, p.195). 
In my opinion, one thing missing in Walzer's arguments was how guerrilla 
forces won that "degree of civilian support" while their war strategy put ciyilian 
population at risk as they did not distinguish themselves from civilians. My thesis 
will fill in this gap. I will argue that though North Vietnam' s guerrilla warfare was 
not consistent with the basic principles of the laws of war and put civilian at risk, 
North Vietnam managed to win the support from substantial part of civilian 
population with its own strict rule of engagement and the just cause. As a result, my 
thesis will help to reaffirm Walzer's critical assessment about the morality of the 
America's war in Vietnam. 
* Implication to learn the new lessons of Vietnam and app~ving it in the 
America's current counterinsurgency efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan 
Nowadays, America has entered a new era of war. Wars are no longer as 
defined in Powell doctrine as brief, decisive and infrequent. Rather. according to 
Bacevich (2008) 
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"The anny (like it or not) is entering an era in which anned conflict will be 
protracted, ambiguous and continuous-with the application of force becoming a 
lesser part of the soldier's repertoire" (Bacevich, 2008, p.3) 
The new kind of conflict has many characteristics in common with the 
Vietnam war. To fight and win current wars, America military strategists starts to 
look back experience in Vietnam to relearn the lessons of Vietnam. Nowadays. what 
American military leaders should learn from Vietnam is no longer the caution 
against intervention but how to fight effectively in an insurgency/counter-
Insurgency war. 
My thesis on North Vietnam's strategy to v;in support from civilian population 
highlights the role of civilian support in an insurgency/counter-insurgency war. If 
the insurgent forces manage to win the support of substantial part of the population, 
then the counter-insurgent war become the "war cannot be won and should not be 
won" (Walzer. 2006). This results in an important lesson for America in current war 
in Afghanistan. For the America to win the war, it should not allow the Taliban 
forces to win the hearts and minds of people, America itself must win that support, 
so American forces not only have to fight the insurgent forces militarily but also 
should focus the effort on winning support from people as well. 
1.3 Project outline 
This first chapter has presented the overvIew of the project including the 
literature review, the significance of the topic, the research methodology and the 
project outline. 
In the second chapter, I will discuss the laws of war and its basic principles. 
Among these principles, I will focus on the principle of discrimination or non-
com batant immunity. against which the North Vietnam' s conduct in the \\'ar \\'ill be 
assessed. And also I will examine the relationship betweenjlls ad helium andjlis in 
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bello in the just war tradition and the law of war and the Marxism-Lenism concept 
about justice in war. 
In the third chapter I will present the parallel in America's persepctive and 
Vietnamese official perspective on the war. This chapter will serve as the 
information basis for next chapters about North Vietnam military strategy and its 
way to win popular support during the war. I will not only present the Vietnam War 
in American perspective but also I will present the North Vietnam's perspectiYe on 
the Vietnam War, under that perspective, North Vietnam military leaders planned 
their strategies and tactics. In the part about North Vietnam's official perspectiYe on 
the war, I will use extensively the sources in Vietnamese language and translate 
these into English. I benefit a lot from recent publication of Vietnamese Communist 
Party's Documents, as this source provides the insights of Communist leaders on the 
evolution of North Vietnam's perception of the war. 
In chapter four. I will focus on the military strategies and tactics that were used 
by North Vietnam in the war. I \vill discuss the roots of the North Vietnam's 
military strategy and then point out the Vietnamese style of people's war in the war 
against America. This chapter will draw on the author's skills as a native speaker 
and benefit from original archival research in The Institute of Military History, The 
Institute of Military Strategic Studies, and Vietnamese People's Army Central 
Library in Ministry of Defence in Hanoi, Vietnam. 
In the fifth chapter, I will first determine the laws that gm'em the North 
Vietnam's conduct in the war. I will discuss the role of the laws of \\'ar in the N0l1h 
Vietnam's strategy making process and in the military's actual conduct in the \\'ar. 
Then I will assess the North Vietnam's military strategy against the basic principles 
underpinning the laws of war. In the last part of this chapter. I will point out the rule 
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of engagement of the North Vietnam's People's Anny in everyday contact \\"ith 
people as well as in actual fighting. 
Chapter six will explore North Vietnam's perspectiYe on its war against 
America and the way it justified its way of war to Vietnamese people when its 
strategy actually put the civilian population at risk. In the first part of this chapter, I 
will discuss the North Vietnam's perspective on the cause and justness of its war 
against America and investigate how the war is justified under traditional ad bellum 
criteria of just war theory. And I will also investigate how North Vietnam carried 
out the job of civilian mobilization to win support from Vietnamese people. 
Chapter seven will be the conclusion and the implications of the examination 
of North Vietnam's military strategy and its compliance with the laws of war. I will 
conclude that though North Vietnam's conduct in its war against America was not 
strictly consistent with principles underpinning laws of war. North Vietnam's anned 
forces was not unrestrained, it followed its own rule of engagement to protect 
civilian and minimize civilian casualties. I will also point out the implication of the 
research to the judgement of the morality of the North Vietnam's \\"ar against 
America and the morality of America's war in Vietnam. I will also draw the 
implication of the research for the American's current counterinsurgency conflicts in 
Iraq and Afghanistan. 
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Chapter II: The laws of war and asymmetric warfare 
The aim of this chapter is to provide the theoretical framework for the 
discussion about North Vietnam's military strategy and its compliance with the law 
of war in the Vietnam War. I will locate the issue of North Vietnam's military 
strategy and its compliance with the law of war in the Vietnam War within the 
framework of the asymmetric warfare and the law of war. The tradition of just war 
was originated and developed in Europe, aiming at regulating wars among European 
states, where wars were carried out by professional armies and ciyilians were not 
allowed to participate directly in the war. In late 19th century and early 20th century, 
the essence of jus in bello was codified into positive international laws, then the 
international law of war aimed at regulating and reducing atrocity of all wars. not 
just limited to those in Europe. In recent decades, the characteristics of war have 
been transformed, wars now became more and more asymmetric. With this new 
kind of war becoming norm rather than exception. the law of war suffered great 
pressure. 
In this chapter, firstly I will point out the basic principles of the laws of war. 
Then I will discuss the asymmetric warfare and how this kind of war put pressure on 
the laws of war. In the last part, as North Vietnam was a communist country 
following the Marxism and Leninism military thought, I will focus on the law of 
war and Marxism-Leninism, specifically the central issue of the relationship 
between jus ad bellum and jus in bello in the Marxism-Leninism military thought. 
2.1 The laws of war and its basic principles 
In just war tradition. there are moral limits defining \\'hen war should be 
fought- jus ad helium - and also there are moral limits defining how war should be 
fought- jus in hello. Jus in hello. the law in \\'ar. is the second of primary di\isions 
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of international laws of armed conflict and governs the conduct of hostilities in 
armed conflicts which in fact occur. The jllS in bello is conventionally divided into 
'Hague' law and 'Geneva' law. The Hague law, named after The Hague 
Conventions, limits the means and methods of warfare which can be legitimately 
used in armed conflict. This includes what kinds of weapons are allowed, their 
usage, tactics and general operation conduct. Geneva law, named after Geneva 
Conventions, seeks to ameliorate the condition of victims of armed conflict. 
'The victim of anned contlict for this purpose are the wounded, sick and or 
shipwrecked, prisoners of war and ciyilians. who have common the essential 
quality of being, or having been rendered, hors de combat and in need of 
protection from the effects of hostile operations' (McCoubre), 1992, p.190). 
The jus in bello has long tradition, it started when the war itself came into 
existence. We can trace back many ideas of jllS in bello to the ancient time in the 
writings such as the laws of Manu in Hindu civilization or Roman laws of war. ... 
However, the latter half of the nineteenth century have a major formative influence 
upon the structures of the modernjlls in bello. This period 'from 1860s to 1914 saw 
a number of substantive developments of continuing value, together with a number 
of attempts to codify laws of\\"arfare' (McCoubrey, 1992. p.217). Jus in bello has 
been an important tool to govern the conduct of war. In jllS in bello. there are 
principles of non-combatant immunity. military necessity and proportionality 
2.1.1 The principle of non-combatant immunity 
The principle of non-combatant immunity requires that 'civilian life and 
property should not be subjected to military force; military force must be directed 
only at military objectives' (Lackey, 1989. p. 59). The primary idea of non-
combatant immunity was dated back to ancient time in the books such as Book (?t 
Manu of ancient Hindu civilization, or Republic. the LQl\"s of Plato in \Vestcm 
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civilization .... For example~ in the Republic, Socrates proyides the follO\\ing 
guidance for soldier guardians of an ideal state: 
'They will not, being Greeks, ravages Greek territory nor bum habitations, and 
they will not admit that in any city all the population are enemies, men, \\'omen 
and children, but will say that only a few at any time are their foes, tho:-;e. 
namely, who are to blame for the quarrel. And on all these considerations they 
will not be willing to lay waste the soil, since the majority are their friends, nor 
to destroy the houses, but will carry the conflict only to the point of compelling 
the guilty to do justice by the pressure of the suffering of the innocent' (Cited in 
Christopher, 1994, p. 10). 
The distinction between combatant and non-combatant was carefully 
developed under the Christian religion. The Christian teaching on just war pennits 
Christian to participate in war, which meets criteria of justice: but it also limits their 
participation. This, Paul Ramsey argues. is the locus from which comes the 
distinction between combatant and non-combatant (Ramsey, 2002. p.144). 
The concept of non-combatant immunity was developed from two branches, 
canon law and Chivalric code. In late lOth century. the Peace of God movement 
which originated in South France and subsequently spread to other regions. 
established the concept of immunity for some sort of people. This movement sought 
to protect persons associated with churches. peasants and town people, as well as 
their property, from brigandage, vandalism, bullying and thievery by individual 
soldiers and armed bands. often out-of work mercenaries. 
The Chivalric code governed the conduct of knight class. in which 
'Knights were to fight only other knight because only members of knightl) class 
should be in arms' (Johnson, 2000, p.419). 
And Chivahic code requires that knight should haye quality of courtesy. 
prO\\ess under am1, loyalty and individual honour. Thus. Chiyalric code lists t) ves 
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of person against whom knights should seek to protect typically included \Yomen, 
children, the aged, the maimed or infirm, and mentally deficient- those who \\ere 
not mentioned in the churchly thought. 
In around the later part of 14th century. after the publication of Honore Bonet" s 
L 'Arbre de battailes. the canonical and chivalric conceptions of non-combatancy 
and of how non-combatant should be treated had coalesced. After this coalescence, 
the idea of non-combatant immunity were continued being developed and become a 
principle in conducting war. Hugo Grotius wrote in his book called 'The 1mI' o/war 
and peace' that 
'One must take care, so far as is possible. to prevent the death of innocent 
persons, even by accident .... except for the reasons that are weighty and \\ill 
affect the safety of many. no actions should be attempted \\'hereby innocent 
persons may be threatened with destruction' (Christopher, 199-'+. p.l 01). 
Grotius also includes in the class of innocents women, children, old men. 
merchant, farmers, prisoners of war and holders of religious office. 
* The distinction between comhatant and non-combatant 
One of the most crucial issues in the principle of non-combatant immunity is 
how to distinguish non-combatant from combatant. There are always people who are 
not directly participating in the fighting but still make contribution to the fighting. 
How can we make clear distinction among these people? What kind of contribution 
makes them combatant? What kind not? Some critics of this principle argue that 
. in modern society. the degree of integration bet\\een civilian and military 
functions is so tight that whate\'er the theoretical difference. no practical 
distinction can be made between the t\\o.' (Johnson. 2000. p. -'+.23). 
However, it can be argued that there is ah\'ays a distinction between 
combatant and non-combatant and we can distinguish between the two. 
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Grotius addressed this issue in his discussion of the status of third-party 
nations that not directly participates in the fighting but are indirectly invoh'ed 
through their trade with one of the belligerents. Grotius divided trading products 
into three categories 
'some things such as weapons, which are useful in war; other things which are 
of no use in war; and other which are of use both in time of war and at other 
times'. (Christopher, 1994, p.l 07). 
Thus, based on these categories of trading products, Grotius classifies the role 
of the third-party nation in the conflicts. According to Christopher, this model 
"forms the basis for modem identification of who among the civilian population 
can be regarded as combatants even though they are not member of the armed 
forces" (Christopher, 1994, p.l 08). 
Recently, James Turner Johnson distinguishes non-combatant from combatant 
on the basis of the function of that person in the time of war. 
'Certain class of person are throughout named as non-combatant, and equally 
significantly, the reasoning behind the list of immune focuses throughout on 
their function in society and vis-a-vis the war' (Johnson, 1971, p.170). 
Johnson divides the functions of non-combatant into positive and negative 
one. Those who have positive function are people performing necessary service to 
society. These might include religious leaders, peasants. doctors ... Those who have 
negative functions are people being unable because of their feebleness to bear arm. 
These might includes the aged, small children, the debt, the dump ... Johnson also 
goes further to argue that 
. indirect participation- ha\'ing a mental disposition fa\ouring one side. 
providing food and shelter to soldiers. even if only enemy soldiers- is 
according to the tradition not sufficient reason to treat as combatants those 
nonnally ha\'ing non-combatant status' (John. 1971. p.170). 
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However. Johnson noted that a person's non-combatant status \\'ould terminate 
as soon as he participate directly in the war because 
'in defining a non-combatant the criterion always requires only that he not 
participate directly in warlike acts'. (Johnson, 1971. p.170). 
Michael Walzer makes distinction between combatant and non-combatant 
status by identifying how a person lost their right to immunity from attack. Walzer 
argues that 
'the theoretical problem is not to describe how immunity is gained, but how it is 
lost. We are all immune to start with: our right not to be attack is a feature of 
normal human relationship' (Walzer, 2006, p.14's). 
Generally. according to Walzer. 'those who do not pose threat to anyone else 
have a basic and inalienable right to life that should not be \'iolated' (Wheeler. 2002, 
p.207). And the right to immunity from attack is lost by 'those \\'ho bear arms 
'effectively' because they pose a danger to other people' (Walzer. 2006, p.145). 
However, the question is at what point of the civilian cooperation with 
military makes the civilian lose their right to immunity? Walzer wrote that 
'the relevant distinction is not between those who work for the war effort and 
those who do not, but between those who make what soldiers need to fight. and 
those who make what they need to live. like all of us' (Walzer, 2006, p.146). 
So, for example, the civilian who work in the ammunition factory will lose 
their right to immunity, while peasants, who provide food for soldier, will not. 
* Doctrine of Double Effect 
According to Walzer. 'Double Effect is a \\'ay of reconciling the absolute 
prohibition against attacking non-combatants \\'ith the legitimate conduct of military 
acti\'it\" (Walzer. 2006. p.153). The doctrine of double effect \\'as first articulated by 
Saint. Thomas Aquinas to justify indi"idual self-defense. His arguments go like this 
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'One can kill an attacker in self-defense provided that he or she does not intend 
(will) the attacker's death (either as an end or as a means). but simply 
endeavours to defend one's own life, and the death of the attacker is 'outside the 
intention' or 'per accidens' (Christopher. 1994. p.57). 
This argument was later developed and had profound effect on the just \\'ar 
thinking regarding the principle of non-combatant immunity. The doctrine of double 
effect holds that any acts may have intended and unintended consequences. Even if 
we intended good, the action still might cause unintended negative consequences. 
And the unintended negative consequences are excusable if the following conditions 
are satisfied: 
1) The act is good in itself or at least indifferent, which means, for our purposes. 
that it is legitimate act of war. 
~) The direct effect is morally acceptable- the destruction of military supplies. 
for example, or killing of enemy soldiers. 
3) The intention of the actor is good, that is he aim only at the acceptable effect: 
the e\'il effect is not one of his ends, nor is it a means to his ends. 
4) The good effect is sufficiently good to compensate for allowing the evil 
effect: it must be justifiable under Sidwick's proportionality rule. (Walzer, 2006, 
p.153). 
However, some modem theorists think that this rendition is too loose and 
'double-effect injunctions ought to be treated sceptically' (Bellamy, 2006, p.125). 
Michael Walzer pointed out that 
'simply not intend the death of civilian is too easy .... What we look for in such 
cases is some sign of a positive commitment to saw civilian liws. Not merely to 
apply the proportionality rule and kill no more ci\ilians than is militarily 
necessary .... Civilians have the right to something more. And if saving ci\ilian 
li\es means riskina soldiers' lives. the risk must be accepted' (Walzer. 2006. ~ 
p.156). 
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Thus, he rewrote the third condition listed above as followed: 
3) The intention of the actor is good, that is. he aims narrowly at the acceptable 
effect; the evil effect is not one of his ends, nor is it a means to his ends. and 
aware of the e\'il involved, he seeks to minimize it, accepting cost to himself 
(Walzer, 2006, p.156). 
Alex J. Bellamy made this condition clearer that 
'to display an intention not to harm non-combatants. combatants must demonstrate 
both that they did not deliberately seek to kill non-combatants and that they have 
taken every reasonable precaution to minimize the likelihood of harming non-
combatant' (Bellamy, 2006, p.125). 
However, Walzer also pointed out that there is a limit to how much risk the 
combatant are obliged to accept 
'There is a limit to the risks that we require. These are, after all, unintended 
deaths and legitimate military operations, and the absolute rule against 
attacking civilians does not apply. War necessarily places civilian in danger; 
that is another aspect of its hellishness. We can only ask soldiers to minimize 
the danger they impose' (Walzer, 2006, p.156). 
Moreover, there are cases that the violations of the very fundamental rule of 
non-combatant immunity are excusable. This is the case Michael Walzer called the 
'supreme emergency". The 'supreme emergency' is defined bv two conditions. 
according to Walzer, 
'the first has to do with the imminence of the danger and the second \\ ith its 
nature. The two criteria must both be applied. Neither one by itself is sufficient 
as an account of extremity or as a defense of the extraordinary measures 
extremity is thought to require' (Walzer. 2006, p.252). 
To explain for this situation, Walzer took the example of British decision to 
bomb GenTIan cities in 1942 \\ith the explicit purpose of 'the destruction of civilian 
morale' (Walzer, 2006, p.256). 
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In this case, Walzer admits that this decision \'iolated the fundamental rule of 
regarding harm to non-combatant. Howeyer, he justifies that by the 'supreme 
emergency'. He wrote 
. it does seem to me that the more certain of a German victory appeared to be in 
the absence of a bomber offensive, the more justifiable was the decision to 
launch the offensi\'e. It is not just that such a victory was frightening. but abo 
that it seems in those years very close; It is not just that it was wry close, but 
also it was so frightening'. (Walzer, 2006, p.S6) 
2.1.2 Principle of proportionality 
According to Lackey. this principle requires that 'the amount of destruction 
permitted in pursuit of a military objective must be proportionate to the importance 
of the objective' (Lackey. 1989. p.59). Or as Alex J. Bellamy put it in another way 
like this 
'military targets may only be attacked when their military value outweighs the 
foreseeable destruction that wi 11 result' (Bellamy, 2006, p.124). 
This principle means that, in a war, certain objectiyes should be excluded 
because it may cause too much destruction if we fulfill these objectives. 
This principle should be observed in every single act in war as well as the 
whole war in general. Christoph Bluth, when discuss the Falklands/Malvinas 
conflict, states that 
'each individual act of war must be submitted to an evaluation of proportionality' (Bluth, 
1987, p.17). 
Kenneth W. Kemp holds that the principle of proportionality should be added 
like this 'one may not do in a more costly way, what could equally well be done in a 
less costly \\ay·. This means that in case t\\O possible military operations can 
. . . 
achieye the same objecti\'e and both are proportionate to the military objectiyes. one 
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must choose the less destructive one. This idea is related to the principle of militarY 
necessary. 
2.1.3 Principle of military necessary 
This principle holds that the destruction of life and property, even life and 
property of enemy, is inherently bad. So military force 'should cause no more 
destruction than is strictly necessary to achieve their objective' (Lackey, 1989. 
p.59). In order to avoid misunderstanding, Lackey makes clear that 'the principle 
does not say that whatever is necessary is permissible, but that everything 
permissible must be necessary' (p.59). 
This principle also requires that certain kinds of weapons be banned, because 
they inflict excessive unnecessary suffering. Brian Orend wrote that 
'even though soldiers may be targeted with lethal force, some kinds of lethal 
force- such as burning them to death with flame throwers, or asphyxiating them 
with nerve gas- inflict much suffering and express such cruelty that they are 
properly condemned' (Brian Orend, 2001, p.16). 
This principle also demands that armies may never employ acts or weapons 
which in the words of Michael Walzer 'shock the moral conscience of mankind' . 
Brian Orend took rape, genocide as example of these kinds of act. He argues that 
'we do not have to do a cost-benefit analysis to determine whether such acts are 
impermissible in warfare: we already judge such acts to be heinous crimes. The 
intentional destruction, and/or forcible displacement of whole peoples, as Walzer 
suggests, is something we find 'literally unbearable" (Orend, 2001, p.l) 
Since 19th century, these principles of just war tradition- the principle of non-
combatant immunity, military necessary and proportionality were codified in many 
intelllational law documents and agreements. And these principles became the 
backbone of the modem law of armed conflicts. 
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Geneva Conventions of 1864 and 1906 focus on protection of combatants who 
have been rendered incapable of serving in that capacity by wounds or illness. 
The Hague Convention IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land 
In 1907 discussed many issue relating to this principle such as the definition of 
persons due protection is broadened by an extensive discussion of obligations 
toward prisoners of war (articles 4-20), the treatment of the inhabitants of territory 
under military occupation (article 42-56) .... 
The Geneva Conventions in 1949, the Geneva Protocols in 1977 and the Red 
Cross Fundamental Rules in 1978 also seek to protect non-combatant in various 
ways. Geneva Convention IV in 1949 provided various new measures for 
monitoring and enforcing the rules of conduct in armed conflicts (article 1. 3, and 
11); The common article 2 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions expanded the scope of 
the law to include armed conflicts between states that are not legally wars; the 1977 
Geneva Protocol II expands the scope of the law to include non-international armed 
conflicts. 
There are also other international laws documents seek to protect the right of 
non-combatant in a broader sense such as in the case of genocide or limiting the use 
of some kind of weapons .... The Convention on Genocide ratified by the General 
Assembly of the UN in December 1948 gave definition of genocide and seeks to 
prevent it. This convention protect non-combatant from being targeted just because 
of their identity as member of a national, ethnical, racial or religious groups. There 
are also many international law documents that prohibit the use of certain kind of 
weapons because of its destructiveness and indiscrimination such as 1925 Geneva 
Protocol for Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating. Poisonous or other 
Gases, and Bacteriological methods of Warfare; the 1981 UN Convention and 
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Protocols on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deem To Be 
Excessively Injurious or To Have Indiscriminate Effects ..... . 
Generally, in modem time, the basic principles of the just \\'ar tradition were 
codified in international laws of armed conflict, in which the 1949 Gene\'a 
Conventions held the central position. However, the codification process was based 
mainly on the experience of European wars after the Westphalia Peace. Carl Schmitt 
noted that 
"The fonnulations of the Geneva Conventions have European experiences in 
mind, but not the partisan wars of Mao T se-tung and the later development of 
modem partisan warfare" (Schmitt, 1962, p.IS). 
In Europe, after the 1648 Westphalia Peace, war was something waged by one 
state against another, and was fought by professional armies. It was an affair for 
sovereign princes and for them only, civilian population had nothing to do with the 
war. Carl Schmitt wrote that 
"The war of the jlls publicum Europaeum was a war between states, conducted 
by one regular state anny against another" (Schmitt, 1962. p.7). 
In these jus publicum Europaeum wars, as civilian population were excluded 
from war activities, the distinction between combatant and civilian was strictly 
observed. In the book titled The Transformation of War, Martin van Creveld also 
wrote that 
"Prince was supposed to wage war in such a way as to minimize the hann done 
both to their own soldiers, who deserved humane treatment if they happened to 
be captured or wounded, and to the ciyilian population. In return, that population 
had absolutely no right to interfere in quarrels between their sovereigns, not eYen 
when they resulted in their property being robbed and their liYes put in jeopardy, 
(oo.). The distinction between the military and ciyilians had to be obsef\ed at all 
cost" (Creveld. 1991. p.37). 
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In 20
th 
century, the wars were very much different from those of jus publicum 
Europaeum. While the classic European wars happened between states of roughly 
equal military strength and the principle of distinction was strongly observed. the 
modem wars usually take place between very unequal adYersaries, hence the 
distinction between civilian and armed forces became extremely blurred on the 
weaker side's way of conduct in the war. 
Toni Pfanner wrote that 
"The wars that took place in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries-i.e after the 
Peace of Westphalia- in which evenly matched government troops confronted 
and fought each other in open battles have sometimes been called a thing of the 
past, for the twentieth century wars became more complex and more unequal" 
(2005, p.152). 
This new kind of war is called asymmetric warfare. Because of its difference 
from classic European wars, asymmetric war put great pressure on the basic 
principles of jus in bello. 
2.2 Asymmetric warfare 
In recent years, the concept of asymmetry has received growing attention in 
Western security circles. It has been called the "term du jour' or 'buzz word'. The 
phrase' asymmetric warfare' has now become ubiquitous. 
'It can be readily found not only in pages of books, journal and magazines 
devoted to military matters, but also in more mainstream media' (Thornton, 
2007, p.5). 
In fact, the asymmetric approaches, as many authors admit are nothing new. It 
is 'an idea as old as warfare itself (Metz. 2001. p.l). The Old Testament told the 
story of how the small David defeated the giant Goliath. According to Toni Pfanner. 
this biblical story shows that asymmetrical warfare is not new. Blank also holds that 
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'"asymmetry is a nev, word for an old tenn' (Blank, 2004, p.3..J.5). Metz and Johnson 
II in the paper titled "Asymmetry and u.s Military Strategy: Definition, Background, 
and Strategic ('oncepts " gave a definition that: 
'In realm of military affairs and national security. asymmetry IS acting, 
organizing and thinking differently than opponents in order to maximize one's 
own advantages, exploit an opponent's weaknesses, attain the initiative, or gain 
greater freedom of action. It can be political- strategic, military strategic, 
operational, or a combination of these. It can entail different methods, 
technologies, values, organizations, time perspective. or some combination of 
these. It can be short-term of long-term. It can be deliberate or by default. It can 
be discrete or pursued in conjunction with symmetric approaches. It can have 
both psychological and physical dimensions. (Metz. 2001, p.6). 
This definition, according to Thornton, 
'does not mention, however, that to be true asymmetric in nature, there can be no 
'matching in kind'. It also fails to note that asymmetric approaches can be adopted 
down at the tactical level' (Thornton, 2007. p.20). 
Then, Thornton himself suggests that 
'we do not really need to defme asymmetric warfare as much as to understand 
what it means ..... Sometimes simple is good. Asymmetric warfare is best 
understood as a strategy, a tactic, or a method of warfare and conflict' (2007, 
p.21). 
This definition, however, as the author admits, is too simple. Thus. it is little 
helpful in understanding the nature of asymmetric warfare. Recently, in an attempt 
to reconsider the use of concept asymmetric threat Stephen Blank wrote that: 
'In contemporary writings as)lTImetric threats generally include terrorism. 
unconventional or guerrilla tactics. or guerrilla warfare as has been attempted in 
Iraq and Afghanistan, the use of \\'eapons of mass destruction (Wt-.10), cyber-
\\arfare, or infornlation war' (Blank, 2004, p.345). 
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In 2007, in the conference of 'New battlefields, old laws' on the occasion of 
100 year anniversary of The Hague Convention 1907, the asymmetric warfare was 
defined as follow: 
Asymmetric warfare refers to belligerents of unequal power attempting to 
exploit each other's weaknesses. The weaker side attempts to use strategies 
and tactics that expose vulnerabilites in stronger side and offset the weaker 
side's deficiencies in size and strength. Many times one side in asymmetric 
conflicts is non-state actors, insurgent groups, terrorist organizations, for 
example. (William C. Banks, International Institute for Counter-terrorism). 
It is obvious that in asymmetric warfare there must be a sense of significant 
difference. However, it is not that every kind of difference can be called asymmetry, 
because "in a sense. all warfare is asymmetrical as there are never identical 
belligerents" (Toni Pfanner, 2005. p.151). There are always differences between the 
opponents in war, but in many occasions the difference has almost no effect on the 
outcome of the war. Thornton states that 
'It needs to be born in mind that asymmetric does not mean unequal. 
'Symmetrical' implies a mirror image; sometimes that image can be smaller, but 
nonetheless a likeness exists. 'Asymmetrical' implies a relationship that cannot 
be consider to be alike' (Thornton, 2007. p.4). 
This idea is also shared by Christopher Bellamy that 
'Whatever differences there may be in numbers and quality. conventional 
military forces are still designed, trained and equipped to fight near mirror 
images of themselves: forces with broadly similar infrastructures. A true 
asymmetric conflict is where not only the means used but the ends. and 
vulnerabilities, are quite different.' (Bellamy, 2002. p.152). 
2.3 How asymmetric warfare put pressure on the laws of war 
Asymmetric warfare. with its asymmetric characteristics, put great pressure on 
the application of jus in bello. In an asymmetric war. the weaker side. lacking of the 
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ability to confront the stronger side directly in conventional military tenn, usually 
has to resort to methods that lie outside the 'nonn' of warfare~ methods that are 
radically different. Thornton noticed that when the weaker opponent conducts their 
war. 'a sense of unethical behaviour can be engendered' (Thornton, 2007, p . .t). 
Because of unlawful conduct on the weaker side, the distinction between war and 
peace becomes blurred~ this complicates the application of the rules OfjllS in bello. 
Just war tradition was developed on the classic European experience of war 
where there is a clear distinction between war and peace. In just war theory, jus ad 
bellum was a branch of the laws of peace, governing the legality of the use of force 
by states while jus in bello governs the conduct of adversary once the war begin. 
"At that time, if two states were at peace their relations with each other and with 
other states were governed by laws of peace. However, once they went to war, a 
legal "states of war" came into being and their relations became subject to a 
different legal regime,ju5 in bello." (c. Greenwood, 1983, p.221). 
Now in the asymmetric war, there is no clear distinction between war and 
peace. N eta Crawford wrote that 
"Because terrorists are potentially always ready to strike. targets of terrorism are 
likely in a constant state of mobilization and preparedness, and thus the line 
between war and peace \\i II become extreme Iy blurred" (Crawford, 2003, p.12). 
This tactics are also employed by partisan in their war against asymmetric 
adversary. In the theory of partisan, Carl Schmitt wrote that 
"For the modern partisan today, the binaries regular-irregular and legal-illegal 
often blur and cross over each other. Agility, speed, and the sudden change of 
surprise attack and retreat- increase mobility, in a word- are even today the 
hallmark of the partisan, and this has only increase with mechanization and 
motorization" (Schmitt, 1962, p.ll). 
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Christopher Greenwood even questioned the legality of the war and peace 
distinction, he wrote that 
"State practice in this century has blurred the distinction between peace and war. 
so much so that some writers have doubted whether it continues to ha\e any legal 
relevance" (Greenwood, 1983, p.222). 
Once the line between war and peace blurred, the application of rules ofjlls in 
bello had great difficulties. As Neta Crawford pointed out that, '"jus in bello criteria 
are in jeopardy once we cannot say when the war begin and ends" (Crawford, 2003. 
p.12). 
In asymmetric warfare, the asymmetrical legitimacy of belligerents also put 
pressure on the jus in bello. According to Toni Pfanner, since late Middle Age there 
has been recognition of the separation between jus ad bellum andjlls in bello. This 
means that the war must be judged twice. A just war must have just cause as well as 
be conducted justly. So warring party, whether lawful or unlawful, still have the 
equal responsibility to abide by the laws of war. However. this is not always true in 
practice. Toni Pfanner notes that 
~'The less equal the belligerents are, the less they \\ill be prepared to treat the 
adversary as legitimate. Groups classified as "terrorists" will probably be denied 
any legitimacy and will be considered criminals. The opposite side is not regarded 
as an equal; the epithets "uncivilized", "criminal" or "terrorist" indicate that it 
should be denied equality at all costs. Its members v,ill be treated as outlaws and 
will be ruthlessly pursued, if necessary by unconditional or illegal mean" 
(Pfanner, 2005, p.160). 
So, the asymmetry of belligerenf s legitimacy IS also an obstacle for the 
application of jus in bello. 
In international humanitarian laws, reciprocity is extremely important. It is 
one of the main motiyations for belligerents to abide by the laws. In a war. one anny 
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treats the prisoner of war well with the expectation that its troops when captured are 
to be treated well. Or similarly_ an army's refrain from bombing tmvns or civilian 
targets was because it does not want to expose its own population to similar fate. 
However, the asymmetric war threatened the very core of this principle of 
reciprocity. Toni Pfanner wrote 
"In asymmetrical wars, the expectation of reciprocity is basically betrayed and the 
chivalrous ethos is frequently replaced by treachery" (Pfanner, 2005, p.161). 
When there is no reciprocity expectation, it become extremely difficult for the 
laws of war to be applied Sir Hersch Lauterpacht wrote more than fifty years ago 
"It is impossible to visualize the conduct of hostilities in which one side would be 
bound by rules of warfare without benefiting from them and the other side would 
benefit from them without being bound by them" (cited in Greenwood, 1983. 
p.226). 
In the situation where there is no reciprocity expectation, when one side 
choose not to abide by the laws of war, the other will feel that it might be more in its 
interest not to consider itself bound by the laws of war. Hence, the international 
humanitarian laws will fail in that case. 
Now, let's see how the asymmetric warfare put pressure on each basic 
principle of the laws of armed conflicts. 
* The principle o(discrimination between combatant and non-combatant 
Discrimination is the central principle of jus in bello, it is the shorthand for the 
"moral immunity of non-combatants from direct attack. (Ramsey, 2002, p.429). In 
conventional warfare in the history of Europe, where there is clear distinction 
between combatant and non-combatant, it is obvious that the jus in bello principles 
can and should be applied to alleviate the horror of war on society. Traditionally, in 
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Europe. "if it was governments that made war. their instrument for doing so 
consisted of armies'. And the ordinary people were kept excluded from the \\-ar. 
'Since war was a question of state, the people should be excluded from it as far as 
possible. This was carried to the point where they were prohibited from taking an 
active part in hostilities' (Creveld. 1993, p.39). 
In asymmetric warfare, there is no clear distinction between combatants and 
non-combatants. The weaker side, being unable to face the stronger side directly in a 
conventional war, usually fails to distinguish themselves from civilian. In that case, 
the stronger side of the war will face great difficulties in carrying out the war 
discriminately. 
In current counter terror war, terrorists always mingle with innocent people, 
they live among civilians, not in the barracks as conventional army. Crawford wrote 
that 
'Counterterror war tends to be waged everywhere, all the time, the conceptual 
distinction between combatants and non-combatants, already difficult to make, 
grows even more fuzzy, as does the ability to distinguish physically between 
terrorists and non-combatant.' (Crawford, 2003, p.17). 
Facing with this difficulty, the US simply took the policy of equating terrorist 
and "those who knowingly harbour or provide aid to them' (US National Security 
Strategy 2002, p.5). 
In guerrilla warfare, another form of asymmetric warfare, it is also very 
difficult to distinguish between guerrilla fighters and innocent civilians. Mao Tse-
tung considered guerrilla live among people like "fish' in "water', he \\Tote that 
"There is no profound difference between the farmer and the soldier' (cited in 
Ramsey, 2002, p. 435). Che Guevara wrote about the essence of guerrilla warfare 
that 
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'who are the combatants in a guerrilla war? On one side \\e have group composed 
of oppressor and his agents, the professional army, well armed and disciplined .... 
On the other side are the people of the nation or region. It is important to 
emphasize that guerrilla warfare is a war of the masses, a \,<ar of people' (Che 
Guevara, 2006, p.16). 
Because there is no clear distinction between combatant and non-combatant in 
asymmetric warfare, it is very difficult for the stronger to carry out a discriminate 
military strategy and tactics. 
'Those who wage counter-terror war try to discriminate between combatants and 
non-combatants, but this is extremely difficult' and it 'nearly impossible to fight 
justly' (Crawford, 2003, p.20). 
In the case of counterinsurgent war, Ramsey argues that the insurgents' 
violation of the discrimination principle created enlarged target that can be 
legitimately attacked by the counter-insurgent forces. Insurgent's failure to 
distinguish themselves from civilian also enlarges the collateral damage resulted 
from the legitimate attack of counter-insurgent force. So according to Ramsey, the 
conduct of counter Insurgency would mainly governed by the principle of 
proportionality. This means that as long as the counter-insurgent forces do not 
deliberately aim their attack against civilian, their attack would be just if it does 
more good than evil as the regulation of proportionality. Ramsey wrote that 
'"It is mainly the principle of proportionality that limits what should be done to 
oppose them (insurgents)' (Ramsey, 2002, p.435). 
On the other side of the conflict. the weaker side does not follow the 
discrimination principle because their aim is to cause great effect on the stronger 
side's ndnerability. In its early phases, the insurgent usually use terror tactics 
designed to subvert the confidence of the population in the regIme and in its 
prospect. 
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'The message implied in these tactics is that no one is safe an) \\ here as long as 
the regime remains in power. In order to convey tills message. the 
revolutionaries set off bomb in crowded public places, engage in hit-and-run 
attacks that imperil non-combatants in the area, engage in indiscriminate acts of 
reprisal or intimidation against locales and areas guilty of supporting the 
government, and the like' (Obriend, 1981, p.180). 
And, recently, the 9/11 event is the most obvious example for the 
indiscriminate tactics of terrorism. 
The lack of sufficient distinction between combatant and non-combatant in 
asymmetric warfare also render great difficulty in detennining the legal status of 
those being captured in anned conflicts. As a result, it would be difficult to treat 
detainees properly. Are the detainees civilian criminals? Prisoners of war? Or 
something else? We can see how difficult it was for the US to detennine the status 
of detainees in Guantanamo Bay. The US denied the POW s for these detainees on 
the basis that 
'Under Article 4 of the Geneva Convention, ... Taliban detainees are not entitled 
to POW status. To qualify as POWs under Article 4, al Qaeda and Taliban 
detainees would have to have satisfied four conditions: they would have to be a 
part of a military hierarchy; they would have to have worn uniforms or other 
distinctive signs visible at a distance; they would have to carried arms openly; 
and they would have to have conducted their military operations in accordance 
with the laws and customs of war. The Taliban have not effectively 
distinguished themselves from civilian population of Afghanistan. MoreO\er. 
they have not conducted their operations in accordance with the laws and 
customs of war. Instead. they have knowingly adopted and provided support to 
the unlawful terrorist objectives of the al Qaeda' (Aldrich. 2001. p. 894). 
Instead. the US calls the detainees 'enemy combatant" \\"hich is defined as 
follow: 
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'An enemy combatant shall mean an individual who was part of or supporting 
Taliban or AI Qaeda forces, or associated forces that are engaged in hostilities 
against United States or its coalition partners. This includes any person who has 
committed a belligerent act or has directly supported hostilities in aid of enemy 
armed forces' (Combatant Status Review Tribunal Order of the Deputy 
Secretary of Defense July, 2004). 
However. Duffy notes that 'as a matter of international law. this 'enemy 
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combatant' classification does not, however, denote the legal status of prisoner" 
(Duffy, 2005, p.397). The detainees are not considered as sick or wounded to be 
protected by the First and Second Geneva Conventions, nor prisoners of war to be 
protected by the Third Geneva Convention, nor criminal civilian to be protected by 
the Fourth Geneva Convention. 
O'Briend also notes this difficulty In the insurgent war, another form of 
asymmetric warfare. 
'In the absence of substantial uniforms or distinguishing insignia, it is hard to 
tell guerrilla combatant from a non-combatant supporter of the revolutionaries. 
With the best of intentions. it is often very difficult to sort out the persons who 
ought to be prisoner of war and those who are properly civilian detainees' 
(O'Brien, 1981, p.188). 
Thus, determining the legal status of the captured In asymmetric armed 
conflicts is very problematic. 
* The principle ofmilitmy necessity and proportionality 
Military necessity permits the use of force that is truly necessary for military 
success. In other word, wanton destruction is forbidden. In asymmetric \\arfare. the 
overall success of the war includes not only military success but also political 
success. Moreover. many times what considered as military necessity goes against 
political success. 
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Crawford notes that in the current counter-terror war, it IS very difficult to 
apply the principle of military necessity. Because 
'Terrorist, like guerrillas, mingle with innocent civilians. living in the cities and 
in the countryside- not in barracks or on front lines as concentrated targets- wars 
against them cannot be decisively won in military terms unless the great power 
is willing to annihilate the population where they reside. But annihilation, which 
would surely involve killing innocent people, cannot be morally or politically 
acceptable and would only sow the seeds for future resentment and terrorist acts 
in retaliation' (Crawford, 2003, p.18). 
This dilemma also takes place in insurgent and counterinsurgent warfare. In 
insurgent war, military success cannot guarantee the overall success because the 
insurgent seeks to win on the political ground rather than on the military ground. 
Andrew Mack noted that 'lacking the technological capability or the basic resources 
to destroy the external enemy's military capability, they must of necessity aim to 
destroy his political capability'. Thus, 'in such asymmetric conflicts, insurgents may 
gain political victory from a situation of military stalemate or even defeat.' (Mack. 
1975, p.177). So in some case, insurgents do not aim at defeating the counter-
insurgent force by military forces, but the insurgents' strategy was to create a 
situation of military stalemate. Because they still can win political gains from that 
situation while their adversary cannot. O'Brien also noted that 
'This principle become difficult to apply in revolutionary/counterinsurgency war 
because purely military success may not be congruent with the political, 
economic, and social success that are equally, if not more important in such 
conflicts.' (O'Brien, 1981, p.178). 
Next is the principle of proportionality. This principle holds that 
'In cases where the use of force is justified. it cannot be employed in absolute!) 
any measure. Obviously. if the aim of war is the correction of injustice. then the 
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level of force must not be such as to create ne\\ and greater injustice' (Philips. 
1984, p.29). 
The nature of asymmetric warfare also put great pressure on this Plinciple. 
Given the difficulty in distinguishing between combatant and non-combatant in 
asymmetric warfare, we will almost never know the exact numbers of how many 
combatants are killed and how many innocent civilians are killed as collateral 
damage. Thus, we would not be able to decide a military action is proportionate or 
not. 
In the current war on terror, Crawford notes that 
'If we foresee that both terrorist and non-combatants may be killed, and we 
cannot know in anyone instance whether more non-combatants than combatants 
will die, the doctrine of double effect does not necessarily alleviate the problem 
posed by a counterterrorism war. We know we will harm non-combatants in a 
war against terror, unintentionally or not, and we cannot know that we will kill 
any terrorists' (Crawford, 2003. p.l8). 
In the counterinsurgent war, same difficulty also exists. In the Vietnam war, 
the US employed body-count to measure the success in the war. Howeyer. the fact 
that Vietcong force usually dressed in clothing that was almost indistinguishable 
from that of rural population rendered the US great difficulty to know the exact 
number of combatant Vietcong death. This situation not only raises the issue of 
violation of discrimination principle but also the violation of proportionality 
principle. 
2. 4 The relationship between jus ad belluI11 and jus ill bello and 
Marxism-Leninism thought about war 
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2.4.1 The relationship betweenjus ad bellum andjus in bello 
In the works of St. Augustine, St. Thomas Aquinas and canon lawyers in early 
period of just war tradition, there was no separation of jus ad bellum andjus in bello 
in judging a war. A war is judged once by both set of rules jus ad bellum (the right 
to wage war) and jus in bello (the conduct of war). If a warring side fails to satisfy 
the jus ad bellum criteria then 
'every act of violence it unleashed- whether against combatants or non-
combatants- had to be considered unjust because those who ordered the \'iolence 
had no license for doing so' (Bellamy, 2006, p.128), 
Their logic was that soldiers who fight in aggressive side should not have the 
same rights as those who fight for a justifiable cause according to the legal maxim 
ex injuria non oritur jus. meaning that one should not be able to profit from one's 
own wrongdoing. So the aggressors should not allow benefiting from the protection 
of the laws of armed conflict. 
However, since late Middle Ages, the separation between .ius ad bellum and 
JUS ill bello was recognized. According to J. Moussa, although the distinction 
between jus ad bellum and jus' in bello appeared in the writing of Grotius, Vitoria 
and Vattel. 
'"It \\as Kant who first, in the nineteenth century. explicitly distinguished 
between (1) the right of going to war and (2) the right during war" (Moussa, 
2008, p.966) 
Toni Pfanner also noticed that: 
'"International law basical1y premises a distinction between the reasons for 
waging war and warfare itself. This distinction was made in the late i'diddle 
Ages and the two areas of law \\'ere called jllS ad bellum. the right to \\'age war. 
and jlls in bello. the law go\'erning the conduct of war. Today this distinction is 
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still a crucial and decisiw factor. without which there would be no chance of 
securing respect for international humanitarian law'" (Pfanner. 2005. p.158). 
Thus, the rules of international humanitarian law should be equally applied to 
all sides of the conflicts, irrespective of whether it is lawful or unlawful. In 1953. Sir 
Hersch Lauterpacht advanced three main arguments for this equal application. 
Firstly, the equal application of jus in bello was originated from humanitarian basis, 
that is essential to limit the horror of war. Secondly, the laws of armed conflicts 
should be equally applied because it is really difficult in identifying the aggressor in 
the absence of an overarch authoritative determination of which party was guilty of 
aggression. Thirdly, Lauterpacht reviewed judicial practice in the aftermath of 
World War II and concluded that the overwhelming majority of decision supported 
the principle of equal application of international humanitarian law. 
Michael Walzer also argued for the separation of jlls ad bellum and jlls in 
bello. He stated that 
"war is always judged twice. first with reference to the reasons states have for 
fighting, second with reference to the mean they adopt. ... The two sorts of 
judgement are logically independent" (Michael Walzer. 2006, p.21). 
This view is also shared by other modem just war theorists. Christopher 
Greenwood wrote that 
'this concurrent application of jus ad bellum and jus in bello raises the question of 
whether these two branches of international law can still be regarded as distinct 
from one another. It is concluded here that they can, and should, be so regarded.' 
(Greenwood, 1983, p.231). 
Moreover, contrary to the view that the two set of rules apply in distinct 
spheres, once hostility commences, jus ad bellum cease to be relevant and jus in 
hello takes controL Christopher Greenwood argued that jus ad helium still operate in 
parallel with jus in hello once the war begin. He wrote that 
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"the whole debate is, therefore, an example of the continuing application 
of thejlls ad bellum during a conflict which both parties ha\'e characterized 
as war" (1983, p.225). 
Recently, Alex J. Bellamy also argued for the separation of jus as bellum and 
jus in bello. Firstly, the separation would make the war less bloody and more rule-
governed. 
'If every violent act in an unjust war was considered unlav,Jul and immoral, e\"ery 
member of the aggressor's army could be justifiably seen as criminal, subject to 
punishment. If all participants in an unjust war are culpable. the \"ictorious 
defenders might be acting justly if they summarily killed all of their enemies once 
the fighting was over. .... However, if combatants know that they \\ill be killed if 
they surrender, they are more likely to (1) fight to dead and (2) use whateYef 
means available to prevail.' (Bellamy, 2006, p.129). 
So if both set of rules, jlls ad bellllm and jllS in bello are judged once, war 
would be bloodier and less rule-governed. Secondly, soldiers who fight in the war 
are not entitled to bear the wrong of their leader to decide to go to war. 
'The soldiers charged with fighting a war are seldom the people responsible for 
initiating it, and we cannot presume that the soldiers agree with what they are 
being asked to do. Some annies are conscript armies that force individual to fight' 
(Bellamy.2006, p. 129). 
Both Alex j. Bellamy and Christopher Greenwood agree that a just war 
conducted unjustly would not remain a just war. Greenwood wrote that 
'it is true that the logical justification fOf holding that a state which is entitled to 
use force must comply with the jus in bello lies in consideration of the jus ad 
bellum, namely that an act Vv'hich contravened the jus in bello could not be a 
reasonable ad proportionate measure of self-defense' (Greenwood. 1983. p.23I). 
Alex J. Bellamy explained this more clearly 
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'if the chosen means are such that the cumulative evil unleashed by the war 
surpasses the cumulative good that can be reasonably expected to accrue from a 
successful outcome, the proposed war would fail the proportionality of ends test.' 
(Bellamy, 2006, p.129). 
Although recently some international law scholars3 challenge this distinction 
betweenjus ad bellum and jus in bello, generally, in order to be judged as a just war. 
the war must pass both set of criteria of jus ad bellum and jus in bello. A just cause 
being conducted unjustly would not be a just war. This is the arguments of many 
Western European scholars about the just war. However, there also exists a different 
school of thought about just and unjust war- the Marxism-Leninism about war. 
, 2.4.2 Marxism-Leninism thought about war 
In Marxist-Leninist concept of war, the justness of war depends on jlls ad 
bellum criteria and the jus in bello criteria are subsumed under jllS ad bellum. The 
war is just when it is waged by progressive class and its aims are for the advance of 
people. In just wars, any means is acceptable to achieve the just cause. According to 
Marxism, 
"Any war that is waged by a people for the sake of freedom and social progress, 
for liberation from exploitation and national oppression or in defence of its state 
sovereignty, against an aggressive attack, is just war. Conversely, any war 
unleashed by the imperialists with the aim of seizing foreign territories, enslaving 
and plundering other peoples, is unjust war." (Marxism-Leninism on war and 
army, 1972, p.87) 
Lenin gave more concrete discussion of just and unjust wars. He wrote that 
3 1. Osterdahl (2010); E. Benvenisti (2009); S.K. Sharma (2008). 
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"There are just and unjust wars, progressive and reactionary wars, wars waged 
by advanced classes and wars waged by backward classes, wars waged for the 
purpose of perpetuating class oppression and wars waged for the purpose of 
eliminating oppression. Reactionary, aggressive wars cannot be just and unjust 
wars retard historical progress. Just wars have progressive aims. The political 
content of a just war is to liberate a people from oppression and exploitation, 
which hold back socio-economic development" (Lenin Selected Works, Vol. 
29, p.343). 
And Lenin gave examples that 
"If Morocco were to declare war against France tomorrow, or India against 
England, or Persia or China against Russia, etc., those wars would be ""just", 
"defensive" wars, no matters which one was the first to attack" (Lenin, Selected 
Works, Vol. 18, p.220). 
In Lenin's theory about the justice of the war, when the cause is just any 
means is acceptable to achieve the just cause. He wrote that 
"Once the insurrection has begun, you must act with the greatest determination, 
and by all means, without fail, take the offensive. The defensive is the death of 
every uprising" (Lenin, Selected Works, Vol. 26, p.180). 
According to Carl Schmitt, Lenin's view on just war is that 
"The purpose is the communist revolution in all countries of the world: whatever 
serves this purpose is good and just" (Schmitt, 1963, p.35). 
Lenin considered the war to stop class oppression is absolute war against 
"absolute enemy", in which there is no restriction in the \var against absolute enemy. 
Carl Schmitt wrote that 
"The war of absolute enmity knows no containment. The consistent realization 
of absolute ennlity provides its meaning and its justice. The only question 
therefore is this: is there an absolute enemy and who is it in conrC'to? For Lenin. 
the answer was unequi\'ocal, and his superiority among all other socialist and 
Marxists consisted in his seriousness about absolute enmity. His concrete 
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absolute enemy was class enemy, the bourgeois, the western capitalist and his 
social order in every country in which they ruled" (Schmitt, 1962, p.36). 
So we can see that, in Leninist war of absolute enmity. there is no restraint. 
The justness of an absolute war was not judged by jus in bello criteria but by jus ad 
bellum ones. In his theory, Lenin sacrificed the jus in bello for jus ad bellum. 
Jus in bello originated and was developed in Europe primarily aimed at 
regulating the wars among European states, where wars were carried out by 
professional mercenaries and there exist clear distinction between combatant and 
non-combatant. However, in 19th and 20th centuries, the essence of jus in bello was 
codified in the international laws of armed conflicts with the aim of governing all 
war to reduce the war's atrocity. When asymmetric war became the popular kind of 
war in international relations, the law of war was put under great pressure because 
of the asymmetric characteristic of the war. Especially. the guerrilla war, a kind of 
asymmetric war, being led by Marxism-Leninism party pose serious threat to the 
law of war .. Because the guerrilla forces usually do not recognize the distinction 
between jus ad bellum and jus in bello. In the Marxism-Leninism thought on war, 
the end justifies the means, thus if the cause of war is just, any means is tolerable to 
fulfil the cause. 
This chapter has presented the theoretical background for the whole thesis. 
The chapter started with the summary of the laws of war and its basic principles. 
with the focus on the principle of non-combatant immunity. Then the next part was 
about the asymmetric warfare and how this kind of war, which is popular today, put 
pressure on the laws of war. The laws of war were originated and developed in 
Europe with the tradition of jus publicum Europaeum. However. in recent history 
wars have been transforn1ed and become more and more asymmetric, thus the laws 
of war were put under great pressure. The last part of the chapter discussed the 
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relations between jus ad bellum and jus in bello in Marxism-Leninism on \var. The 
early authors of just war tradition did not separate jus ad bellum from jus in bello. 
War was judged once by both sets. However, in recent history, just war theorists 
argued for the separation between jus ad bellum and jus in bello. In Marxism-
Leninism, the end of the war justify the means, meaning that in judging a war, jus 
ad bellum override jus in bello. 
In the next chapters, North Vietnam military strategy in the Vietnam War will 
be discussed and assessed against the basic principles of the laws of war. The 
Vietnam War was an asymmetric war between America- a world superpower and 
Vietnam- a small, backward Asia country. So the discussion about the asymmetric 
warfare and the laws of war in this chapter will be the theoretical basis for the 
arguments in the next chapters. Also, as North Vietnam was a communist country 
and followed the line of Marxism-Leninism, thus the discussion of Marxism and 
Leninism perceptions on just and unjust war is very theoretically relevant here. 
Generally, what are discussed in this chapter will serve as the theoretical 
background for remaining chapters. 
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Chapter III: The Vietnam War 
This chapter will provide dual narrative about the Vietnam War from the 
views of America and North Vietnam, which is necessary to understand the North 
Vietnam's military strategy. to be discussed in next chapter. The strategy of North 
Vietnam in the Vietnam War was to defeat America's aggressiye will rather than to 
defeat it militarily. North Vietnam aimed to make American leaders realize that any 
strategy they applied in South Vietnam would eyentually faiL and dissuaded 
America from deeper involvement. So to understand North Vietnam strategy, we 
must understand which strategy America employed in each specific period of the 
war and how North Vietnam perceived that strategy to initiate its owns counter 
strategy. This will be the content of this chapter. 
The chapter will be divided into two parts, one on the Vietnam War in 
American perspective and the other on Vietnamese perspective. In the first part of 
this chapter. I will explore America's step-by-step involvement in Vietnam from the 
time America supported France in its effort to keep its colonialism rule in Indochina 
in the first Indochina war (1946-1954) to the time America made full commitment 
with its ally in South Vietnam by sending its troops to bear military fighting tasks 
there, and until the time America withdrew all its military force from South 
Vietnam. In the second part, I will examine the Vietnam War as it is accounted in 
the official history of Vietnam. In this part. I will use extensive sources from 
Vietnamese archive. As the sources were written in Vietnamese. to use them I have 
to translate them into English by myself. It is true that the Vietnam War is so well 
documented and literature about the war is abundant but most of researchers writing 
about the war focused on the American experience in the war rather than a balanced 
view about the war itself. Moreover, as Vietnamese sources are not easy to access 
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for foreign researchers, Western researchers writing about the war in Vietnamese 
perspective were not able to narrate the war as it was viewed in Communist Vietnam 
official history of the war. This research aim to fill in that gap. 
3.1 The Vietnam war in American perspective 
3.1.1 America's changing perception about Vietnam after the World 
War II 
America's perception about Indochina underwent profound changes between 
1945 and early 1950s. In Indochina, during the World War II, Office of Strategic 
Services (the predecessor of CIA) had contact with Vietminh- the Vietnam National 
Independence League and supplied Vietminh with armed materials and training in 
their fighting against Japanese forces. After the World War II, America generally 
opposed to the reestablishment of colonial system. In late 1945 when the war broke 
out between Ho Chi Minh forces and France, America still publicly supported the 
former. Stoessinger wrote that: 
"Roosevelt had openly opposed the return of French power to Indochina and had 
advocated some forms of International trusteeship for the area. If the fighting in 
Indochina was a colonial war, it followed that the United States should disapprove 
of France .... .In 1945. when hostilities erupted between France and Ho Chi Minh, 
the president was decidedly sympathetic to the latter" (Stoessinger. 2008, p.l 03). 
However, the advent of many events in Europe in following years after the 
WW II changed the America' s attitude about Indochina. After the WW II. the world 
witnessed the competition between the Communist bloc led by SO\'iet Union and the 
free world led by America. This competition was known as Cold \\·ar. where the t\\·o 
superpowers refrained from fighting each other directly but competed strongly in 
every other field. In the early period after the WW II. there were many crises 
between the two blocs as the Cold war got its momentum. Along with the idea of 
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Iron Curtain, the United States initiated the grand strategy of Containment. The 
America gradually saw itself as "a leader of an embattled "free world" resisting the 
expansion of the ruthless totalitarian" (StoessingeL 2008, p.1 03). 
Obviously, the main battle was in the Europe, but gradually America came to 
believe that the frontier of the free world included Asia as well, especially after the 
Mainland China became communist ruled country. Hence, America began to 
redefine the nature of the struggle of people in Indochina. 
"America considered the French war in Indochina as a war against the expansion 
of Communist and Ho Chi Minh was an agent of Comintem" (Stoessinger. 2008, 
p.l03). 
Consequently, by early 1950s, America leadership and a large segment of the 
America public perceived France as the free world frontally ally in the fight against 
Communist in South East Asia, just as what United Nations did in Korea. This also, 
in part resulted from the need of America for France's support of its strategic 
implementation in Europe. Truman administration was trying to convince Paris to 
support American defence plan for Western Europe, even including possible 
rearmament of West Germany. Thus, America attitude to the France's military 
adventure in East Asia reversed. Peter Lowe pointed out that 
"'The need for French military co-operation in Europe overshadowed US dislike 
for French effort to restore colonial control in Indochina" (Lowe. 1998, p.96). 
So between 1945 and early 1950. America's perception about Indochina 
changed greatly from supporting the process of decolonization and opposing 
French's return to supporting French force in the war against Vietminh in 1950s. In 
these years, America defined Indochina as strategically important and considered 
the French fighting in the area as an effort of a Western country to stop the 
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Communist expansion in Asia. A Vietminh victory would provide an unacceptable 
gain for America's adversary in the Cold war- the Soviet Union. 
"A Communist success in Vietnam could not be tolerated because it \\ ould 
threaten the security of US interest in Europe and Asia" (Anderson, 2005, p.20). 
However, America was still very restrained in the issue of military 
involvement in the war. Rather, America chose to provide aid to France for its 
continuation of the war in Indochina. John G. Stoessinger wrote that: 
"President Truman never committed combat troops to Southeast Asia as he did to 
Korea, but he authorized material aid in 1950 and raised the level of this assistance 
steadily until he left office" (Stoessinger, 2008, p.l 05). 
Gradually. the US was the main bearer of the French war's burden In 
Indochina. Michael Lind pointed out that 
"By 1954, the U.S was paying for most of the cost of the French effort to defeat 
Ho Chi Minh'" (Lind, 199, p.9) 
However, no American forces were involved, the war was still between France 
and Vietnam, it was not yet American war. 
3.1.2 America's commitment in Vietnam under Eisenhower 
administration 
The first Indochina war ended with the French military defeated at Dien Bien 
Phu by Vietnamese forces and a settlement was reached at Geneva conference July 
1954. The Geneva conference resulted in the signing of several agreements to cease 
hostilities in Indochina and to establish the three independent sovereign states of 
Laos. Cambodia and Vietnam. The accords on Vietnam provided for a "provisional 
military demarcation line" at the seventeenth parallel. Vietminh forces were to 
regroup In the north of the line, while the forces of the French Union were to 
regroup to the South. The line had military significance only and the political 
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unification of Vietnam was to be brought about through a general election in two 
years under the supervision of a neutral three-power international control 
commission consisting of Canada, India and Poland (Stoessinger. 2008, p.l 03). 
The United States' position at Geneva conference was ambivalent. On the one 
hand, America public opinion favoured "'toughness in US policies toward 
communist regimes" (Anderson, 2005, p.26) and Eisenhower administration wanted 
to be seen domestically as a force fighting against Communist expansion in Asia. 
On the other hand, America did not want to block a peaceful settlement in Indochina 
as French public was tired of involvement in Indochina. If the US insisted on 
continuing fighting the war against Communism in Vietnam, it would jeopardize 
French participation in European defence plan. 
"Part of the America displeasure was due to the French attempts to gain Russian 
support for a compromise peace in Indochina in exchange for the French rejection 
of European Defence Community" (Lomperis, 1984, pA 7). 
So Eisenhower administration chose to observe the Geneva proceedings and 
did not actively engaged in arranging terms. The US never signed the Geneva 
Accord, but 
"in a unilateral decision at the end of the Geneva conference, the US government 
pledged to "refrain from the threat or the use of force to disturb" the settlement 
and added that it would view any violation of the accords with grave concerns" 
(Stoessinger,2008, p.1 09). 
However, in the wake of the accord signing, the United States decided to 
dissociate itself from the settlement and seek another solution to prevent any further 
territory in Asia from falling under Communist control. In a National Security 
Council meeting in Washington just after the Geneva conference, John Foster 
Dulles, then the US Secretary of State, stated that 
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"The remaining free areas of Indochina must be built up if the dike against 
Communist is to be held" (Anderson, 2005, p.26). 
The US was quick in its effort to create South East Asia Treaty Organization-
SEA TO, an arrangement for collective security in South East Asia. Although the 
Geneva cease fire agreement tenns prohibited Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia from 
joining military alliance, on the day the treaty was signed in Manila, its eight 
signatories (the US, Britain, Australia, New Zealand, the Philippine, Thailand and 
Pakistan) designed in an additional protocol that the states Cambodia, Laos and .. the 
free territory under the jurisdiction of the state of Vietnam" (Anderson, 2005. p.26) 
to be under SEATO protection. Dulles Described SEATO as "no trespassing" signs 
to deter Communist aggression. John G. Stoessinger wrote that 
"The United States thus created SEA TO to offset the results of Geneva. It also 
decided to consider South Vietnam a separate state ......... Hence Geneva and the 
SEATO treaty meant the end of French power in Indochina and the beginning of 
the America effort to enter the struggle with its own military powe(" (2008, 
p.IIO). 
So, SEATO makes the beginning of the US full commitment to deter 
Communism expansion in South East Asia. In that effort, America was detennined 
to keep South Vietnam as an independent and non-communist country. 
3.1.2.1 Ngo Dinh Diem's Government 
Ngo Dinh Diem was born in a Catholic family in Quang Binh province in 
Central Vietnam in 1901. His father had been an official in the imperial court at Hue 
before the French removed him. Diem attended French Catholics school in Hue and 
then School of Laws and Public Administration in Hanoi from which he graduated 
at the top of the class (TuckeL 1999, p.81). Diem gained reputation of anti-
communism after he assisted Bao Dai in crushing a communist uprising in 1929. In 
1933, Emperor Bao Dai appointed him Minister of Interior for Annam. But Diem 
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soon discovered that he had no real power and resigned. Diem was a strong 
Vietnamese nationalist, who opposed both French colonialism and Communism. 
"Among Vietnamese, he (Diem) had a reputation for independence, honesty. and 
courageous criticism of French rule" (Anderson, 2005, p.28). 
After Vietminh declared the independence of Democratic Republic of 
Vietnam in September 1945, Diem was kidnapped and was taken to Hanoi. 
Reportedly, Diem was asked to joint Communist but he refused. Later, much to his 
surprise Diem was released. In the next few years, Diem travelled around the 
country seeking for political support. And in 1950, he decided to go abroad (Tucker. 
1999, p.81). Diem spent two years in the US, where he met with some prominent 
American figures such as Justice William, O. Douglas, Senator John F. Kenedy and 
Mike Mansfield and Francis Cardinal Spellman, the Archbishop of New York-
Diem's greatest American supporter (Anderson, 2005, p.28). After Geneva 
conference, Diem's qualities of both anti -communist and anti -colonialist were 
compatible with the US policies to Indochina. Although his reputation as a 
nationalist was tarnished by his having been abroad during much of Indo-China war, 
his opposition to cooperate with French colonial enhanced it. Thus Diem initially 
got support from some prominent American after the Geneva accord was signed in 
July 1954. 
On June 18, 1954, Bao Dai, the last Emperor of Vietnam and then the Head of 
State of Vietnam, summoned Diem to his villa in Cannes and appointed him Prime 
Minister. Diem returned to Sai Gon on June 26, and on July 7 officially fonned his 
new government, which claimed to embrace all Vietnamese (Tucker. 1999, p.82). 
Bao Dai' s decision to appoint Diem ,vas surprising for he had disliked and 
distrusted Diem. Possibly because of the time Diem had spent in the US and his 
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meeting with prominent Americans there, Bao Dai believed that Washington would 
back Diem. 
"8ao Dai turned to Diem as a mean of trying to win US backing for the state of 
Vietnam as the French were at Geneva negotiating a possible exit from Indochina" 
(Anderson, 2005, p.29). 
The US official position of Diem government was at first cautious and then 
wholeheartedly supported. After Geneva accord was signed, Eisenhower was eager 
to establish a strong anti-communist regime in South Vietnam, thus the 
administration looked around for a Vietnamese leader who could carry out the job. 
After Diem formed his government in July 1954, General J. Lawton Collins was 
sent to Saigon in November 1954 by Eisenhower. According to Anderson, Collins 
had served as one of Eisenhower's principal field commanders in Second World 
War, spoke French and was personally acquainted with general Ely, who had been 
appointed French High Commission in Indochina (Anderson, 2005, p.27). Collin 
was sent to Sai Gon with specific task "to formulate a crash program to maintain a 
government in Sai Gon and to establish security in free Vietnam" and also .. to make 
a judgement of Diem's ability to provide the alternative regime Washington desired 
to contest the Communist-led Democratic Republic of Vietnam" (Anderson, 2005. 
p.27& 29). After five months in Sai Gon, Collin was very much in doubt of Diem's 
success and reported that 
"Diem was incapable of providing the strong leadership that South Vietnam 
needed" and "the regime in Sai Gon was a practically one man government that 
had to be substantially broadened to include other patriotic Vietnamese who 
opposed the communist" (Anderson, 2005. p.29). 
However, in April 1955, fighting broke out between Diem government and 
various religious sects in the South like Cao Dai. Hoa Hao and gangster Binh Xuyen 
who controlled the vice trade in Sai Gon. Diem's Vietnamese National Army with 
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the help of Edward Lansdale, won the battle and was able to settle down the conflict 
among various sects. Edward Lansdale, an air force officer who had secretly aided 
Philippine president Ramon Magsaysay in politically outmanoeuYring communist 
insurgents, was the representative of CIA director Allan Dulles. Lansdale befriended 
with Diem and helped him a lot in his early days as head of government. 
The success of Diem in dealing with religious sects and armed gangster 
convinced the Eisenhower administration to reverse Collin's recommendations. 
Hence, since then the Eisenhower was committed wholeheartedly support for Diem 
to build a viable non-communist country in South Vietnam. 
"It cannot be known if a shift to some other South Vietnam leader in 1955 would 
have changed the ultimate course of the Vietnam war, but from that point until 
1963 the success of US objectives in Vietnam depended on the ability of Diem to 
create an effective government" (Laws Collins, 1979 cited in Anderson. 2005, 
p.30). 
In the early days, Diem's government faced enormous obstacles. One of the 
most significant obstacles to the survival of the government was its own legitimacy. 
Anderson (2005) wrote that Diem's government 
"bears the image of puppet government and it would not be able to compete 
politically with the nationalist appeal of the DRV .... His (Diem) constitutional 
authority as prime minister came from Bao Dai, whose own position was 
understood throughout Vietnam to have been created by France" (p.3l). 
Moreover, though Bao Dai appointed Diem as Prime Minister, he did not give 
Diem much real power. 
"Although invited by Bao Dai to fonn a government on June 16. 195-L Diem 
arrived in Sai Gon to find that he had been granted no real authority" (Lomperis. 
1984. p.49). 
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So, one of the first tasks of Diem was to create the legitimacy for himself as 
well as his government. Thus after settlement of conflict with religious sects Cai 
Dai, Hoa Hao and gangster Binh Xuyen, Diem was quick in deposing Bao Dai and 
establish himself as Head of State. On 30 April 1955, Diem organized a general 
assembly that demanded Bao Dai's resignation as Chief of State. In October 1955. 
Diem held a referendum between himself and Bao Dai (Lomperis, 1984, p.49). 
Diem was declared the winner of the referendum with 98% of vote in his favour. 
Then Diem and his American supporters cited the referendum as basis for the 
regime's authority. On 26 October 1955. using the referendum result as justification, 
Diem proclaimed the Republic of Vietnam with himself as president. This event was 
the finish of the process of creating an independent non-communist country in the 
South Vietnam, to counter the spread of Communism from the North Vietnam. 
3.1.2.2 America's support to Diem and nation building effort in South Vietnam 
According to the so-called "domino theory", which dominated the American 
foreign policy in Indochina in Eisenhower administration and its successors, if 
South Vietnam fell to the Communist, the whole region would be affected. Gary 
Hess wrote that 
"Communist success in Vietnam would inexorably lead to the collapse of the 
other non-communist states. Like a row of "dominos", the nations in Southeast 
Asia and beyond would succumb to communism" (Hess, 20 I 0, p.31). 
Michael Lind even stated a worse outcome of the loss of Indochina to 
Communism according to the "Domino theory". 
"It was feared that the loss of South Vietnam to Hanoi-sponsored communist 
insurgents would lead to communist takeovers in neighbouring countries in 
Indochina or Southeast Asia, or to copycat Communist or anti western re\·olutions 
in other areas if the developing world. or to bandwagon with or appeasement of 
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the Soviet Union or communist China by U.S allies and neutrals unsure of the 
reliability of u. S security guarantees". (Lin, 1999, p.3 5) 
Thus the America policy toward Indochina since Geneva conference was .. to 
seek an independent non-communist South Vietnam" (Joes. 2001, p.42). After some 
initial hesitation, the Eisenhower administration threw its wholehearted support to 
the newly created non-communist government in South Vietnam headed by Ngo 
Dinh Diem. 
The US commitment to Ngo Dinh Diem received non-partisan political 
support from a group called The America Friends of Vietnam. One of prominent 
member of this group - Senator Mike Mansfield in October 1954 wrote that 
"in the jungle of colonial decay. corruption and military defeat which 
characterized Sai Gon in 1954. Diem assumed the leadership with few assets other 
than his nationalism, his personal incorruptibility and his idealistic detennination" 
(Joes, 2001, p.43). 
Senator John F. Kennedy of Massachusetts described South Vietnam as the 
"cornerstone of the free world in South East Asia" and "an inspiration to indeed the 
world". Even in 1957. a journal on the prestigious Foreign Affairs wrote that 
"history may yet adjudge Diem as one of the greatest figures of twentieth century 
Asia" (Joes. 2001. p.43). 
Internationally, the US strongly supported Diem by creating his image as great 
leader and the saviour of South Vietnam. One of the first US' s international move to 
support Diem was taking the lead in the creation of SEATO on 8 September 1954. A 
separate protocol extended the treaty's security protection to Laos, Cambodia and 
the "free territory under the jurisdiction of the State of Vietnam" (Tucker. 1999. 
p.83). 
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Also to further strengthen Diem's position internationally and domestically, 
President Eisenhower sent high ranking US officials to visit Vietnam, including 
Secretary of State John Foster Dulles in 1955 and vice president Richard Nixon in 
1956. Most prominently was America's reception of Diem in his visit to the US in 
May 1957. During the visit, Diem attended the elegant dinner and met privately with 
President Eisenhower and Secretary of State J.F Dulles in the White House. Diem 
also addressed a joint session of Congress. Publically Eisenhower and other official 
hailed Diem as "tough miracle man" and the "saviour" of South Vietnam. They 
characterized Diem's regime as an important partner with the US in the fight against 
global communism. 
'This ceremonial treatment was intended to strengthen Diem's image as a leader. It was 
one of several such state visits hosted by Eisenhower for Asia and Afiica leaders" 
(Anderson, 2005, p.32). 
Domestically, the US did everything possible to help Diem to consolidate his 
power and eliminate other opposing armed sects. In the first few days, Diem 
government faced great challenges from existing French forces, Cao Dai, Hoa Hao 
and Binh Xuyen. By late August 1954, General Nguyen Van Hinh, the Chief of 
Staff of Bao Dai's Army, a French citizen and an officer in French Air Force 
"openly admitted to US authorities that he was talking to leaders of religious sects 
about coup against Diem" (Tucker, 1999, p.83). In that situation, General J. Collins, 
President Eisenhower's special envoy in Sai Gon, made it clear to Hinh that US aid 
for South Vietnamese would be cut off if Diem was to be removed by force. Tucker 
wrote that 
"Washington's October decision to channel all aid directly to his government was 
critical to Diem's survival" (1999, p.83). 
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After assisting Diem in consolidating his poweL Washington continued to 
provide aid to Diem government to keep nation standing. Each year the United 
States provided almost a quarter of billion dollars to South Vietnam. The US aid 
was vital to South Vietnam economy. Tucker pointed out that 
"'In 1955, Diem's government collected revenues equal to onl) one-third 
of expenditures ..... Totally, during the period 1954-1963, US aid carne to 
about 1.7 billion (1999, p.87). 
Anderson clearly said that 
"The Southern economy would have collapsed without $ 200 million in aid 
provided annually by the United States. The modestly affluent consumer culture of 
refrigerators and motor-bike in the cities contrast sharply with rural poverty that 
left some families with $25 annual incomes after payment of rent and taxes" 
(Anderson cited in Peter Lowe, 1998, p.97). 
Eighty percent of US aid went directly to South Vietnam military budget 
because "Eisenhower administration considered military security to be the most 
urgent needs of Sai Gon government" (Anderson. 2005, p. 32). In May 1955, the US 
Military Assistance Advisory Group recommended to Washington to build an anny 
for South Vietnam of 150,000 men. After debating about the composition within 
150,000 men, the process organization South Vietnamese Anny completed in 1960 
with seven "field divisions" of 10,450 men (TuckeL 1999. p.86). 
Eisenhower administration did throw full support to Diem III creating his 
government and consolidating his power. Eisenhower also helped to build South 
Vietnam Anny and paid for 85% of the cost of maintaining the 150,000 strong 
force. However, Eisenhower did not deploy troop in Vietnam and the number of 
unifonned American advisors in the Republic of Vietnam never exceeded 900 
before 1 961 . 
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3.1.3 Kennedy Administration and counter insurgency in Vietnam 
During his brief presidency of a thousand days, John F. Kennedy deepened the 
American military involvement in Vietnam considerably. By the time of Kennedy's 
death in 1963, over 16,000 America military advisers were in South Vietnam. This 
number was a huge increase from the number of 900 military advisors in the end of 
Eisenhower administration. The American became more identified with the highly 
unpopular regime of president Diem. Stoessinger (2008) wrote that 
"Under Kennedy's leadership the United States entered a crucial period of 
transition from a marginal commitment to fateful and direct involvement" (p.lll). 
Kennedy, entering the White House on 20 January 1961, was convinced of the 
importance of the so-called "'Third World" in the Cold War conflict. According to 
the historian Gary Hess, four words- Commitment, Credibility, Consequences and 
Counter insurgency- are central to Kennedy administration's Vietnam policy. 
(Lowe, 1998, p.98). In his inauguration speech, the President had made the 
commitment that the US would 
"pay any price. bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose 
any foe to assure the survival and the success of liberty" (Cited in Anderson, 2005, 
p.37). 
To show to the world that America was up to its commitment, the Kennedy 
team felt that '"the US need to pay close attention to internal political struggles in 
Vietnam and other developing nations" (Anderson, 2005, p.36). The administration 
chose to step up counter-insurgency war in South Vietnam. According to Anderson, 
the Administration's counter-insurgency plan contained military. economic. 
psychologicaL covert and financial sections. The Eisenhower administration had 
limited the Republic of Vietnam's (RVN) armed forces to 150,000 in its military 
assistance program. And by the time Eisenhower left office, the number of l.:S 
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military advisor was kept under 900 men. After 4 months as the President of the US, 
in May 1961 Kennedy authorized a personnel ceiling of 200,000 for the South' s 
regular military forces and expansion of local self-defence forces. Kennedy also sent 
400 US army special forces to South Vietnam in order to help training Montagnard 
tribesmen in anti-guerrilla warfare. Also, to assure Diem of continued US support, 
Kennedy asked his vice president Lyndon Johnson to visit Saigon. Johnson was 
favourably impressed with Diem and hailed him publicly as "the Winston Churchill 
of Southeast Asia" (Stoessinger, 2008, p.112). 
In October 1961, the President decided to send two of his own special 
representatives to Vietnam for an on site fact-finding trip, Deputy National Security 
Advisor Walt Rostow and General Maxell Taylor. After the trip, Rostow and Taylor 
recommended the introduction of 8000 American combat troops into Vietnam and 
"stated flatly that without such a commitment Vietnam could not be saved" 
(Stoessinger, 2008, p.113). 
The report shocked the president. Although Kennedy rejected Rostow's and 
Taylor's recommendations and did not send troop in Vietnam. he authorized 
military advisors. During 1962, the number of US military advisers reached 9000, a 
tenfold increase over the Eisenhower level (Anderson, 2005, p.38). And by the end 
of Kennedy administration, the number of US military advisors in Vietnam totalled 
more than 16,000. Also, Washington set up the Military Assistance Command, 
Vietnam (MACV) to provide an effective command structure for this mounting 
military effort. 
Kennedy also made effort to counter the mounting insurgent operations in 
South Vietnam. According to Anthony Joes (2001), in February 1962, close advisors 
of Kennedy concluded that personal security in the "illages of South Vietnam was 
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the key to winning the war against guerrilla. The strategic hamlet program was the 
centrepiece in this view. 
The purpose of strategic hamlet program were: (1) separating armed guerrilla 
bands from sympathizers inside the hamlet (the revolutionary structure) who 
previously supplied them with recruits, foods and intelligence, (2) providing the 
opportunity to root out this infrastructure, and (3) organizing the peasants into self-
defence units to resist demand or attacks by the guerrillas (Joes, 2001, p.63). 
Previously in late 1950s, Diem government had carried a program of agroville 
to remove peasant communities from exposed areas into new and more secured 
locations. But the inadequate government financial assistant and the undermining 
activities of Vietcong led to failure of the program. In 1962, the strategic hamlet was 
introduced under the direction ofNgo Dinh Nhu, Ngo Dinh Diem's brother, who is 
the senior advisor for Diem's government. Still facing with many problems such as 
lack of cooperation from peasants, corruption from government, sabotage from 
Vietcong, the program failed to achieve its objectives. However, the program did 
cause difficulties to Communist insurgency in the South Vietnam. 
"Radio Hanoi launched a furious and prolonged campaign denunciation of the 
strategic hamlets, and captured documents indicate that the Communist were 
greatly preoccupied with finding the right way to deal with them" (Joes, 2001, 
p.65) 
However, in the years of Kennedy administration, the domestic situation in 
South Vietnam gets worse. The resentment of South Vietnam Buddhists against 
Diem regime became unsolvable. Diem's brother Ngo Dinh Nhu directed the 
regime's secret police attack on Buddhist pagodas. There were self-immolations of 
Buddhist monks in Sai Gon street. Facing with the situation getting worse and 
worse, Kennedy decided to give up support for Diem. 
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"On 24 August 1963. a State Department cable to Ambassador Henry Cabot 
Lodge in Sai Gon authorized the ambassador to demand Diem remo\e Nhu 
from the government. This instruction also permitted the embassy to inform 
dissident South Vietnamese generals that the United States would not interfere 
with a coup if Diem failed to oust his brother" (Anderson, 2005, p.39). 
In November 1963, the coup was started by South Vietnamese army generals. 
The US embassy knew about it before hand but did not interfere. As a result, Diem 
and his brother were ousted and then murdered. Three weeks later, Kennedy was 
also assassinated in Dallas. These events marked the end of the period of relati\'e 
political stability in South Vietnam and beginning of a chaotic time and the direct 
America military involvement in Vietnam. 
3.1.4 Johnson and the escalation of America's military involvement 
in Vietnam 
Johnson's sudden accession to presidency came when the political situation in 
South Vietnam underwent huge chaos. The coup against Diem regime did not 
produce a viable coalition to lead Sai Gon government. South Vietnam entered a 
period of coup and anti-coup with factions struggle for power. 
"The removal of the Diem regime did not produce the desired stable. legitimate 
political order committed to American-sponsored reforms" (Lomperis, 1984, 
p.61). 
Indeed, the death of Diem unleashed seething rivalries and factionalism and 
put the country back in some ways to where Diem had found in 1954. Instead of 
removing major obstacles to effective action against the communist, Diem's death 
had destroyed the source of whatever collaboration and dynamism had existed in the 
South Vietnamese war effort, just as the opponents of the coup in the US mission in 
Sai Gon had fear it would (Joes, 2001, p.80). Politics in two years after the coup 
against Diem became an elaborate intrigue played on the stage of Sai Gon. 
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Jockeying for power were military factions~ civilian bureaucrats and political parties 
like the Dai Viet~ VNQDD and Can Lao remnants as well as Roman Catholic and 
Buddhist organizations. 
"Before the flashy air Vice Marshal Nguyen Cao Ky stepped in on 
February 10, 1965, and finally stabilized the situation, there had been 
nine changes of governments" (Lomperis, 1984, p.62). 
And J oes wrote that 
"Reflecting years later on the meaning and genesis of these events, a 
senior Vietnamese military officer was moved to confess that the 
overthrow and consequently death of Diem had indeed been a great 
disaster for South Vietnam." (Cao Van Vien, 1980, cited in Joes, 200 L 
p.81 ). 
So, until the maSSIve American intervention~ South Vietnam was close to 
collapse. The immediate post-Diem military governments were utterly unable to 
stem the rising tide of Communist insurgency. 
"The condition within South Vietnam continued to deteriorate. By the spring of 
1964, vast areas of South Vietnam were under National Liberation Front (NLF) 
control, the strategic hamlet program was essentially moribund and the infiltration 
of man and material from the North had grown" (Lowe, 1998, p.l 02). 
To make the situation worst, at the same time the North was heating up the 
war. In December 1963, a few weeks after the killing of Diem~ the Ninth Plenum of 
the Communist Party Central Committee was convened in Hanoi and decided on a 
major escalation of the struggle. By the end of 1964 regular North Vietnam Army 
(NV A) elements had been introduced into the South and large Vietcong units \\'ere 
manoeuvring near the Sai Gon. At the end of the winter 1964-1965, almost half the 
population and nearly two third of the territory of South Vietnam were in 
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Communist hand. "The Southern Republic seemed on the verge of extinction". 
(Joes, 2001, p.81). 
It was in this context of emergency that the Johnson administration began a 
rapid build up of US ground forces in South Vietnam, otherwise the country would 
collapse under communist regime. 
As vice president of Kennedy administration and came to power after the 
assassination of Kennedy, Johnson had much the same perception of Vietnam as did 
Kennedy. According to Anderson (2005), Johnson's views were summarised by four 
words- Commitment, Credibility, Consequences and Combat. Four days after 
Kennedy's murder, Johnson approved National Security Action Memorandum 
No.273 that restated, in a language very similar to Truman ~ s, the US pledge to assist 
the South Vietnamese "to win their contest against the externally directed and 
supported Communist conspiracy" (Lowe, 1998, p.l 01). 
This memorandum was drafted by the NSC before Kennedy's death. So by 
approving it, Johnson stood firmly in the containment tradition. The situation in 
South Vietnam was so grave that simply assisting the South against the North was 
not enough. Thus, in June, General William C. Westmoreland was sent to Vietnam. 
He was one of the most accomplished combat officers. After arriving to Sai Gon and 
unimpressed by the pacification program so far, he immediately requested more 
American military personnel to help the army of Republic of Vietnam and he got the 
agreement from Washington. Thus, in 1965 the US army advisory strength 
surpassed 23,000. The Johnson administration believed that the root problem of 
insurgent in the South Vietnam came from the North. The administration held that 
the NLF was under the direction from the North Vietnam. The pace and fierce of the 
insurgency in the South was controlled and guided by North Vietnam leadership. 
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The North was also the great rear and great supplier of logistic for insurgents in the 
South. 
So the Johnson administration was convinced that Hanoi. not NLF. was the 
true enemy. In order to remove the problem of Southern insurgency. the 
administration believed that they should deal with it from the roots. They reasoned 
that "pressure on the North would strengthen the South" (Anderson, 2005, p.43). 
However, the coercion measures against the North Vietnam should not 
provoke the intervention by China, thus the America chose covert actions first. 
Before his death, Kennedy had approved two harassing covert activities against 
North Vietnam: OPLAN 34A and the DESOTO patrols. OPLAN 34A was a 
program of seaborne raids along the North Vietnam Coast by South Vietnam troops 
with American logistic support, which began in February 1964. DESOTO patrol 
was conducted by the i h fleet to test North Vietnam coastal radar (Lompersis, 1984, 
p.65). However, these harassing programs seem unimpressed Hanoi. Hanoi still 
stepped up its aid to insurgents in the South through Ho Chi Minh trail. Because 
"In December 1963. Hanoi, sensing a opportunity to achieve a military and 
political breakthrough, decided to step up its material support for insurgency, and 
by late 1964 units of the North Vietnamese army (PAVN) would be operating for 
the first time South of 17th parallel (Ruane, 2000, p.82). 
Lomperis (1984) wrote that 
"In April 1964, elements of the 325th PA VN Division prepared to move South. 
The first regiment skirted around the demilitarized zone in late September. the 
second regiment in October and the third regiment in December. By march. 1965, 
when the first America combat unit splashed ashore in Danang, in addition to 
groups of individuals infiltrated as "fillers", or replacements, for local Vietcong 
units. 5800 regular PA VN troops \\ere in the South" (p.64). 
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This was due to the North Vietnam leadership reasoned that they could get a 
quick victory before America would involved in directly. William Duiker wrote 
that Hanoi felt that 
"If Washington was faced with a sudden and irreversible deterioration of the 
situation in South Vietnam, it might decide (as it had done in the case of China) 
that intervention could not succeed. Consequently, a determined effort to overturn 
or at least seriously weaken the Sai Gon regime in a relatively short time was 
vital" (Cited in Werner & Luu Doan Huynh, 1993, p.78) 
So the Johnson administration opted for an air strike against the North 
Vietnam. And what they needed at that time was a pretext to start the air war. Then 
came the so called Tonkin Gulf Resolution. On 2nd August 1964, Vietnamese 
torpedo boats engaged in the USS Maddox, a destroyer, in the area of Gulf of 
Tonkin. And two days later, on 4 August, under very poor weather condition, 
another North Vietnam attack was reported. Later, there has been intensive debate 
about these attacks and 
"A controversy arose between war critics and defenders as to whether the attack 
actually took place or, if they did, whether they were politically designed to gain 
public support for a more active America role" (Lomperis, 1984, p. 65). 
However, right after the attack, Johnson, receiving confirmation from Admiral 
US Grant Sharp, commander in chief of US Pacific forces, concludes that '"no doubt 
now existed that an attack on the destroyer had been carried ouC (McNamara 1995. 
cited in Anderson, 2005, p. 44), ordered a retaliatory act against North Vietnam by 
bombing coastal bases at Vinh. Then Johnson sought the support from congress to 
escalate the air war against North Vietnam. The so-called Tonkin Gulf Resolution 
was passed almost unanimously with only two dissenting votes from the Senate. The 
resolution wrote that 
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"That the Congress approves and supports the determination of the president as 
Commander in Chief, to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack 
against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression" (Ruane. 
2000. p.98). 
3.1.4.1 The America's air war in Vietnam 
In order to coerce North Vietnam to stop supporting and directing insurgent 
force in the South, Johnson administration chose to use air power. The opportunity 
came in February 1965, when an American camp in Pleiku was attacked by 
Vietcong. Eight American were killed and 60 wounded. By coincidence, Johnson's 
close aid, McGeorge Bundy was in South Vietnam at the time of the Pleiku raid. 
After the raid, he visited Pleiku and 
"recommended a reprisal policy of sustained bombing against the North that 
would cease only if the Vietcong ended their insurrectionist activities" 
(Stoessinger. 2008, p.119). 
Following Bundy's recommendation, Johnson began the relentless bombing 
campaign that was to devastate North Vietnam. The bombing of North Vietnam was 
intensified steadily during the Operation Rolling Thunder. According to Gary Hess, 
in 1965, American dropped 63,000 tons of bombs in North Vietnam in 25,000 
sorties, in 1966 it was 136,000 tons in 79,000 sorties and in 1967, it was 226,000 
tons in 10S,000 sorties (Hess, 2010, p.S5). 
James P. Harrison wrote that 
"During "Operation Rolling Thunder" (1963-1968), an average of 800 tons of 
bombs a day were dropped on the North, and several times as much on the South 
and Laos. In the eight years of heavies warfare, the average tonnage of bombs 
dropped was close to 2,400 tons a day, accumulating to over 7 million tons" 
(Wemer& Luu Doan Huynh, 1993, p. 131) 
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Throughout the war, total bombing for Vietnam equal to about five times the 
estimate of the bomb tonnage dropped by Anglo-America force in World War II. 
The total number for bombing varies from over 5 million tons on Vietnam to 7.8 
million tons on Indochina. 
After the Tonkin Gulf incident and reprisals against the North Vietnam in 
August 1964, America initiated the Operation Barrel Roll on December 14 1964 
against Ho Chi Minh trail in Laos. Then after the Pleiku raid, the operation 
'"Flaming Dart" began on 7 February 1965. Then came the most publicized bombing 
in history commenced on March 2 1965 with Rolling Thunder, which continued 
with eight pauses until 1968. "Linebacker I" resumed bombing the North Vietnam 
with a revenge from the late spring to October 1972, and "Linebacker II" 
explosively closed the America side of air war against Hanoi- December 18-29, 
1972. In South Vietnam and Laos, the bombing was carried out since 1965 without 
any major stop, though not as heavy as in the North. In 1969, the bombing secretly 
began in Cambodia and continues there with names like "Arc Light" and '"Operation 
Menu" (Breakfast Lunch and Dinner) until July 1973. 
The total tonnage of bomb against both North and South Vietnam increased 
every year. It started with 300,000 tons in 1965 to over 1 million tons in 1966 and 2 
million tons each year from 1967 to 1970. The peak year saw 2,966,548 bombs 
dropped by 400,000 combat sorties in 1968. During the '"Operation Rolling 
Thunder" (1965-1968), an average of 800 tons of bombs a day were dropped in the 
North. James P. Harrison concluded that 
"Vietnam will go down in history (hopefully) as the country that -small as it is-
suffered more bombardment than all other put together. in all previous \\ar" 
(Hanison cited in Luu Doan Huynh & Werner. 1993. p.130-133). 
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However, despite fierce as it was, the American air war did not produce 
desired result. The North Vietnam did not stop its support for Southern insurgency. 
"The most astonishing question, and one of the most overlooked aspects of the 
America war in Vietnam, was how the Vietnamese communist and their support 
could survive at all against the staggering fire power thrown at them" (Luu Doan 
Huynh & Werner, 1993, p.130). 
The North matched the American aIr escalation with its own escalation 
through infiltration on the ground. Since withdrawal was unthinkable, there was 
now only one possible response for Johnson administration: to meet Vietcong 
challenge head-on with American combat troops on the ground. 
3.1.4.2 The American ground war in Vietnam 
After Diem's death, South Vietnam politics underwent chaos and was 
threatened by the Communist force. The country was near the extinction. In order to 
save its allies, the Johnson administration chose to Americanize the war. 
"In the first half of 1965, Johnson made a series of fateful decision to Americanize 
completely the combat against DRV and its southern allies in the NLF. This 
Americanization took two forms (1) a sustained and gradually increasing US air 
bombardment of targets in South and North Vietnam. (2) deployments to South 
Vietnam of entire US combats division with supporting elements" (Anderson, 
2005, p.46). 
As the air war did not produce the desired result, thus the American had to 
increase its troops in South Vietnam. In March 1965, two battalions of US marines 
landed at Danang to protect the US airbase there. But Johnson still was very 
cautious and hesitated in sending combat troops to South Vietnam. 
"He would "not permit the independent nation of the East to swallO\\ed up by 
Communist conquest but it would not mean sending American boys 9 or 10.000 
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miles away from home to do what Asian boys ought to be doing for themselves" 
(Me Mahon, 2003, p.I78). 
And in June 1965, Westmoreland asked for 150,000 troops more to South 
Vietnam to reverse the tide of failure there, while Joint Chief of Staff endorsed this 
request, Johnson still very hesitated. He sought the counsel from several sources. In 
a meeting with White House cabinet on 21 July 1965, Johnson asked: 
"Options open to us: (1) Leave the country with as little loss as possible- the 
"bugging out" approach; (2) maintain present force and lose slowly; (3) add 
100,000 men-recognizing that may not be enough- and adding more next year. 
Disadvantages of option 3 -risk of escalation, casualties will be high-may be a 
long war without victory .. .I would like you to start out by stating our present 
position and where we can go." (Ruane, 2000, p.112) 
Then after consult with his close advisers, Johnson came to decision on 28 
July 1965. In the address to the Nation on that day, he stated that 
"What are our goals in that war-stained land? First, \\'e intend to convince the 
communist that cannot be defeated by force of arms or by superior power. They 
are not easily convinced. In recent months, they have greatly increased their 
attacks and the number of incidents. I have asked the commanding general, 
General Westmoreland, what more he needs to meet this mounting aggression. He 
has told me. We will meet his needs. 
I have today ordered to Vietnam the Air Mobile Diyision and certain other forces 
which will raise our fighting strength from 75,000 to 125,000 men almost 
immediately. Additional forces will be needed later, and they will be sent as 
required." (Ruane, 2000 p.l13) 
However, politically the President did not want the war to intrude on 
American domestic life. Internationally, the risk of a wider war with China and 
Soviet Union meant that the US would not go all out to annihilate the North 
Vietnam. 
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"The US believed that it could preserve a non communist South by forcing ~orth 
Vietnam to withdraw its support for the Southern insurgency. Johnson wanted to 
escalate the America force level unit until reached North Vietnam' s breaking 
point, exhibiting the administration's determination to Hanoi vet showim~: 
, - ~ 
restraint to minimize Chinese and Soviet intervention" (Hall, 2008, p.33). 
Under the strategy of gradual escalation, the US carried out the 
Americanization of the war. The US troop level in Vietnam increased gradually. In 
the end of 1964, there were only about 23,000, and then in mid-1965 the total 
number of US troops in Vietnam was about 45,000. However, the number reached 
385,000 in 1966 and 535,000 by early 1968. The president entrusted General 
Westmoreland with carrying out the ground war in South Vietnam. As being 
restricted not to take the war to North Vietnam, Westmoreland chose the strategy of 
attrition, which emphasized firepower and mobility of the US army. The aim of the 
attrition strategy was not control of territory but to weaken the strength of People's 
Liberation Armed Forces (PLAF) and People's Army of Vietnam (PA VN). 
"The United States and South Vietnam troops reports not how much 
territory was wrested from Vietcong control but how many Vietcong 
were killed each day of combat"" (Sardesai, 2005, p.l 07). 
Westmoreland reasoned that the beginning of the end will come when the 
crossover point was reached. 
"The cross-over point is the theoretical point in time when the US and its allies 
inflicted more casualties on North Vietnamese and NLF force than they could 
replace through recruitment. Some US officials believed that upon reaching this 
point the enemy would be forced to end the war on tenns favourable to the US" 
(Hall, 2008. p.34). 
Westmoreland carried out the attrition in two phases and he belie\'ed that he 
could stop the insurgency within 18 months. Initially he moved to secure the hea\'ily 
populated coastal areas and broke the VC's momentum. During this tirst phase. he 
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developed the logistical base necessary to support a larger force. Then 
Westmoreland assigned Army of Republic of Vietnam CARYN) with pacification 
occupation and security tasks. This arrangement freed large US combat force. In the 
second phase, Westmoreland used big unit confrontation to attack the NLF in their 
mountainous bases and blocking infiltration from the North. During this second 
phase, he hoped to impose a conventional war upon guerrillas, which held distinct 
advantages for the US. In this phase, Westmoreland implemented big unit search 
and destroy operations such as Cedar Falls, Junction City ... 
"Search and destroy is the name given to the US tactical application of its attrition 
strategy. It represent the dominant tactical approach used by American forces in the 
war. US force took the offensive to locate, engage, and destroy enemy forces. This 
assumed that American fire power could inflict sufficient casualties to force the 
enemy to give up fighting. (Hall, 2008, p.33). 
To track the effectiveness of this strategy, the pentagon devised a host of 
statistical measurements of the war's progress. The most notorious of these 
measures was body count- that is the actual or estimated number of enemy 
combatant killed. However, when commander rewarded individual or unit with 
promotions and extra leave for high body count, it could easily be inflated. And 
there existed a rule that '"if if s dead and Vietnamese. it's Vietcong". 
However. contrary to Westmoreland' s expectation, the US attrition strategy 
had failed to meet its objectives by the end 1967. The escalation of American armed 
force in Vietnam did prevent the defeat of South Vietnam. However, even with 
more than half of million American and allied troops in Vietnam, the military 
situation in Vietnam actually became stalemate. From 1965 to 1967, the American 
and South Vietnam forces did cause great loss to Vietcong and P A VN. According to 
Hall, fon11 1965-1967. the communist lost an estimated 79.000 combatant compared 
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to 13,500 American and 40,000 South Vietnamese. During the same period, 
however, the communist troop level in the south increased by 42,000 as they 
matched each US escalation and avoided the crossover point. The escalation had 
increased the costs of the war and money, but failed to diminish the North's threat to 
the South. 
Moreover, the '"assumption that military efforts could achieve political 
stability in Sai Gon and that Limited War could achieve victory quickly enough to 
prevent domestic umest both proved to be incorrect'" (HalL 2008, pAO). Corruption, 
factionalism and continued Buddhist protest plagued Thieu-Ky government. 
The increase of America's military involvement in Vietnam and its failure to 
achieve concrete result produced opposition to the government policy. This anti-war 
movement, though unorganized, grew dramatically and became one of the largest 
social movements in the national history. David Anderson described that 
"The protest movement in the US against the Vietnam war had no single 
organization as source. It was basically spontaneous and ad hoc collection of 
various pacifists. ideological anti-imperialists and peace liberals acting individually 
or in separate groups. It eventually came to include thousands of people engaged in 
various activities including political campaigns, petition drives. lobbying of 
legislators, street demonstrations, draft resistances, and occasionally overt acts of 
violence. Many of the movements also included veterans, political activists. 
ministers, mothers, and even some Vietnam veterans" (Anderson, 2005, p.62) 
The anti-war movement ultimately contributed to a general questioning of 
America's direction and values. The most common form of anti war movement was 
public protest. Since 1965, there were many big protests with the participation of 
tens of thousands of people. Most of the protest were non violent. however, some 
were not. Although, the US government denied being influenced by the anti-war 
movement, national leaders were well aware of its existence and tried \arious \\'ays 
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to quiet it. Coinciding with the escalation of war in Vietnam. the Johnson 
administration launched a public drive to explain its Vietnam policy. 
On 7 April 1965, Johnson. himself. had a television speech to justify the 
escalation of war 
"Our objective is the independence of South Vietnam, and its freedom from 
attack. We will not withdraw, either openly or under the cloak of a meaningless 
agreement...Once this is clear. then it should also be clear that the only path for 
reasonable men is the path of peaceful settlement." (Ruane,2000, p.l 08). 
The ground war then entered the stalemate in 1965-1967. At the end of 1967. 
the president asked General Westmoreland to be back in the US to make public the 
progress of the war. On 21 November 1967, Westmoreland appeared before the 
national press and asserted 
"We have reached an important point when the end begins to come into view. I am 
absolutely certain that whereas in 1965 the enemy was winning. today he IS 
certainly losing. The enemy's hopes are bankrupt" (Tucker, 1999, p.136). 
However, just two months later. an important event came and changed the 
course of the war-the Tet offensive. 
At the end of January 1968, PLAF and PA VN troops launched their most 
massive attack yet called Tet offensive. The DRV leaders selected the Lunar New 
Year celebration or Tet as time for the general offensive. Tet was the most important 
holiday of the year in Vietnam, when traditionally both sides had observed a cease 
fire. South Vietnamese military units would be at low strength with many men at 
home with their families for the customary celebrations and worship at family 
shrines (Tucker, 1999, p.136). The Tet offensive lasted 25 days, from January 31 
until Ferbruary 24 1968. 
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Scholars disagreed on what motivated the Tet Offensive. Some argued that 
northerners were worried about mounting losses and pursued a conventional assault 
as a desperate measure to stay in the war. Most, however. believed that Hanoi 
remained optimistic about its ultimate success. Exactly what they hoped to gain is 
also uncertain. Some hoped to stimulate a popular uprising and the formation of 
coalition government. A few might have looked for the collapse of Thieu' s regime 
and perhaps even an America's withdrawal. A majority more likely expected a less 
decisive change, such as a halt to the bombing or a weakened government in Sai 
Gon, and view the offensive as part of a long-term strategy of "fighting while 
negotiating" (Hall, 2008. p.49). 
While the Tet Offensive was not a total surprise to the American command, its 
intensity and breadth had a shocking impact that no one could disguise. The bulk of 
the attacks began on 31 January 1968. Communist forces struck 36 to 44 provincial 
capitals, 5 of 6 autonomous cities, 64 of 242 district capitals and about 50 hamlets. 
In the vital strategic area around Sai Gon, roughly a 30 mile zone around the capital 
known as the "Sai Gon circle", the communist committed the equivalent of more 
than two divisions. In the capital itself, communist sapper actually penetrated the US 
embassy (Hall, 2008, p.49). 
Overall, the Tet offensive was a major communist military defeat. North 
Vietnamese leaders had not realized their goals, there was no crushing defeat of 
allied force in the South, especially the ARVN. The Vietcong suffered great loss in 
term of human casualties. According to Office of Military Command Vietnam. 
figures for the number of casualties in the first wave enduring on March 31 \\ere 
America 3895, ARVN 4954, civilians 14,300 and VCINVA 58,373. By mid-May, 
the number of communist dead had reached 92,000. However, once again these 
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figures provide a relative guide because it IS usually highly inflated (Lomperis. 
1984, p.77). 
There also had been no general rallying of civilian population to the 
Communist cause. no "general uprising". A February 1 COSVN directive calling for 
continuation of the offensive admitted the failure 
"We failed to seize a number of primary objectives and to completel: destroy 
mobile and defensive units of the enemy. We also failed to hold the occupied 
areas. In the political field we failed to hold motivate the people to stage uprising 
and break the enemy oppressive control" (Tucker, 1999, p. 139). 
However, to some extent we can say that although the communist suffered a 
tactical defeat, ultimately. they achieve an enormous political victory. Because Tet 
offensive was a military defeat but it had great impact on the America and caused a 
major reassessment of America strategy in Vietnam war. Having been repeatedly 
told by leading political and military leaders that the communist were fading and 
that there was light at the end of the tunnel, the American public was stunned to find 
them still capable of such an effort. The new reality reinforced public discontent 
with the war. A Gallup poll in February 1968 showed a sharp reverse in the 
optimism revealed in an earlier poll in November 1967 (Lomperis, 1984. p.78). 
However, Westmoreland himself rightly learned that Tet offensive was a 
military loss for the Communist and he 
"saw an opportunity to pursue a more aggressive policy. the possibility of 
destroying the enemy's will to continue the war with reinforcement he could 
attack P A VN base areas and sanctuaries in Laos and Cambodia and eYen 
possibly cut the Ho Chi Minh trail" (Tucker, 1999, p.l ~5). 
Thus he requested for 206,000 reinforcements. Clifford urged Johnson not to 
make an immediate decision on the troop request and recommended full-scale 
revie\\ of Vietnam policy. Clifford's study group, after revie\\'ing the progress of the 
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war, came to conclusion that the strategy of graduated response and attrition was 
just not working. 
"A national Security Council study in early 1969 showed that e\ en at half the 
1968 casualty rate, it would take thirteen years to exhaust the manpower pool in 
the North. This. despite the massive America effort, only a stalemate had been 
achieved" (Lomperis, 1984, p.79). 
Moreover, when the N ew York Times broke the story that Westmoreland had 
requested 206,000 more troops, more public protests followed. A week later, 139 
members of the House of Representative voted for a resolution that called for a 
complete review of Vietnam policy. And in March some 78% of American 
expressed disapproval of Johnson's handling of the war. (Tucker. p.148). Thus on 
31 March 1968, Johnson had a television speech to the nation. He announced that he 
was restricting bombing of North Vietnam to the area just North of the DMZ and 
said that he would not seek or accept re-nomination for presidency. 
"Whatever the reasons, Johnson's 31 March speech marked a decisive turning 
point in the war and a return from graduated response to the pre-1965 policy of 
struggle to deny communist victory" (Tucker, 1999. p.1..J.9). 
This was the end of America's escalation and the next phase would be the 
peace with honour under Nixon administration. 
3.1.5 Nixon's Vietnam war 
In the November 1968 election, Nixon defeated Humphrey by one of the 
narrowest popular vote margin in the US history. During the campaign, candidate 
Nixon had been vague about his Vietnam policies. He had promise to end the \\'ar 
and win the peace. Nixon understood that the American public were fed up with the 
war. they \\anted America by "one \\"ay or another get out of Vietnam" (Anderson, 
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2005, p.84). However, Nixon was also afraid that America's credibility in the world 
would greatly be damaged. 
"Nixon and Kissinger believed that America's friends and enemies abroad would be 
closely watching how the US extricated itself from the war. Kissinger maintained 
resolutely that the "peace of the world" and the stability of "international order"' 
defended on the ability of the US to end the war with its honour and credibility as a 
world power intact" (Anderson, 2005, p.84). 
So in order to gain peace with honour, Nixon initiated the Vietnam strategy 
including twin measures. The first measure was to continue the peace negotiation 
with North Vietnam which already started in July by Johnson. Along with public 
peace negotiation, Nixon and Kissinger also opened a parallel secret talk. Kissinger 
proposed a two-tiered approach in which the US and the DRV would negotiate a 
mutual withdrawal of forces from the Republic of Vietnam while the Sai Gon 
government and the national liberation front discussed "political reconciliation" 
Kissinger thought that "this position would demonstrate flexibility to both Hanoi 
and the Democrats" (Anderson. 2005, p.86). 
To support the negotiation process, Nixon and Kissinger used the military 
forces to put pressure on North Vietnam. Nixon believed that the previous 
administration had failed because it had not used all available military force at 
disposal. Nixon wanted to send Hanoi the message that he would do anything, use 
any weapons at his disposal to end the war on his term. Nixon himself termed this as 
"madman theory". He told an aide that 
"'I \\ant the North Vietnam to believe that 1 have been reached the point \\ here 1 
mioht do anythino to stop the war. We \\ill just slip the word to them that "for 
:::> :::> 
God's sake, you kno\\" Nixon is obsessed about Communism. We cannot restraint 
him \\hen he is angry and he has his hand on nuclear button" and Ho Chi Minh 
himselfwill be in Paris in two days begging for peace" (Tucker, 1999, p.1 :"6). 
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To demonstrate to North Vietnam that he really meant what he said, I\ixon 
ordered the Operation menu to bomb P A VN sanctuary in neutral Cambodia. The 
military justification for bombing the Cambodia sanctuary was to prevent a P A VN 
thrust against Sai Gon. But Nixon' s real reason for approving it was to take a step 
that Johnson avoid, thus make it clear that the period of escalation and restriction 
had ended. Nixon wanted to terrify Hanoi into peace on his tenns (Tucker. 1999, 
p.156). Anderson (2005) wrote that 
"It was meant to signal a departure from Johnson's rational approach of slow but 
steady increase in military pressure (enough but not too much) to the creation of 
an irrational context in which there were no apparent limits to the amount 
pressure" (p.87). 
In light with this way of reasoning, the US used its military force to coerce 
Vietnam to accept its tenns in the process of negotiation. Prior to any breakthrough 
in negotiation was always air campaign against North Vietnam. For example, 
Linebacker I preceded the draft agreement of Paris accord in October 1972 and 
Linebacker II was followed by the signing of Paris accord in January 1973. In these 
air campaigns, the target was least restricted. Many targets had been not allowed in 
Johnson administration, now was fully operational under Nixon. Thus, Linebackers 
were arguably more successful than Rolling Thunder. 
Along with using military power to put pressure on North Vietnam, Nixon 
used its international relations to coerce North Vietnam to stop support South 
Vietnam insurgents. Nixon engaged dentente with Soviet Union as early as 1969. 
Sardesai (2005) wrote that 
"The dominant foreian policy official in the State Department observed that 
:;, -
Kissinger in 1969 and indeed for the entire period though 1972 was not a detente 
summit with Moscow but finding a honourable exit from Yietnam" (p.113). 
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Nixon also simultaneously made diplomatic overturn to China as counter 
weight to the Soviet Union and as a likely mediator with DRV, urging Hanoi to 
compromise in the same manner as China did in Geneva conference in 1954. 
The second part in Nixon strategy to Vietnam was Vietnamization, which is 
the gradual withdrawal of America troops out of Vietnam. replaced by the 
increasing of South Vietnam armed force and equipment. In May 1969. Nixon 
promulgated a new doctrine regarding the US role in subsequent Vietnam type 
situations. 
"In the face of future aggression that did not involve one of the nuclear powers. 
the US would "provide elements of military strength and economic resources 
approximate to our size and our interests" and would consider the defense and 
progress of other countries as "first their responsibility and second a regional 
responsibility" (Sardesai,2005, p.115). 
To carry out this doctrine, phased US troop withdrawal was introduced. 
American combat strength was at its peak in April 1969 with 543,000 men. In June 
1969, America announced that 25000 US troops would return to the US by the end 
of August. By summer 1970, America had 475,000 troops in South Vietnam but in 
1971 this number reduced to 335,000. At the same time, the Republic of Vietnam 
increased its armed force from 820,000 in 1968 to more than one million in 1970 
(Hall, 2008, p.61). Moreover, when the American troops withdrew from Vietnam, 
they turned their equipments over to the RVNAF. This included 1000,000 M16 
rifles, 12000 M60 machine guns, 40,000 M70 grenade launcher and 2000 artillery 
pieces or heavy mortars as well as tanks, ships and planes, with more than 500 
aircrafts. The RVNAF became the fought largest army in the world (Tucker. 1999. 
p.159). 
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From February 8, to March 24, 1971, to demonstrate its ability to assume the 
burden of fighting, South Vietnam armed forces carried out the Operation Lam Son 
719 to reduce the flow of supplies from the North to the South and forestall a PA VN 
invasion of northern South Vietnam. South Vietnam army fought well. This 
operation indeed had delayed a P A VN offensive by a year. However, both side 
declared victory. 
In a television address on April 4, 1971. Nixon stated "Tonight I can report 
Vietnamization has succeeded". President Thieu dubbed Lam Son 719 "The biggest 
victory ever". But radio Hanoi proclaimed that "The route 9 Southern Laos victory 
as the heaviest defeat ever for Nixon and company" (Tucker, 1999, p.167). 
On January 13, 1972, Nixon announced that an additional 70,000 troops 
would leave Vietnam by 1 May, reducing the total force from 545,000 when he 
entered office to only 64,500 troops. 
* Ending American military inl'o/w!ment in l'ietnam 
Nixon fully understood that the American public was fed up with the war and 
whether he won the election for second term or not depends on the success of his 
disintegration from Vietnam. Both Nixon and Kissinger are very pragmatic and they 
would shape US foreign policy to their best interest. Anderson (2005) pointed out 
that 
"'They did not necessarily assume that the Thieu regime would fail and a total 
withdrawal of US forces from South Vietnam did not mean that other fonn of 
America assistance could not remain available to Sai Gon .... and they know that 
they had to end US military intervention in Vietnam before 1972 presidential 
election" (p.96). 
Kissinger himself wrote privately that 
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"We are ready to withdra\v all our forces by a fixed date and let objecti\"es realities 
shape the political future. We want a decent interval" (Cited in Anderson, 2005. 
p.96). 
Thus, parallel with war on the ground in Vietnam and the process of 
Vietnamization, America carried out negotiation with North Vietnam both publicly 
and in secret. In the early years of the negotiation, the talk in Paris was not fruitful 
because the two sides' positions were too far apart. And more importantly. both 
sides were not serious about negotiation. Both American and Vietnam just wanted a 
framework of fighting while negotiating, no one was ready to make any concession 
for productive talk. 
During the first half of 1972, both the US and DRV made their own big plays 
to end the America war in Vietnam. In 1972, Nixon visited China and Soviet Union. 
Nixon hoped that he would be able to persuade Moscow and Beijing to urge Hanoi 
to compromise. Facing with the possibility of being neglected by its two big allies, 
North Vietnam found that they needed to continue military pressure on South 
Vietnam to gain balance of force required for a negotiated settlement they could 
accept. Thus, North Vietnam launched the great Easter Offensive in 1972. 
To relieve the burden of military pressure on South Vietnam, the US carried 
out the air campaign Linebacker I against North Vietnam. In this air campaign. the 
US did not apply great restriction in term of targets. This air campaign caused great 
loss to North Vietnam. 
"Hanoi discovered that although diminished, US firepower was still very 
dangerous and that the P A VN was not strong enough to coerce US into 
settlement" (Anderson, 2005, p.1 03). 
In October 1972, Kissinger and Le Duc Tho returned to bargaining table to 
discuss a cease fire in place, return of US prisoner of war, temporary continuation of 
- 111 -
Thieu's government in office. and pennission for PA VN units to remam in the 
South. However, these issues were protested by Thieu. The time was near the 
American election thus Kissinger announced that "peace was at hand", only some 
details remained to be decided. 
After Nixon won re-election as a president in a landslide victory. the 
negotiation resumed. During the time of election, America introduced Operation 
Enhance Plus, which provided the ARVN with thousands of pieces of heavy 
military equipment: tank, airplanes, helicopters and artilleries. North Vietnam 
strongly protested the Operation Enhance Plus and withdrew some of its previous 
concessions. To force North Vietnam back to the table and agree on the tenns of the 
draft accord, America carried out the Linebacker II or Christmas bombing from 
December 18 to 30, 1972. North Vietnam was terrified by the bomb and back to the 
bargaining table on Januray 8, 1972. 
On January 27, 1973, the United States, DVN, RVN and PRG signed in Paris 
the Agreement Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam. Its tenns were 
virtually identical to those that Kissinger and Tho had drafted in October. It 
provided for a cease-fire with PA VN and ARVN forces remaining in place, but did 
not specify precisely where those forces were located. All US and other foreign 
troops were to be out of Vietnam within 60 days, and during that same period US 
prisoners of war would be released. The RVN and PRG were to create a National 
Council of National Reconciliation and Concord to supervise compliance with the 
agreements and to replace for elections and reunification through "peaceful means". 
(Anderson, 2005, p.l 05-106). 
Finally, American got out of the Vietnam War. However, the war did not end 
there. The war lasted for two more years in the South Vietnam until April 1975 
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when the North Vietnam gained victory over RVN and reunified the country under 
Communist government. 
3.2 The Vietnam war in North Vietnam's official history 
account 
According to the North Vietnam's official account of the Vietnam War. the 
war started in 1954, just after the end of the first Indochina war. As early as July 
1954, at the 6th Plenary Session of the Lao Dong Party's Central Committee, 
leadership of North Vietnam identified American as the new enemy of the country. 
In North Vietnam's official view, the Vietnam War. or in Vietnamese language - the 
Vietnamese people's resistant war against America to save the country, lasted for 
more than 20 years, from July 1954 to April 1975. The war is usually divided into 
five phases as follow: 
Phase 1: From July 1954 to the end of 1960. This was the period of struggle 
for the implementation of the Geneva agreement. During this period, North Vietnam 
was of the view that the revolution in the South Vietnam should focus on using 
political struggle rather than using armed struggle. This is the period of political 
struggle. 
Phase 2: From 1961 to mid-1965. This was the period of fighting against the 
America's Special War in South Vietnam. America's Special War is the war carried 
out by South Vietnamese troops with America's military equipments and advisory. 
Phase 3: From mid-1965 to 1969. This was the period of defeating America's 
Limited War in South Vietnam. In this period, America sent its own troops to carry 
out the ground war in South Vietnam and at the same time waged the air war against 
North Vietnam. 
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Phase 4: From 1969 to mid-1973. This was the period of Vietnamization. in 
which America withdrew its troops out of Vietnam but increased its aid of military 
equipments for the South Vietnam's armed forces to bear all the burden of the \yar 
fighting. 
Phase 5: From mid-1973 to April 1975- the final phase of the war and the 
North Vietnam achieved its goals since 1954 of reunifying the country. 
Hereafter, I will go in details of each period. 
3.2.1 Phase 1- From July 1954 to the end of 1960 
In North Vietnam' s perspective. the 6th Plenary session of the Vietnamese 
Worker Party's (The official name of Vietnamese Communist Party. \\hich was 
operating in secret) Central Committee from 15th - 18th July 1954 was considered as 
the starting point of the resistant war against America to save the country. The 
resolution of the session identified that 
"America has become the main and direct enemy of the people in Vietnam, 
Laos and Cambodia" (Party Resolution, Volume 15. p.I66). 
According to the Military History of Vietnam, on 13 th July 1954, Diem, 
supported by America, returned to Vietnam after being appointed as prime minister 
of the Vietnam State by Bao Dai. After Diem's return to Vietnam, America 
implemented a series of strategic moves to impose neo-colonialism on South 
Vietnam, in order to create a non-communist independent state in South Vietnam. 
America 
+ Replaced France and supported Diem in his efforts to establish his rule 
South Vietnam 
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+ Built a new regime, armed forces in South Vietnam under the influence of 
America. 
+ Carried out the campaign to exterminate the communist forces in the South 
and to destroy the revolutionary bases of the South Vietnamese people (Vietnamese 
Military History, 2003, p.236). 
In order to establish the rule of a new regime, Diem resorted to many harsh 
measures against South Vietnamese people and revolutionary forces. Tran Van Tra 
wrote that 
"A dictatorial family rule, under Ngo Dinh Diem, was imposed on the people 
of South Vietnam. It was a government that tried to maintain its rules by force 
of arms, jails, and bloody repression (including the use of mobile scaffolds). It 
even murdered those who opposed its views. Labelling them Communists" 
(Ira, 1993, p.235). 
On the contrary, in two years after the signature of Geneva agreement, North 
Vietnam advocated strict adherence to the articles in the agreement. North Vietnam 
waged a political struggle to demand Diem government to abide by Geneva 
agreement and to cooperate with North Vietnam to organize a general election to 
reunify the country. North Vietnam did not allow the Southern cadres to resort to 
armed struggle. Ang Chen Guan wrote that 
'"In early April 1956, senior party officials in Nam Bo convened a special 
conference to re-evaluate the situation in the South. Ihe meeting concluded 
that the tactical use of violence had not only failed to yield the desired result, 
but had also undennined Hanoi's diplomatic efforts to resolve the issue. As 
such, any further use of violence at the point of time would be inappropriate" 
(Ang Cheng Guan, 2002, p.16). 
- 115 -
Tran Van Ira described the situation in the South \\'hen the North leadership 
did not allow using violent means to fight against Diem's repression. 
"'It is hard to describe accurately how a nation angered to the extreme by the 
ruthless and barbarous repression of the Diem government could abide strictly 
by the instruction of president Ho Chi Minh and the leadership of Vietnam' s 
Worker Party. At that time, those who resorted to arms to defend themselws 
were disciplined by the Party for erratic behavior. while those who refrained 
from violence were captured and/or killed. It was clear that Vietnamese side. 
both in North and South Vietnam, tried its best to maintain peace and ensure a 
correct implementation of the Geneva Agreement, but all these efforts were of 
no avail because of the Us policy of preventing South East Asia from falling 
into the Communist orbit" (Tran van Tra, 1993, p.nS). 
One question may be raised at this point is that did Hanoi truly believe in its 
political struggle that could coerce America and South Vietnam to fully abide by 
Geneva agreement and to implement the general election to reunify the country? 
The answer is No. As early as July 1954. at the 6th Plenary Session of the central 
committee of the Lao Dong party, Hanoi leadership had predicted that there would 
be no reunification by peaceful means. Ang Cheng Guan pointed out that 
"'Significantly, the session was held when the Geneva Conference was 
meeting on the other side of the globe. At the plenary session, the Hanoi 
leadership acknowledged that the country could not be reunified by peaceful 
means and Ho Chi Minh already indentified America as new enemy" (Ang 
Cheng Guan, 2002, p.14). 
So why did Hanoi keep on its political struggle and demand the 
implementation of Geneva agreements? According to the letter to the South of Le 
Duan. the first secretary of Lao Dong party, he explained that North Vietnam must 
not use violent means and keep demanding Diem govemment to implement the 
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general election because of propaganda value. Hanoi wanted to show the world and 
also the South cadres regrouped in the North that they did try their best and it was 
the Diem regime, supported by America, who refused to abide by Geneva 
agreement. Also, at that time Vietnam communists had just undergone a war with 
France, it would need some time to recover and reorganize the economy of the 
North. 
The general election to reunify the country as regulated III the Final 
Declaration of Geneva Conference never happened. The years from 1956 to 1959 
communist forces in the South suffered from great loss due to Diem's policy of 
terrors. According to the Vietnamese Military History, from 1956 to 1958, the party 
in the South lost 90% of its members, about 70.000 cadres was killed and 90.000 
other cadres was arrested, jailed and tortured. In 1955 there were about 60.000 party 
members in the South, but in 1958 there were only 5000 members left. In Zone V. 
about 40% of provincial party committee members, 60% of district party committee 
members and 70% commune party committee members were arrested and killed. 
Especially, in Tri Thien area, only 160 party members left out of 23,400 members in 
1955 (Vietnamese Military History, 2003, p.237). According to the book "Re1'ie1l' of 
the resistant "war against America to sart' the countr),: '"ictOlY and lessons". the loss 
of the revolutionary movement in the South Vietnam in 1955-1958 was because 
"The Party could not find out the appropriate method of struggle against Diem 
regime" (Vietnamese Military History, 2003, p.237). 
Under the pressure of the situation, the 15th plenary session of Lao Dong party 
was conyened in January 1959 to re-evaluate the situation and initiate the \\'ay 
forward for the revolution in the South. The session. chaired by Ho Chi Minh. 
reaffinned that 
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"The principle task of the revolution in the South \\ as to liberate the South. 
The immediate task is to overthrow Diem goyernment. The reyolution method 
is the combination of the political struggle with armed struggle, looking 
forward to general uprising and a protracted war" (Party Resolution, Volume 
20, p.82). 
The book "Local people's war in the war against America .. commented that 
"The 15th resolution reflected the true demand of the revolution in the South 
Vietnam. It also reflected the desire of the cadres and the mass in the South to 
use violent means to counter Diem government's policy of terror." (Local 
people's war in the war against America, 1996, p.30). 
The Resolution 15 was disseminated to the South by the party members who 
attended the session in Hanoi. The resolution relieved the restriction on the use of 
forces, thus helped to bring the revolution in the South Vietnam to a new level. With 
the new guidelines from Hanoi, there was a wave of general uprising in the South 
Vietnam in later 1959. The first uprising happened in Tra Bong, Quang Ngai 
province in the south of central Vietnam. In the uprising, people stood up, forced the 
Head of District to step down and dissolved the local apparatus. Diem government 
sent troops to the area to re-establish law and order but failed to do that. Tra Bong 
was then under the control of the revolutionary forces. After Tra Bong, uprising 
happened in many provinces in the South Vietnam, especially in Ben Tre Province. 
Diem central government was not able to stop the wave of uprising in many 
provinces. Its armed forces could only defend the main cities and Sai Gon. Ang 
Cheng Guan wrote that 
"'The practice of attacking the enemy by combining the political struggle \\ ith 
the armed struggle was first employed during Ben Tre uprisings. From the 
uprising in Ben Tre onwards, concerted uprisings swept across the proyinces 
of the South. Guerrilla action. once regarded by the US as long teml threat to 
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Diem regime, was now South Vietnam's 'number one problem' (Ang Cheng 
Guan, 2002, pA3). 
The general uprising in the South Vietnam marked the end of the period of 
political struggle in North Vietnam's strategy. The general uprising also showed that 
Diem government could not stand finnly in South Vietnam without more assistance 
from America. The revolution in South Vietnam entered a new level in 1960. 
3.2.2 Phase 2: From 1961 to mid-1965 
After the Resolution 15, mass uprising, instigated and led by the communists 
and supported by revolutionary anned units has swept all over South Vietnam. 
North Vietnam was of the view that the widespread of the uprising movement in the 
South was evidence that Diem regime could not sustain without further American 
support. The book" Vietnamese military history" wrote that 
"Mass uprising movement in the South Vietnam showed that the America's 
neo-colonialism with the imposition of Ngo Dinh Diem family dictatorship 
has failed" (Vietnamese Military History, 2003, p.240). 
Facing with the possibility of losing its influence in South Vietnam, America 
had to change its strategy. From 1954 to 1960, America's strategy was to rule South 
Vietnam through Diem government without deep interference from America. 
However, after the uprising movement spread all over South Vietnam, it was clear 
that that strategy failed. America had to introduce the strategy of Special War in 
South Vietnam. Special war meant that the war would be carried out by South 
Vietnam anned forces. America would provide South Vietnam with anned 
equipments and advisory. This was a type of war in the Kennedy's grand strategy of 
flexible response. 
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America initiated the following strategic measures, according to .. Vietnamese 
military history": 
+ Implementing the program of strategic hamlet all over South Vietnam in 
order to separate communist and guerrilla forces from civilian. This was considered 
to be the back bone of the Special War strategy. 
+ Building up South Vietnam's army, carrying out assault campaign to destroy 
the revolutionary armed forces and also to support the strategic hamlet program. 
+ Carrying out the secret war against North Vietnam (Vietnamese Military 
History, 2003, p.24S). 
In 1961, Staley-Taylor plan was adopted by the Kennedy administration to 
concretize these strategic measures. The plan aimed at pacifying the South Vietnam 
within 18 month from mid-1961 to the end of 1962. The main point of the Staley-
Taylor plan was to build strategic hamlet in all over South Vietnam and forced 
people to live in these hamlets. The objective of the Staley-Taylor plan was to 
control 10 million people in 16,000 strategic hamlets in South Vietnam. 
After the assassinations of Diem and Kennedy, Johnson became the president 
of the US. Johnson introduced Johnson-McNamara program to replace Staley-
Taylor program which had failed to achieve its objectives. The purposes of the 
Johnson-McNamara were also to pacify South Vietnam by strategic hamlet 
program. However, according to North Vietnam, Johnson-McNamara plan paid 
more attention to increasing South Vietnam armed forces and operations to destroy 
revolutionary forces. 
In order to counter America's Special War 111 Vietnam, North Vietnam 
outlined the following strategic guidance: 
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+ Intensifying the building of anned forces (both the regular and local one) 
and the local bases in the South. 
+ Developing the guerrilla warfare in all three strategic areas, gradually 
improving the fighting skills of the anned forces. 
+ Intensifying the aid from the North to the South by Ho Chi Minh trail on the 
ground and at the sea. 
+ Intensifying the cause of construction of the North, implementing first five 
year plan on economic and second five year plan on defence. (Vietnamese Military 
History, 2003, p.250). 
To concretize these points, Lao Dong Central Committee in North Vietnam 
issued several directives to provide strategic guidance for the revolution in the 
South. The directive of the Politburo dated 24th January 1961 wrote that 
"Due to the change in power balance toward our forces, we had to change the 
motto of struggle: we must intensify our political struggle and at the same 
time intensifying the armed struggle to be in the same pace with political 
struggle. We will attack enemy by both political and military means" (Party 
Resolution, Volume :2:2, p.158). 
This is a new level of struggle since the Resolution 15. Previously, North 
Vietnam always emphasized political struggle only, anned struggle was used as a 
supporting means only. Now, North Vietnam intensified both political and anned 
struggle and both were considered equally important. On i h February 1961. Le 
Duan sent a letter to the Party's Central Office of the South Vietnam, making clear 
the strategic guidance in the directive on 24th January 1961. Ang Cheng Guan noted 
in the letter Le Duan argued that 
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'"The revolutionary struggle at that point of time should not mimic to Chinese 
model of protracted anned struggle whereby rural forces would fIrst descend 
upon and besiege the cities before the fInal liberation of the whole country by 
the military forces. Instead, in South Vietnam and in Laos as well, the strategy 
should begin with separate but co-ordinated uprisings with the objectiYe of 
establishing base areas and employing guerrilla warfare tactics. culminating in 
a general mass uprising in the fInal stage. The most important task was to 
conduct political struggle supplemented by anned struggle to regain political 
supremacy for the masses" (Cited in Ang Cheng Guan, 2002, p.57) 
Later in July 1962, Le Duan sent another letter to the South explaining the 
strategy to the Vietnam's revolution in that period. He argued that America was 
determined to defend South Vietnam against Communism in South East Asia. And 
South Vietnam was different from Laos that it did not share border with China, so it 
was more likely that America would send its troops to South Vietnam. In that 
situation, whole Vietnam would be at war with America, thus North Vietnam would 
not be able to carry out the current unfinished socialism revolution, and, as a result, 
it would not be able to support the revolution in the South. He recommended that the 
struggle in the South Vietnam should not cause harm to peace in the North Vietnam. 
He wrote that 
"The main task of our country's revolution now is to preserve peace in North 
to carry out the socialism revolution and to liberate the South, aiming at 
reunify the country" (Party Resolution, Volume 23. p.71 0). 
With the guidance from the North to intensify the armed struggle in the South. 
military activities by the revolutionary forces were increased. The most notable 
battle in the early years of special war period was the battle of Ap Bac. This battle 
was the first battle of local revolutionary anned forces against regular troops of 
South Vietnam go\'emment \\ith the support of America's military equipment and 
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advisory. The battle took place in a commune just 40km to the south of Sai Gon. It 
ended with the victory belong to revolutionary forces. In North Vietnam official 
history of the war, this battle was an important mark of the war. The book 
.. T'ietnamese military history" wrote that 
"The victory of Ap Bac on 2 January 1963 was an important event in the war. 
It revealed the capability of the revolutionary forces to defeat the America's 
special war" (Vietnamese Military History. 2003. p.243). 
Ang Cheng Guan wrote that 
"North Vietnam Politburo observed that after the Ap Bac battle of January 
1963, the Americans had realized that the South Vietnam military would fmd 
it difficult to defeat the communists even with their (American) support." 
(Ang Cheng Guan, 2002, p.82). 
After Ap Bac battle the situation in South Vietnam get worse and worse. Anti-
Diem protests broke out in many places and more frequently. Among the protests. 
the most influential ones were organized by Buddhism and other religious factions 
such as Cao Dai. Hoa Hao .... The book "Hist01J' of the resistant lI'ar against 
America" wrote that 
"The America's special \var and Diem' s regime is getting close to bankrupt 
beginning with the defeat at Ap Bac batlle" (History of the resistant \\ar against 
America, 1999, p.264). 
The tension of the situation led to a series of coups against Diem and finally. 
Diem was assassinated in the coup on 2 November 1963, instigated by generals in 
the South Vietnamese army. 
After Diem' s death. the situation III South Vietnam \\as not improved but 
deteriorated. The politics in South Vietnam became chaos as Generals organized 
coups after coups against each other. At that time, facing with the danger of failure 
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of the Special War strategy. America intensified its war against North Vietnam to 
relieve the pressure for the South. The book .. TTietnamese military history" \\Tote 
that 
"'Facing with the tide of attack from the revolution in the South. America 
intensified its activities against the North Vietnam. America created the Tonkin 
Gulf incident as an excuse to begin its air war against North Vietnam" 
(Vietnamese military history, 2003, p.244). 
North Vietnam was afraid of the possibility that America would bring its 
military forces in South Vietnam to reverse the losing tendency there. North 
Vietnam did prepare for that possibility but did not want that happened. On 25 th 
September 1964, Vietnamese Worker Party's Politburo met to re-evaluate situation 
and issues the guideline for the struggle in the South. Ang Chen Guan described this 
meeting as: 
"The politburo decided to focus on developing its main fighting force in the 
quickest possible time. They estimated that the tasks would require at least a 
few year. For the meantime, it was imperati\e that the war be kept at a level 
that would not giw the Americans a pretext to transform the current special 
war into a 'limited/local war' or worse still. to expand the \\ar into the North" 
(Ang Cheng Guan, 2002. p.82). 
Thus, in late 1964 and early 1965. the communist forces carried out a series of 
operations with the hope to overthrow the South Vietnam government before 
America could interfere directly in the war. Thus, during these two years, there were 
many battles initiated by revolutionary forces in the South such as Binh Gia 
operation. Ba Gia operation. Dong Xoai operation ..... These series of battles put an 
end to period of Special War in South Vietnam. 
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America confronted with two choices, either (1) escalating its war effort by 
sending its own troops in South Vietnam to bear the fighting tasks or (2) 
withdrawing and South Vietnam would collapse and the whole Vietnam \\'ould be 
under communist control. The American leadership chose the first choice-
escalating the war. Then came the next phase of the war- the phase of Limited War. 
3.2.3 Phase 3: From mid-1965 to early 1969. 
In late 1964. America's Special War in South Vietnam was about to faiL 
South Vietnam government was on the edge of collapse if the American leadership 
did not intensify its commitments. Facing with the hard choice between intensifying 
the war by sending American troops to bear the fighting tasks in Vietnam and let the 
South Vietnam government collapse, America chose the first option. On 10th April 
1965, first regiment of America marines landed on Danang beach, starting the 
period of pouring American and allied troops in South Vietnam. According to the 
book "Local people's 11'ar in the 11'01' against America ", American leadership 
intended to pacify the South Vietnam in 25-30 months from mid-1965 to the end of 
1967. The pacifying plan was divided in three periods. 
+ From mid-1965 to the end 1965: Deployed the American troops in South 
Vietnam, stopped the losing tendency of the South Vietnam armed forces. 
+ From 1966 to mid 1967: Carry out big operation of search and destroy to kill 
Viet Cong and communist forces, win back the initiative on the battle fields. 
+ From mid-1967 to the end 1967: Carry out the pacification program along 
with search and destroy operation. Finalize the war and withdraw troops to America 
(Local People's War in the Resistant War against America. 1996. p.36). 
The introduction of American troops in South Vietnam \\'as a big problem for 
the North Vietnam. which was exactly what it had been afraid of. North Vietnam 
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wanted to keep the war at Special War level and won the war at that level. North 
Vietnam military leaders fully aware that 
"The US was an opponent not to be treated flippantly. an aggressor that had 
the greatest economic potential and the most powerful armed forces among 
the imperialist powers" (Ang Cheng Guan, 2002, p.l3). 
So when America sent its troops to bear the direct fighting, Lao Dong Party 
held 11 th plenary session in March 1965 and 12th plenary session in December 1965 
to evaluate the situation and reaffirm the determination to fight against America. 
The resolution wrote that 
"The current world and domestic situation do not allow America to bring its 
utmost economic and military strength into the battle in South Vietnam. The 
America's weakest point now is still in the political front" (Party resolution, 
volume :26. p.516) 
And in order to strengthen the country's determination to fight against 
American forces, the resolution ended with the slogan that 
"America and its lackey will definitely fail. 
Vietnamese people will definitely win the war"' (Party resolution, volume 26, 
p.533) 
Ang Cheng Guan wrote that 
"In the leadership's analysis of the situation. although the US was 
economically and militarily the strongest power in the imperialist camp, it was 
restrained by both international as well as American domestic opinion from 
bringing its full power to bear. The enemy was therefore politically weak even 
if it was economically and militarily strong. On the other hand the 
conU11Unists had been able to strengthen their armed forces on eyer)' front laid 
a strong foundation, and were able to hold the initiatiye in launching the war. 
... The leadership aftirmed that the communist strategy was to fight a 
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protracted war but the tactic should be concentrate the armed forces to exploit 
any opportunity to achieve a decisive victory in a relativel) short time:' (Ang 
Cheng Guan, 2002, p.l 03) 
The book "I 'ietnamese Jfilitary HistOl:l'" also commented that 
"The session reaffirms that even America sent tens of thousands of troops in 
South Vietnam, Vietnamese army and people are still strongly determined to 
defeat the American and allied forces to \\in the war and reunify the country" 
(Vietnamese Military History. 2003, p,~4 7) 
After these two plenary sessions of strengthening the determination to fight 
and win over American forces, North Vietnam changed its economy to war time 
economy. According to the book "1'ietnamese ;\filitGlY History", the decision to 
change the national economy to war time was to make the North ready to fight 
America if it decided to escalate the war to the North. And, that also aimed at 
intensifying the North's effort to support the South in fighting America (Vietnamese 
Military History, 2003, p.248). 
At the same time, in the South, the Party's Central Office of South Vietnam 
run an indoctrination program in all over the South's reyolutionary forces to 
strengthen the determination to fight and win the war against America. Leaders of 
the revolutionary forces in the South were of the yiew that reyolutionary forces 
should not fear American forces, just fight American and they would find out the 
way to defeat America. On the battle field, North Vietnam initiated many battles to 
destroy American forces. This was the period of most fierce fighting during the war. 
The Communist forces carrying out the operations in Nui Thanh in May 1965 (the 
first clash between reyolutionary and regular American forces), Van Tuong in 
August 1965, Dat Cuoc in November 1965, Playme in January 1966 ... 
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In the first period of the pacification program, America entrusted South 
Vietnam with pacification tasks in rural areas, American forces themseh-es carried 
out Search and Destroy missions aimed at Viet Cong regular armed forces. Among 
the operations carried out by America in this period, the most notable ones were the 
Operation Attleboro, Operation Cedar Fall and Operation Junction City. These were 
very big operations in the war, with the later was bigger than the previous one. The 
biggest operation was the Operation Junction City, this had the participation of 
45,000 American and allied troops. However, all these operation could not achieve a 
decisive victory. The American forces could not destroy the Vietnam regular armed 
forces to fulfil its set objectives. 
In October 1966, Politburo of Lao Dong party met to e\'aluate the situation of 
the war in the South. Ang Cheng Guan wrote that 
"In the Politburo's view, the communists had achieved very significant 
victories, both military and political, but especially military. Many valuable 
experiences were gained which had helped to further their understanding of 
the laws of national liberation. In the assessment of the communist leadership, 
by mid-1966, they had managed to defeat the first American counter-offensive 
in the South. However, the leadership noted that even though enemy had been 
continuously defeated, the Americans kept on increasingly its military 
strength and expanding the war in the hope of solving the Vietnam problem in 
1967 and 1968." (Ang Cheng Guan, 2002, p.ll) 
This evaluation of the situation was reiterated in the 13th plenary session of 
Lao Dong party Central Committee in January 1967. The book "Vietnamese 
,Hi/iIGl)' HisIOlY" wrote that 
"While the Americans "ere not winning the battle. they had the potential to 
expand the war. On the other hand. \ye had successfully managed to 
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withstand US military power, but we were not able to achieve a decisive 
victory" (Cited in Vietnamese Military History. 2003, p.114). 
Actually at that point of the war, Americans and Communist forces were in a 
strategic stalemate. No side could win decisively but no side wanted to deescalate 
the war. North Vietnam stated that they stuck to the strategy of protracted war. but 
in that particular moment, they adopted a strategy to win a decisive victory in a 
relative short time. Because they feared that American would send more troops in 
South Vietnam to break the strategic stalemate. 
"The Politburo surmises that a prolonged or protracted war strategy would 
only lead to a further increase in US military strength and hence there was 
urgent need to win the war in a relative short period, ideally in 1968" (Cited in 
An Cheng Guan, 2002, p.117). 
So the 13th Plenary Session of Vietnamese Worker Party decided that 
"On the basis of protracted war strategy, at this specific moment, Vie had to 
concentrate all the forces of both North and South to win a decisive victory in 
South Vietnam in a relative short time" (Party Resolution, Volume 28, p.125) 
In that situation, North Vietnam leadership approved the Tet Offensive 
proposal, which they called the General Offensive and General Uprising. The 
primary objective of the Tet Offensive was 
"To deal him (the Americans) thundering blows so as to change the face of the 
war, further shake the aggressive will of US imperialism, compel it to change 
its strategy and de-escalate the war" (Cited in Ang Cheng Guan, 2002, p.l27). 
So Tet Offensive was launched on 30 and 31 January 1968- the Lunar New 
year in Vietnam which is called Tet, in all three main cities in South Vietnam- Sai 
Gon, Da nang, and Hue, 37 towns and hundreds of districts in all over South 
Vietnam. This offensive caused surprise and shock to Americans in South Vietnam 
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as well as American leadership at home. After the first attacking phase in January. 
North Vietnam launched the second phase in May 1968 and third phase in August 
1968. These two later phases did not achie\"e the desired result~ on the contrary the 
communist forces suffered from heavy loss. 
However. Tet offensive had great strategic impact on American domestic 
politics. On 31 March 1968~ Johnson made televised address~ announcing that (l) 
He was restricting air strike to the area below the 20th degree parallel~ thus sparing 
most of North Vietnamese territory. (2) He had authorised Averell Harriman to open 
negotiations whenever the Vietnamese communists were ready. (3) He would not 
seek another term as President (Ang Cheng Guan, 2002~ p.131). 
After the second and the third phase of attack in the series of Tet Offensi\'e. 
Johnson had to declare stop bombing North Vietnam unconditionally on 1 st 
November 1968. This announcement marked the end of the limited war period in the 
America commitments in South Vietnam. 
At the same time, along with development in the battle field in South Vietnam~ 
North Vietnam decided to open diplomatic front. In January 1967~ the Lao Dong 
Party central committee held its plenary session. The session agreed that the 
diplomatic should be open to coordinate with the political and military front to 
counter American in South Vietnam. 
3.2.4 Phase 4 the Vietnamization from 1969 to early 1973 
In North Vietnam's official account of the history of the Vietnam \Var. 
Johnson's decision to deescalate the \\'ar and stop bombing North Vietnam on 1 ~t 
November 1968 was the ending of the Limited War period. In other word, the 
decision to deescalate the war in South Vietnam meant that America had to admit its 
failure with the strategy of Limited \Var. and they had to change their strategy. 
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Johnson, before stepping down, had authorized the program of de-Americanization 
of the war. Nixon came to power in January 1969 and introduced the strategy of 
Vietnamization. In the view of North Vietnamese leadership~ Vietnamization was 
different from de-Americanization. The book" Vietnamese militwy hist01y'" wrote 
that 
"De-Americanization is only focus on military aspect of the war. While 
Vietnamization is a complete strategy of military, political and foreign 
relations" (Vietnamese military history, 2003, p.254). 
The objective of Vietnamization program was to gradually withdrav, 
American forces out of South Vietnam but at the same time increased the armed 
forces of South Vietnam to be able to carry out fighting tasks against communist 
forces. 
On the revolutionary side, with the surpnse of the Tet offensive, the 
communist forces won some victory. However, after the first phase, communist 
leaders launched the second and the third phases, both of which suffered from great 
loss. The book" r 'ietnamese MUitwy Hist01y" wrote that 
"The second and third phase of the general offensi\'e and general uprising 
caused us great loss on casualties, land and people" (Vietnamese Military 
History. 2003. p,252). 
Ang Cheng Guan wrote that 
"American intelligence in 1968 calculated that the communist lost 85.000 out 
of 195,000 troops in the T et offensi\'e, Although the exact figures are not 
known the more recent Vietnamse accounts acknowledged that they suffered 
hea\'y losses, By the end of 1968 and the beginning of 1969, the communists 
had lost both territory and support. Many of their grassroots organization were 
smashed and their activities in the liberated area curtailed. the enemy had 
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pacified 9.200 hamlets of about 16 million people. out of a total 12,395 
hamlets with a population of 17.5 million. ,. (Ang Cheng Guan, 200'+. p.16). 
The liberated area was narrowed from the point re\'olutionary forces 
controlled 7,700,000 people to the point that there only 4,700,000 people under their 
control. The years 1969-1970 was considered the most critical years for the 
revolutionary movement in the South Vietnam. Tran Van Tra wrote that 
"The liberation forces sustained so many losses (much heavier than during 
any previous period) that they could not be replaced fast enough to carry out 
normal operations. They also had to face extremely arduous conditions under 
repeated enemy assaults. A large portion of the guerrilla units mobilized to 
attack the cities during T et had also sustained losses that could not be made up 
in time for new operations. These grass-roots units also had to deal with the 
enemy's new pacification schemes and the Phoenix program" (Tran van Tra, 
1993, p.239). 
During those difficult years for the revolutionary forces, Hanoi Politburo met 
III April 1969. The Politburo analyzed the weak points of the American's 
Vietnamization. The Politburo asked the leaders in the South Vietnam to increase 
the revolutionary activities in rural areas while intensifying the pressure of struggle 
in the towns and cities. Then Vietnamese Worker Party's Central Committee 
convened its 18th plenary session on 1 January 1970 to appraise the political and 
military situation since the Tet offensive of 1968 and to discuss the way forward. In 
the session the central committee pointed out that: Revolutionary forces must focus 
its struggle in the rural areas. The book" r'ietnamese JJUitmy histOl)''' wrote that 
"From April 1969 to early 1970. the Politburo. realising the mistakes of the 
general offensiw and general uprising, changed the focus point of the 
re\olutionary strategy to rural area. The Politburo asked cadres in the South to 
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make every effort to push back the enemy pacification program" (Vietnamese 
Military history, 2003, p.256). 
Also in the 18th Plenary Session, leadership in Hanoi believed that the decisive 
period for the Vietnamization program would be around the end of 1970 and 1971 
before the next presidential election in 1972. Thus, leadership in Hanoi asked their 
cadres to prepare for the intensification of fighting in 1971. In February 1971, South 
Vietnamese armed forces launched the Operation Lam Son 719, aiming at cutting 
the communist's transportation/logistic line from the North Vietnam to the battle 
field in the South. The battle was in the mountainous regions, sparely populated area 
in two provinces Quang Tri of South Vietnam and Savanakhet of Laos. The 
operation ended in May 1971. Both sides claim victory. 
In 1972, the revolutionary forces launched the Easter Operation in March 
1972 to win a decisive battle aiming at coercing America to stop its Vietnamization 
program and withdraw its forces completely from Vietnam. The Easter Operation 
was a very big operation on three areas of Route 9- Tri Thien. North Central 
Highland, and South East Delta region. The communist forces achieved important 
victories in the operation. 
Facing with the intensification from revolutionary forces in the South 
Vietnam, America had to resume air attacks against the North Vietnam to relieve the 
pressure for South Vietnam government. The air campaign was codenamed 
Linebacker I. 
During this period, the negotiation process between America and North 
Vietnam was also taking place in Paris. However, any progress on the negotiation 
table closely linked to the de\'elopment on battlefield. Before the final Paris 
agreement was signed on 23 January 1973. the US had carried out the most 
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destructive air campaign against major cities in North Vietnam. The air campaign 
was called Linebacker II or Christmas bombing. The North Vietnam called it "A 
Dien Bien Phu on the air"'. 
Finally, Paris agreement was signed, and American leadership withdrew all its 
troops out of South Vietnam, put an end to the period of America' s direct 
commitment in Vietnam. And this was also the end of the Vietnamization period. 
Tran Van Tra summarized this period as follow 
"In 1972, we took the initiative in launching new attacks which resulted in 
numerous victories in Quang Tri province, in Sa Thay (the High Plateau area), 
and in Loc Ninh (north of Sai Gon). Again the developments on the 
battlefield impacted heavily on the negotiation table and in October 1972. 
both sides came to an agreement. But it was only after the failure of the most 
ruthlessly destructive air raids of the U.S Air Force against Hanoi and 
Haiphong (twelve days and nights of continuous attacks in December 1972) 
that the Paris Agreements could be concluded. The United States did properly 
implement the provisions of the Paris Agreement on the complete \vithdrawal, 
within sixty days, of U.S troops, as well as those from other countries" (Tran 
Van Tra, 1993, p.239). 
With the America's \vithdrawal out of Vietnam, the Vietnam War changed to 
a new phase. The final phase of the war was the phase in which North and South 
Vietnam competed with each other to decide the fate of the whole Vietnam. 
3.2.5 Phase 5: From early 1973 to April 1975- Ending the war 
The signing of Paris agreement was considered as a victory for North 
Vietnam, but not the final dctory. As Tran Van Tra wrote that 
"We had won a victory, but not yet a complete victory" (Cited in Ang Cheng 
Guan p.127. volume II). 
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The complete victory for North Vietnam was to reunify the country. To 
achieve this goal, North Vietnam was willing to use any means, and if necessary. 
including military means. After the signing of the Paris agreement North Vietnam 
leadership were of the view that it would strictly abide by the provisions of the 
agreement. North Vietnam leadership were hoping that the goal of national 
reunification would be achieved without resort to bloodshed. Luu Van Loi explained 
the rationale of North Vietnam' s adoption of this position as fo11o\\;: l) North 
Vietnam feared that if they mount to a full scale war. American forces would return. 
2) North Vietnam would like to win the support of Soviet Union. China and other 
brother countries as well as the international public, even the people in the US (Ang 
Chen Guan, 2002, p.l27). 
The Directive 3/CT173 of the Central Office of South Vietnam on 1 i h March 
1973 noted two possibilities for the revolution in the South Vietnam. The first is that 
reunification can be carried out by mainly political struggle, although military 
fighting may be needed at some time. The second possibility was that the 
reunification by fighting. Ang Cheng Guan wrote that 
"According to the directive, there were two possibilities for the future course of 
the Vietnamese re\"olution. The fIrst, the preferred route, was to achieve the 
victory through primarily political struggle. (" .. ) The second was to achieve 
victory through resumption of the fIghting war. The whole of the communist 
leadership would prefer not to resort to this path and did not see the military 
option as an immediate possibility. they realized that the possibility of a rene\\"al 
of the anned struggle could not be ignored and therefore they must be ready to 
fIght and if necessary. move quickly to destroy the enemy" (Ang. 2004, p.130). 
In the first few months after the signing of Paris agreement the revolutionary 
forces in the south did not have a clear strategy. and there \\"ere not many activities" 
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On the other side, America strictly abided by the provision of the agreement. 
America withdrew all its fighting forces out of South Vietnam by 29th March 1973. 
However, South Vietnam government was of the view that they would not respect 
the Paris agreement and intensify their pacification programs. Taking the advantage 
that the communist forces were still uncertain of their strategy, South Vietnam 
government won a lot of land and people. According to the book .. Vietnamese 
Military History". by June 1973, in Zone 5, the revolutionary forces lost control of 
260,000 people, 45 communes, 302 hamlets; In Zone 6&7, they lost control of 
290,000 people, 308 hamlets; in Zone 8 they lost control of 100.000 people, 24 
communes and 102 hamlets (Vietnamese Military History, 2003. p.260). 
The communists, learning from the experience of the political struggle after 
the Geneva agreement in 1954, were quick to change their strategy. After a series of 
meeting within Politburo, the Central Office of South Vietnam, the Lao Dong Party 
convened the 21 st plenary session in July 1973. The session reaffirmed that 
"The road of South Vietnam revolution is through violent means. The 
revolution must take the strategy of violent struggle to fight against the armed 
forces of South Vietnam government. In any situation, we have to take every 
opportunity. hold on the strategy of offensive and be flexible in operations to 
move the revolution forward" (Party Resolution, Volume 34. p.631) 
Le Duan, in his letter to the South after the Plenary Session, wrote that 
"'The revolution in the South can only win victory by means of continuous 
revolution and violence. The South Vietnam revolution must rely on the 
political and military strength of the people and make full use of the new 
factors and advantages that \\ill be brought about by the Paris Agreement" 
(Party resolution. Volume 34. p.148). 
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North Vietnam' s official history of the war considered the Resolution 21 as a 
turning point of the war. Under the guideline of the Resolution 21. the communist 
forces intensified its military preparation and organized many program to win back 
the land and people they had lost in previous months. At the same time, in America, 
Nixon had to step down as a result of the Watergate incident. So the aid of the 
America to South Vietnam government decreased greatly. In that situation, South 
Vietnam government force could not hold on what it had won before. According to 
the book "People's 11'01' in the l1'W' against America", by the end of 1973, the status 
quo has returned to the one before the signing of Paris agreement. The South 
Vietnam government was not able to organize effective counter-offensive operation 
against communist forces. 
Realizing the strategic opportunity. Hanoi leadership held an extended 
Politburo meeting in December 1974. The meeting decided to liberate the South and 
reunify the country before the raining season in 1975. it means that before June 
1975. With this decision, Communist leadership ordered the armed forces to carry 
out a series of operation first in Central Highland, then in Hue, Da Nang ... Finally. 
the communist started the Ho Chi Minh campaign attacking Sai Gon, the capital city 
of South Vietnam. South Vietnam armed forces were not able to withstand and lost 
on 30 April 1975. The South Vietnam Government collapsed and the country was 
reunified after more than 30 year of consecutive struggle since the first Indochina 
war. 
The chapter has presented parallel narrati"es about the Vietnam War in the 
"iews of America and North Vietnam. In the first part, I investigated the process of 
America's gradual increasing interference in the Vietnam issue. StaI1ing \\-ith the 
sympathetic attitude toward Indochina in its effort of decolonization after World 
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War II, America gradually changed its position to supporting France in returning 
and maintaining its colonial regime in Indochina. France, despite receiying strong 
material support from America, was defeated by Vietminh force at Dien Bien Phu,. 
America got involved in Vietnam by throwing strong support for Ngo Dinh Diem 
Government in the South. However, until the end of Eisenhower administration, 
America still refrained from sending troops to Vietnam. During Eisenhower 
presidency, the number of uniformed American advisors in South Vietnam was kept 
below 900. During Kennedy's short presidency. America deepened its involyement 
in Vietnam but still did not participate directly in fighting tasks. The America' s 
intervention in Vietnam reached its climax under Johnson administration. Johnson 
ordered to send American troops to Vietnam to bear the main fighting tasks. The 
number of American troops in Vietnam in 1968 reached more than half a million. 
Then, in the Nixon administration, America sought to get out of Vietnam with 
honour. At the end of his presidency, Nixon successfully withdrew all American 
troops out of Vietnam. And the Republic of Vietnam collapsed in April 1975. two 
years after American troops had been withdrawn out of Vietnam. 
The second part of the chapter presented the North Vietnam' s official view of 
the war against America. In North Vietnam's official view. the war was divided in 
five phases, each phase \\'as characterized by the North Vietnam's specific strategy 
to counter the America's strategy in that phase. In the first phase. which was from 
July 1954 to early 1960. in North Vietnam's point of yie\\'. America established its 
influence in South Vietnam through the government of Ngo Dinh Diem. Thus. 
North Vietnam employed the strategy of political struggle, calling for mass uprising 
to overthrow the puppet government. In the second phase. North Vietnam' s strategy 
was to defeat America special war while trying not to trigger the America' s direct 
intervcntion in military fighting. The third phase was the period to defeat America' s 
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local war, in which American troops were introduced to Vietnam and bore direct 
fighting tasks. Then it came the phase of defeating America's strategy of 
Vietnamization. And the last phase in North Vietnam's official account of the 
history of the war was to defeat South Vietnam government and unified the country. 
With the main points mentioned above, the chapter presented a broad \'ie\\' of 
the Vietnam War. which is important to understand the North Vietnam's strategy in 
the war. The North Vietnam's military strategy in the Vietnam War. \\'hich \\-ill be 
discussed in next chapter. was very flexible, though its core was always the people's 
war. The specific strategy of North Vietnam in each phase of the war depended on 
which strategy America employed in that phase. As ultimate aim of North Vietnam 
was not to defeat America militarily but to destroy America's aggressi\'e will, North 
Vietnam's strategy was to make America realize that any strategy they applied in 
the end would fail and there was no winning strategy for America in the war in 
Vietnam. Thus, America's aggressive \,"ill would be deteriorated. So in order to 
understand North Vietnam's military strategy in the war, which will be discussed in 
next chapter, we must understand how America executed its war and how North 
Vietnam viewed the way the war evolved. The aim of this chapter is just that: 
providing the parallel views of how America carried out the war and how North 
Vietnam perceived America's strategy and the way America carried out the war and 
initiated its counter-strategy against America. 
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Chapter IV: The North Vietnam's Military Strategy in the war 
against America 1954-1975 
This chapter is about the North Vietnam' s' military strategy in the Vietnam 
War, which will be assessed against the law of war in the next chapter. To 
understand the North Vietnam' s military strategy more clearly. the first part of this 
chapter will focus on the roots, the most influential factors on the military strategy 
of North Vietnam. In this part, I will discuss the Vietnamese history of struggling 
against foreign aggression, Marxism-Leninism on war and military, Ho Chi Minh 
military thought and Chinese theory about people's war. Then. in the second part, I 
will focus on North Vietnam's military strategy to fight against America in the 
Vietnam War. Facing with American armed forces which were very much stronger 
than themselves, North Vietnam could not apply the same military strategy that had 
been used in the first Indochina war to win over the French. In the war against 
America, North Vietnam has devised their own version of people's war. which can 
be summarized in the strategic model .. two legs. three points of attack, three 
strategic areas, three types of forces". Though this military strategy \\as influenced 
by Marxism-Leninism on war and military and Chinese people's war. it is original 
and has strong Vietnamese characteristics, as it was inherited from Vietnamese 
tradition of fighting against foreign aggression and Ho Chi Minh military thought. 
4.1 The roots of North Vietnam's military strategy 
4.1.1 Vietnamese national experience to fight against foreign 
aggression 
Vietnam is a small and thin country in East Asia, borders with the South China 
Sea in the east and the south, with Laos and Cambodia in the west and with China in 
the North. As situated at the foremost mainland Asia, through its long history. 
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Vietnam encountered many foreign aggressIOns. Dinh Xuan Lam, a leading 
Vietnamese historian wrote that 
"Vietnam is a rich and beautiful land, with vast natural resources, located in 
strategic position in Southeast Asia, at the crossroads of important land and sea 
routes from North to South from East to West, like a starting base from the 
mainland to the ocean, a bridgehead from the ocean to the mainland. That is why 
powerful aggressive forces always coveted and tried to attack our country with a 
view to exploiting and enslaving our people and using our land as a springboard 
to expand their influence to other directions" (Dinh Xuan Lam, 2007, p.347). 
The geo-strategic position of the country makes its history become the history 
of struggling for its own freedom and independence. As Spence Tucker once 
commented that 
"As a crossroads of Asia, Vietnam was destined for a stormy history" (Tucker, 
1999, p.2). 
The constant enemy of Vietnam during its long history was Chinese 
feudalism. Many Chinese dynasties attempted to subjugate Vietnam, but since the 
establishment of the feudalism state of Vietnam in 10th century, Chinese has never 
succeeded in its attempt. Thus, fighting against Chinese enemy became a main 
theme in the history of Vietnam. 
"Over the past one thousand years, the Vietnamese have no less than seven times 
defeated attempts by China to assert its influence by armed force. No theme is 
more consistent in Vietnam history than the theme of resistance to foreign 
aggression" (Taylor, 1983, p.xviii) 
In these wars against Chinese aggressors, Vietnamese people were always on 
the weaker side and had to defend their country by the force which is much smaller 
than their enemy's. Vietnam was just a small country in Asia. while China was an 
ancient ciyilization and called the Central Kingdom. So. in order to defend their 
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native land and to defeat the enemy, Vietnamese people had to devise their own \\"ay 
of war. They had to bring into full play the strength of the whole people. of the 
whole nation and could not rely on the army alone. 
Vo Nguyen Giap wrote that 
"Our people soon built up and developed the tradition of "the whole nation 
joining forces" against foreign aggression, ( .... ) And since time immemorial. 
there has been the popular saying "when the enemy comes to house, even the 
women should fight". That is an impressive practice but also a \"ery familiar one 
in our nation's life and struggles" (Giap, I 977b, p.349) 
And he came to conclusion that 
"The participation of the masses in the national uprisings and wars in our 
country. the tradition of "the whole nation joining forces" and of the whole 
people fighting the enemy, enable us to affIrm that national uprising and wars in 
our history have long been people's uprising and people's war" (Giap, 1977b, 
p.349). 
The tradition of "the whole nation joining forces" is well reflected throughout 
the long history of Vietnam, We can see that many times in history, the whole 
people stand up to fight foreign aggression, 
For ten centuries after the beginning of Christian era, Vietnam was under the 
domination by foreign feudalist. During those ten centuries, Vietnamese people 
continually rose up III struggle to liberate the country and won back national 
independence, It began with the uprising of the Trung sister which defeated the 
enemy over the whole country, followed by insurrection led respectively by lady 
Trieu, Ly Bi, Mai Thuc Loan, Phung Hung, Khuc Thua Du and finally Ngo Quyen 
won back the independence for the country after the yictory in 938 AD at Bach 
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Dang river. The Ngo Quyen's victory put an end to the period under foreign 
domination. 
Generally during that period of foreign rule, there was no Vietnam nation, thus 
there was no standing army. All the uprisings were carried out by the insurgent mass 
led by Lac hau (civilian chief) or Lac tuong (military chief). In this period, we can 
only see the uprisings of people, but their insurgences never succeeded to form a 
sovereign state. 
The Bach Dang nver victory marked a turning point III the Vietnamese 
history. 
"That was the beginning of a period when our nation, having won complete 
independence and having built up and developed an ewr more prosperous feudal 
State, consolidated and preserved this independence for many centuries" (Dinh 
Xuan Lam. 2007, p.356) 
And since then, the system of "everyone is a soldier" was set up and gradually 
completed through various dynasties. 
The tradition of "the whole nation joining forces" and "everyone is a soldier"' 
was especially well reflected in Tran dynasty in 13 th century. It was when Vietnam's 
independence and freedom faced with the utmost serious challenge of Mongolia 
invaders. 
Under Tran dynasty. the organization of the armed forces was based on the 
system of mobilization the forces of the whole population to participate in armed 
services. following the line of "the \"hole nation joining forces". A great Vietnamese 
historian wrote that 
"The military was very strong at that epoch. As a rule. troops \\ ere stationed in 
convenient place in peace time, and \\'ere eager to tight when the war broke out. 
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So under the Tran, all people were soldiers; therefore they defeated cruel 
enemies and strengthened the position of the nation" ( Phan Huy Chu, 200 I, 
p.358). 
During the three resistant wars against Mongolia~ Tran Quoc Tuan, a 
Vietnamese national hero and a world famous general, combined the tactics of 
concentrated and big battles by the regular army with small attacks on the spots by 
the local and village self-defence forces and the armed people from the beginning to 
the end of the war. The army had a very important direct and decisive role. Many 
outstanding battles of annihilation were successfully conducted in Dong Bo Dau, 
Ham Tu~ Chuong Duong, Van Kiep ... But the armed people were in great numbers 
and played a very important role too. The people in mountainous area intercepted, 
pinned down, wore out and annihilated many enemy forces. 
"That really was a war of the entire people, of the whole nation. That was a true 
people"s war in feudal times. The Mongolia troops of aggression who had sown 
devastation over Asia and Europe, who had conquered and erased many states 
from the map of the world, attacked Vietnam three times but were three times 
ignominiously defeated by Vietnamese people'" (Dinh Xuan Lam, 2007, p.362). 
In 15th century, Nguyen Trai~ another Vietnamese national hero~ reaffirmed the 
strategy of people's war. He especially highly appreciated the role of people in 
defending the country and in fighting against the foreign enemy. He said that 
"people are like water, leadership are like the boat on that v·;ater. Water can carry the 
boat or tum it upside down" or "people are the root of the nation" (Vietnamese 
History, 2007, pAS). He believed that no war can be won without the support of 
people. The war deemed to fail if it did not get the support from people. He led the 
people's \\ar to fight against the inyader from Chinese Ming dynasty and eventually 
won the war. 
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'"In the 15 th century, the Lam Son insurrection under the leadership of Le Loi and 
Nguyen Trai, turned into a protracted national liberation war. It lasted 10 years 
and resulted in the Ming invaders being driven out and national independence 
being regained after 20 years of foreign domination" (Giap, I 977a, p.203). 
Unlike the patriotic war under Tran dynasty more than two centuries earlier, 
this war was a national insurrection which developed into war of liberation with 
fighting by insurgents who developed into an army, combined with widespread 
uprising by the people. Nguyen Trai was very successful in combining the fighting 
activities of the main armed forces with the widespread fighting of local people 
everywhere in the country. 
that: 
Vo Nguyen Giap, a 20th century Vietnamese military strategist commented 
"Without uprising by the people, it would not have been possible to overthrow 
foreign local authorities, to gi\"e the insurgents greater prestige and wider fields of 
operation. But without the insurgent troops which later developed into an army 
which could conduct big battles of annihilation, it would not have been possible to 
defeat the war of aggression and shatter the foreign administration. The 
combination of the national army and the armed people recorded a further 
development as compared with the national defence war under Tran dynasty and 
was characterized by widespread uprising by the people" (Giap, I 977b, p.365-
366). 
These are only two among manyexamples of the Vietnamese tradition of .. the 
whole nation joining forces" and the combination of the army and armed people. V/e 
can find many other examples in the long history of Vietnamese fighting against 
foreign aggression. It has become tradition of war fighting in Vietnam that: there is 
always good combination between regular army and armed people in fighting 
stronger enemy. As Vo Nguyen Giap wrote that 
- 145 -
"To lead those insurrection and national wars to victory as reaards military 'b _ 
organization, our people put into practice the motto "everyone is a soldier". at a 
very early stage, mobilizing the broad masses in various forms, the highest of 
which was the armed people fighting beside the army. C .... ) Obviously, the 
combination of the armed people with the national army, and vice versa, has 
become a principle of military organization, and even of military art to achieve 
victory in national insurrections and national wars of liberation waged by our 
Vietnamese people in former times" CGiap, 1977b, p.371-372}. 
Then, Giap referred to the war against America 
"The tradition of the whole nation joining forces in the fight against foreign 
aggressors, the experience of people's insurrection and people's war, and the 
experience of military organization including both the national army and the 
armed forces of the people have been very valuable tradition and experience of our 
people. They have also been quite original features rarely found in the military 
history of other nations. When the Vietnamese working class emerged and our 
Party was born, in the light of Marxism-Leninism and our Party's political and 
military lines, this valuable tradition and experience was inherited and developed 
to new levels by our party and people, in new historical conditions, in order to 
defeat the most brutal aggressor of our time" (Giap, I 977b, p.375). 
In modern history, Vietnam had to face with Western invaders, who were even 
much stronger than the Chinese empire and of course very much stronger than 
Vietnam. France colonized Indochina in 1858, then divided Vietnam into three areas 
with different ruling mechanism. While France was an industrialised country, 
Vietnam was still a backward agricultural country. The French army used such 
weapons as gun, gunship... the Vietnamese troops still used archery, sword ... 
However, the Vietnamese constantly stood up to fight and drive French colonialists 
away. In the first Indochina war, which was from 1946 to 1954, Vietnamese military 
leaders applied the strategy of people's \VaL according to the model of Chinese 
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People's war. In this war. there was clearly three phases as pointed out in Mao Tse-
Tung's theory of people's war. Following the model of Chinese people's \\ar. 
Vietnamese people finally defeated the French forces in Dien Bien Phu and won the 
war. However, Vietnam was still divided, only the Northern half of the country was 
liberated according to the Geneva accord in 1954 about Vietnam. The nationwide 
election was expected to be held within two years to reunify the country but this 
never happened. This situation led to the Vietnam War, in which America gradually 
sent its own troops to South Vietnam to bear the direct fighting tasks. The 
Vietnamese experience in the first Indochina war was very close to the war against 
America years later. However, in the new situation with a different context and 
different enemy, Vietnamese military forces had to employ different military 
strategy and tactics in the war against America. 
4.1.2 Marxism-Leninism on war and military in Vietnamese 
perception 
According to Marxism, the army is a special organization of state, an 
instrument of a given class which is used to carry out its political line by means of 
armed violence. In an exploiting state, the army has always been an instrument of 
the ruling class to repress the exploited masses in the country and to plunder and 
enslave other countries and peoples. Marx strongly argued for the exploited masses 
to organize its own army to counter the suppression of the ruling class. Marx 
regarded Spartacus as .. the most splendid fellow in the whole ancient history. Great 
general, noble character, real representative of the ancient proletariaC (Marx, 1958 
cited in Giap, 1977a, p.167). 
Marx and Engels pointed out that under capitalism the standing army is the 
main instrument through which the bourgeoisie maintains its domination m'er 
- 147 -
working people. So in the proletariat revolution, the workers need to smash the 
military machine because smashing the anny of the bourgeoisie state eliminates the 
danger of resistance and counter offensive on its part. 
Marx wrote that 
"The Paris commune has taught the world proletariat a vital lesson. The first 
decree of the Commune was the suppression of the standing anny, and the 
substitution for it of anned people." (Marx, 1958, p.173). 
The working class need not only smash the anny of the bourgeoisie class but 
also build up and develop its own military organization, regarding it as sole anned 
force that can safeguard the success of the insurrection and develop the revolution. 
Marx and Engels also pointed out the way to build anny of proletariat state: To ann 
the working class. After the bloody experience of the first great battle of the French 
proletariat against the bourgeoisie in 1848, Marx and Engels wrote that 
"The worker must be armed and organized. The anning of the whole proletariat 
with rifles, muskets, cannon and munitions must be put through at once. Any 
attempt at disarming must be frustrated, if necessary by force" (Marx-Engels. 
1958,p.113). 
Marx and Engels believed that once the proletariat was anned, it would have 
tremendous force. They themselves saw this force in 1848 revolution in Paris. Marx 
wrote 
"It is well known how the workers, with unexampled bravery and ingenuity. 
without leaders, without a common plan. without means and for the most part, 
lacking weapons, held in check for fi\'e days the anny, the Mobile Guard, the Paris 
National Guard, and National Guard that streamed from the provinces". (Marx, 
1958,p.161) 
And Engels eulogized the event as follows 
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"If 40,000 Paris workers were able to resist with such vigour a force four time" 
as large as themselves, what great result could be achieved by all the Paris 
workers acting with discipline and as one man" (Marx-Engels. 1960, p.134). 
Marx and Engels dealt with the question of arming the masses not only in the 
armed insurrections of the proletariat and in the military organization of the socialist 
State but also in national liberation wars. Marx and Engels drew a distinction 
between just wars and aggressive wars and always supported just wars, wars of 
liberation and self-defence waged by oppressed peoples and victims of aggression. 
According to Marxism, 
"Any war that is waged by a people for the sake of freedom and social progress, 
for liberation from exploitation and national oppression or in defence of its state 
sovereignty, against an aggressive attack, is a just war. Conversely, any war 
unleashed by the imperialists with the aim of seizing foreign territories, 
enslaving and plundering other peoples, is an unjust war" (Marxism-Leninism 
on war and military, 1972. p.87). 
Engels made a concrete study of contemporary events, summmg up their 
experience so as to point out the way by which an oppressed people should wage a 
people's war and defeat the aggressors' professional armies. In many works dealing 
with the history of war Engels dwelt on the great role and effectiveness of the armed 
masses in just wars and self-defence wars. This idea of Engels was closely 
connected with the new mode of waging a people's war advocated by him. Engels 
wrote that 
"A people who want to win back independence for themselves must not limit 
themselyes to conventional means of waging war. Mass uprising, re\'olutionary 
wars, guerrillas e\'erywhere- that is the only way by which a small people can 
defeat a large one. a less strong ann)' can oppose a stronger and better organized 
one". (Engels. Lenin & Stalin. 1970. p.27). 
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Generally, Marx and Engel pointed out that to establish the dictatorship of the 
proletariat and defend the socialist state and to succeed in the liberation war waged 
by oppressed people, it is necessary to ann the working class, to ann the people and 
to ann the revolutionary masses. North Vietnam Communist Party considered this is 
the theoretical basis for its revolutionary line. Vo Nguyen Giap wrote that 
"It is a model of the correct appraisal of the decisive role of the masses in armed 
insurrection and revolutionary war. The great value of this thesis lies in the fact 
that for the first time in the world, it shows the proletariat and oppressed peoples 
the direction and most correct way to create their own organization, of a 
completely new type, born of the proletariat and working people fighting for the 
people and for their class. With a correct revolutionary line, and when the 
revolutionary party firmly relies on the revolutionary masses, on the workers and 
peasants, to build up and develop its armed organization, it can create an 
invincible revolutionary armed force. This view has become the theoretical basis 
for building the armed forces in the military theory of Marxism-Leninism. It is an 
extremely powerful weapon of the proletariat and all oppressed peoples in the 
world. It gives them wings in the revolutionary struggle to overthrow the old 
world and create a new one'" (Giap, 1977b, p.330). 
* Lenin's the5;es regarding building army 
The Russian Marxists headed by Lenin, applied the theses of Marx and Engels 
to the new historical condition when the socialist revolution and the bourgeoisie 
democratic revolution were carried out in the period of imperialism. Lenin~s great 
contribution lies in the fact that he not only confinned Marx~s and Engels's 
principle of anning the people but also developed their ideas by setting forth the 
principle of the necessity of building a regular standing anny of Soviet State on the 
basis of am1ing the people, a new type anny of the working class and labouring 
people. Lenin showed that in face of the extremely great danger of aggression, if the 
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Soviet Republic did not want to fall an easy prey to imperialism, it needed a 
powerful regular standing army, well equipped and well trained, with strict 
discipline, centralized and unified command. Lenin pointed out that in conditions 
when the capitalist countries have big armies with proper training and modem 
equipment, when the armed force of the Soviet State were increasingly equipped 
with modem materials and the soldiers needed more training time to master the use 
of equipments along the rules of modem military art, when the imperialist were 
always in position to launch surprise attacks, the armed forces of the Soviet State 
could not be maintained in the form of people's militia but had to become a regular 
standing army. Lenin wrote that 
"Today, the regular army must be put in the fore. It was a regular army 
qualitatively different from the bourgeoisie army. It was a new type of army, a 
people's army, a revolutionary army, a socialist anny".(Lenin, 1965, p.150) 
Yo Nguyen Giap commented that 
.. Lenin's thesis on building the regular Soviet Red Army was a further 
development of Marx's and Engel's theory on the military organization of the 
socialist State under new historical conditions. when the socialist State was faced 
with a hostile encirclement by the capitalist it has pointed out to the proletariat that 
in the imperialist period, when imperialism, with its extremely warlike nature, has 
under its command huge aggressive armies, equipped with ultra-modem weapons, 
it is essential that the socialist State, to safeguard its security, should haw a 
powerful regular standing army and not only the armed people."(Giap, 1977b, 
p.337). 
Lenin paid great attention to building up a powerful regular standing army. 
But also he laid special emphasis on arming the people. He highly appreciated the 
role of the mass in the revolution. 
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According to Lenin, the regular anny should be built up on the basis of anning 
the people. He wrote that 
"This is what the people have felt, and that is why when the ordinary people 
without education say that the Red Guards are doing the utmost to fight the 
exploiters, this propaganda is an invincible force. It will penetrate millions and 
tens of millions of people and lay a firm foundation for the work that the French 
Commune in the 19th century began to build, but only for a short period of time as 
it was defeated by the bourgeoisie. This propaganda will build up the Socialist Red 
Arm)' on the basis of arming the people, a thing which all socialist have dream of' 
(Lenin, 1965, p.284). 
The regular anny fonns the core while the anned mass fonns the basis for the 
newly established anny of the socialist state. Thus, a newly established state should 
pay attention to building its own regular anny and at the same time to ann the 
masses. Vo Nguyen Giap made a comment that 
"Anning the revolutionary masses III combination with building up the 
revolutionary army is the comprehensiw principle of Marxism-Leninism 
regarding the form of military organization of the socialist countries' defence 
system, and of wars of liberation, national defence wars and revolutionary war by 
the peoples in our time. This principle is developed from Marx's and Engel's 
thesis on ann ing the people to Lenin's thesis on building up revolutionary army on 
the basis of arming the people" (Giap, 1977b, p.343). 
4.1.3 Ho Chi Minh's military thought 
North Vietnam~s military strategy in the Vietnam war was devised under 
the guidance of Ho Chi Minh' s military thought. So in order to understand the 
military strategy of North Vietnam in the war, we should first learn about the Ho 
Chi Minh's military thought. \\"hich is actually about Vietnamese people' s \\"ar. 
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Ho Chi Minh's thought, of which Ho Chi Minh' s military thou aht is a 
• b 
part, is the creative application of Marxism and Leninism in the special context 
of Vietnam. In his thought about national liberation of colonised country, the 
only way to gain freedom and independence is through armed struggle. There is 
no peaceful way to gain independence from the colonialism or neo-colonialism. 
'"Having thoroughly understood the nature of imperialism and colonialism ruling 
their colonies by cruel force, Ho Chi Minh asserted that in order for the colonies 
to liberate themselves, armed struggle is the only way, using revolutionary 
violence against counter-revolutionary violence" (On Ho Chi Minh's military 
thoughts, 2002, p.130). 
In the case of Vietnam, a small backward country under the rule of French 
colonialism for long time and the under the America neo-colonialism, the only 
way to achieve independence and freedom is by waging a people's war, a truly 
people's war which can mobilise the strength of the whole population to fight 
against the colonial armed forces. 
Ho Chi Minh always highly appreciated the role of mass people in society. 
In his thought, people are the roots of society, people play the central role in 
society. So the cause of national liberation is the cause of the whole people. 
every people in the Vietnamese society must play their part and contribute to the 
cause. One of the main characteristic of the Vietnamese armed struggle against 
French and then America was that Vietnam was much weaker than its 
opponents. Vietnam was in the position of the weak against the strong, the less 
against the many. In that situation, to win the war of national liberation. 
according to Ho Chi Minh, the only possible way is to wage the truly all 
people's \\"a1'. 
"In the condition of confronting with aggressors. whose economIcs and 
militaries are bigger than Vietnam's mam times, people's war is the most 
~~ . 
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suitable and effective method of struggle to defeat the enemy, safeguarding 
the country's independence and sovereignty" (On Ho Chi Minh's militarv 
thoughts, 2002, p.188) 
Every Vietnamese people must participate in fighting the enemy in their 
own way, using any weapons available, and fighting the enemy at anytime, 
anywhere. This thought of Ho Chi Minh was reflected in his call for the whole 
nation to fight against the France on 19th December 1946 
"Every man, woman, old or young, no matter what religion, political party or 
ethnicity, as long as Vietnamese people, must stand up and participate in the 
fighting against the French colony to save the fatherland. Those who have gun 
use the gun, have sword use sword. If have not, use stick, stone, even digger to 
fight the French. Everyone must make every effort to fight against French colony 
and save the country" (Call for national struggle against French colony December 
1946). 
In the war against the America, Ho Chi Minh wrote that 
"Our struggle is the all nation people's struggle, a truly people's struggle. 31 
million country fellow men both in the North and in the South, no matter what old 
or young, male or female, must be 31 million brave soldiers to kill American 
troops to save the country" (Cited in History of Vietnamese people's army, 2003, 
p.375). 
In Ho Chi Minh's military thought armed activities do not belong to armed 
forces only, but are carried out by the country's people under the leadership of 
Communist party. Every people in Vietnam, as long as they are Vietnamese, ha\'e 
right and responsibility to participate in the armed struggle against the foreign 
invasion force to save the country. The people's army history \\Tote that 
"Our people's patriotic \\'ar is truly people's \\ar. Every people participate in the 
\\'ar, the whole country fight against enemy by the combination of strength of the 
anny and the whole population. So the war can last very long until we finally win. 
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the enemy, however strong and aggressive it is, will finally be defeated" (History 
of Vietnamese people's army. 2003. p.381). 
Another aspect of the people's war is that the armed forces, who held the main 
responsibility for carrying out the war, is the people's army. Ho Chi Minh said that 
the people create the army, the army are from the people, of the people and fight for 
the people. Ho Chi Minh maintained that the VPA was a people's army, the war was 
a people's war, and the army must always be closely associated with the people 
even though weaponry and technical skills must be constantly improved. Ho Chi 
Minh said that 
And 
"Remember that people are our master. People are water. Army are fish. All the 
forces we have are from the people. People are the parent of the army" 
"The army fight the enemy for the people but the army is not the savior of the 
people because it is the responsibility of the anny to fight against any enemy of 
the people" (Ho Chi Minh's selective works, volume 9, p.140 cited in History of 
Vietnamese people's anny, 2003, p.387) 
In order to bring the strength of people into full play, the people's armed force 
is organized in three categories: main forces, local forces and guerrilla forces. Each 
type of forces has its own advantages and disadvantages. When three types of force 
are combined, the disadvantages of each type can be negated, and the strength of 
this type can offset the weakness of the other. This is the best way of organisation to 
make full use of the strength of the whole people. The VP A official history wrote 
that 
"The reality of the revolutionary struggle of our people prove that organising 
people's armed force in three types of force to fight against the enemy is the 
most suitable \\ay to bring into full play of our people's strength. This is also 
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suitable with our country's special context, with our military strategy and our 
people's war" (History ofYietnamese People's army, 2003, p.385). 
According to Ho Chi Minh's military thought~ the best way to carry out the 
people's war is by combination of guerrilla warfare and conventional warfare. The 
guerrilla tactics is mainly used in the early stages of the war when the people's 
armed forces were still small. Ho Chi Minh wrote that 
"Militia, guerrilla force is the force of the whole people, an unbeatable force. The 
enemy, however strong it is, when facing with these force, will definitely 
defeated" 
In the first Indochina war, Ho Chi Minh wrote that 
"Guerrilla is a force spread all over the country. It is like a giant net cover the 
whole country. Wherever the French go to, they were still caught by this 
net"(Cited in Hoang Minh Thao, 2004, p.192) 
In the later phases of the war, when the regular force became strong, it will 
take the responsibility to fight in big unit battle. The regular force is responsible for 
fighting conventional war. Its task included annihilating the enemy regular force, 
liberating a large area, changing the posture of the war, defeating the aggressive will 
of the enemy and finally winning the war. To fight the war until the final victory, 
Vietnamese must combine the conventional war with guerrilla war. (On Ho Chi 
Minh's military thought, 2002, p.195). 
Under the guidance of Ho Chi Minh's military thoughts, North Vietnam 
leaders devised detailed strategies in fighting against America in their resistant war 
to save the fatherland. With the long tradition of fighting against very much stronger 
enemy and Ho Chi Minh's thoughts on the central role of the people in society, it 
was easy to understand that North Vietnam military strategist would adopt the 
strategy of people's \\ar. In a meeting of Vietnamese Worker Party's officers in 
1960, Ho Chi Minh stated that 
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"Our resistant war is an all-nation war. a true people's war". 
And he made clear that 
"31 million Vietnamese country fellow men and women, both in the North and 
in the South, no matter old or young, male or female, must be 31 million soldiers 
fight against America to save the country". (Cited in Hoang Minh Thao, 2004, 
p.77). 
So confronted with America, a very much stronger enemy, North Vietnam 
military strategists took the strategy of people' s war. Because only with people's 
war can Communist Vietnam stand and fight against America, only by people's war 
can Communist Vietnam mobilize the strength of the whole nation and bring this 
strength into full play. Lin Piao, one of famous Chinese strategist of people's 
protracted war wrote that: 
"People's war is the only way to mobilize and apply the whole strength of the 
people against enemy. the only way to expand our forces in the courses of the war, 
deplete and weaken the enemy, gradually switch from guerrilla to mobile warfare 
and finally defeat the enemy" (Cited in Lomperis.1984, p.139). 
However, due to the experience in the resistant war against the French colony 
and the special condition in the second Indochina war, the Vietnamese people's war 
is not totally the same with the Chinese people's war model. Vietnamese strategists 
borrowed many element of people's war from Chinese strategists such Mao Tse-
tung or Lin Piao, but they also created their own version of people' s war. 
4.1.4 Chinese people's war 
The most famous strategist for people's war is Mao Tse-tung, though this type 
of war came into existence long time ago. Lomperis (1984) wrote that 
"Others before Mao Tse-Tung had considered various features of a people' s war, 
but he detailed it as an operational blueprint for a revolutionary seizure of political 
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power. More than a blue print, it is hardly an exaggeration to say that his strategy 
of people's war has grown into an entire political philosophy" (p.133). 
In Mao's writings. the people's war is divided into three stages. This is the 
most famous feature of Mao's strategy of people's war. He wrote that 
"The first stage covers the period of the enemy's strategic offensive and our 
strategic defensive. The second stage will be the period of the enemy's strategic 
consolidation and our preparation for counter offensive. The third stage will be 
the period of our strategic counter offensive and the enemy's strategic retreat" 
(Mao Tse-tung, 1965, p.34 cited in Johnson, 1968, p.439) 
Reading these stages of Mao' s people's war, Lomperis (1984) contended that 
"What made Mao's protracted war was that the strength to wage it came from the 
mobilization of the masses. What made the people's war also a war of national 
liberation was that the chief motive appeal in gathering mass support was to 
patriotic struggle for national salvation against Japanese" (p.13 5). 
In carrying out three staged war, there are three types of war available- mobile 
war, guerrilla war and positional war, In each stage, a type of war plays central role. 
For example, the first stage of strategic defence is mainly carried out by the mobile 
war. However, each stage also consists of tactical mix of other stages which changes 
not only from one stage to another but also within each stage. Generally, three 
stages and three forms of warfare are very interrelated. 
Mao also gave four requisites for victory by people' s war which was 
summarised by Ralph Powell as follow: 
First. a people's war must be led by a Leninist party that is by a disciplined party 
of revolutionaries who act as the vanguard. 
Second, it must be built on mass support and a united front. In this case. mass 
support was meant to come primarily from poor peasants and the united front 
"'as the party ,'ehicle to attract other classes and groups. 
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Third, it must be waged by a party army, that is an army organized by and loyal 
to the party. 
Fourth, the revolution must have secure rural base areas as strategic haven or 
reserves both to support the fighting and to develop showcase models of the 
political system to come.(Powell, 1968, p249). 
After Mao, Lin Piao, the Chinese minister of defence heralded as Mao's heir 
apparent, further developed the strategy of people~s war in the publication entitled 
"Long live the victory of people's war" in 1965. He reaffirmed that Communist 
China had first developed the art of people' s war and the Chinese experience was of 
universal relevance. He considered Mao as the founding strategist of the people' s 
war. Lin Piao wrote that 
"Comrade Mao Tse-tung's theory of people's war has been proved by the long 
practice of the Chinese revolution to be in accord with the objective laws of such 
wars and to be invincible. It has not only been valid for China, it is a great 
contribution to the revolutionary struggles of the oppressed nations and peoples 
throughout the world" (Lin Piao, 1965, p.57 cited in Loperis 1984, p.139). 
David Mozingo and Robinson sum up main points in Lin Piao's strategy of 
people's war as follow: 
1) the strategy of united front; 2) the leading role of the Communist party; 3) the 
formation and defense of revolutionary base area; 4) an army arising from the 
masses, with the peasantry solidly behind both the army and the party; 5) the 
continued primacy of guerrilla warfare strategy (that is. protracted war) e\en 
though the three stages are no longer important; 6) self-reliance 7) and 
supplemental assistance from other socialist countries is permissible. (Mozingo 
and Robinson, 1965, p.3 cited in Lomperis. 1984, p.140). 
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4.2 Vietnamese people's war in the resistant war against 
America 1954-1975 
The above mentioned factors are those strongly influenced the North 
Vietnam's military strategy in the war against America. The North Vietnam's 
military strategy, though having some borrowed ideas from Chinese people's war 
and bases on the Marxism-Leninism on war and military, had the strong Vietnamese 
sense. This strategy inherited many characteristics from the Vietnamese tradition of 
fighting against foreign aggression. Moreover, Ho Chi Minh's military thought help 
to shape the Vietnamese military strategy to fit with the situation in Vietnam. In 
particular in the war against America, with its vivid experience in the first Indochina 
war against French, North Vietnam initiated its own strategy of people's war, 
tailoring it to be suitable to the new context and situation. 
In the war against French or the first Indochina war 1946-1954, Vietnamese 
communist leaders followed the Chinese Mao's three-stage protracted war. In that 
war, the French armed forces were already in Vietnam when the war broke out and 
they were much stronger in term of military power than the Vietminh forces. The 
aim of the Vietnamese forces in the resistant war against French colony is to defeat 
the French military and force the French to go out of the Vietnamese soil. So in that 
context, the most suitable strategy for Vietnamese armed force to fight against 
French army was Chinese three stage people's war. As early as six months after 
fighting broke out between the French force and Viet Minh in June 1947, Ho Chi 
Minh appealed his country fellow men for backing the Vietminh banner and 
declared that they would \\'in because "\\'e use the strategy of a protracted \\ar of 
resistance" (Lomperis, 1984, p.141). Then in September 1947, Truong Chinh, the 
then General Secretary of Vietnam Labour Party, \\Tote the article titled .. The 
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Resistant 'war will end in victory" to concretize the strategy of protected war. In this 
paper, Truong Chinh \-vas strongly influenced by Mao's three stage war and 
borrowed many from Mao, though he did not acknowledge that. 
"'He echoed Mao's call for a protracted war against superior force and reiterated 
Mao's emphasis on self reliance. He also repeated Mao's conviction that the 
people's war depended on a strategic defensive posture and a tactical offensive 
one of rapid settlement engagements. Further, he borrowed Mao's idea that the 
three levels of armed forces flowed into each other from the basic source of 
people. He even clinched this point by repeating Mao's analogy "The people are 
the water and our army the fish" (Lomperis, 1984, p.142). 
Truong Chinh also argued that the war must pass three stages, which he called 
the stage of contention, the stage of equilibrium and the stage of general 
counteroffensive. He wrote that 
"The long-term resistance war of our people must pass through three stages. That 
is a necessity" (Cited in Lomperis, 1984. p.142). 
So, basically according to Lomperis (1984), Truong Chinh's .. The ResTs/ant 
war will end in rTctory" was '"mainly an application of Mao's strategy of people's 
war to Vietnam". (p.142) 
This strategy was then reiterated in the Vietnamese Communist Party 
resolution. The party's second congress in 1951 declared that 
"The Party and the Government believe that our resistant war must pass through 
three stages. 
_ The first stage from 23 September 1945 to Viet Bac Campaign in winter 1947: 
This was the period of strategic defence and development of our regular forces 
_ The second stage from Viet Bac campaign up to now: This is period of strategic 
contention and preparation for general counter- offensive 
_ The third stage is general counter offensive." (PaI1) resolution. \'olume 12. 
p.125). 
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In the resistant war against America, which in North Vietnam's official yie\\-
started as early as July 1954 and lasted until April 1975. the situation changed 
greatly. 
As chapter 3 noted earlier, before 1965, the Americans were not directly 
involved in South Vietnam in terms of military affairs. America intervened through 
puppet government headed by Ngo Dinh Diem family. In this period, the strategic 
requirement for Communist Vietnam was to win the war without triggering direct 
US military intervention. So in the few years after Geneva agreement, North 
Vietnam mainly used political struggle to demand for Diem's implementation of the 
general election to reunify the country. Then, when it was clear that there would not 
be an election, the North used the political struggle in combination with gradual 
armed struggle. In early 1960s, sensing the possibility to win the war in short period 
of time, North Vietnam intensified their effort to win the war over South Vietnam 
before America could intervene. However. when it seemed that the Communist 
nearly won, the Americans sent their troops to South Vietnam to bear the fighting 
tasks. 
The presence of American troops was disturbing for the Vietnam military 
leaders to find a suitable strategy. The American forces were so much stronger than 
Vietnamese forces that it would be unrealistic to hope for the moment when North 
Vietnamese arn1ed forces became stronger and was able to defeat the America 
militarily. This meant that the third stage of Mao' s three staged war would neyer 
come. Lomperis pointed out that 
"There \\as the military challenge of the tremendous, superior mobility of allied 
forces, which was due in large part to the ubiquitous helicopter transports. and 
their massi\"e firepo,,-er on the ground. which was multiplied by O\-erlapping 
artillery fans_ And in the air, helicopter gunships. low-flying ground support 
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planes. and tactical fighter bombers were poised to respond almost instantly to 
the ground commander's call. This made frontal assaults on the most isolated of 
Allied positions suicidal, and e\"en lighting surprise attacks in the middle of the 
night could be broken up. How, then, was one to progress through the three 
stages of protracted war, if the enemy possessed greater numbers, firepower and 
mobility?" (Lomperis, 1984, p.147). 
Thus, the North Vietnamese military leaders had to abandon the strategy of 
three stage war and instead. created its own version of people's war. 
David Elliot acknowledged the changes in situation and the nature of the task 
of the war that made Vietnamese military leader abandoned three staged war. He 
wrote that 
and 
"The guiding concept changed from one that was predominantly offensive and 
military to a primarily defensive and psychological strategy. Rather than 
culminating in an apocalyptic counter offensive shattering the enemy's military 
forces, the purpose of military action in the anti-America strategy would be to 
deter and dissuade the United States from deeper involvement and to exhaust the 
strategic options open to Washington- a kind of strategic judo. This strategy 
would not rely on the direct military defeat of the United States, but rather would 
erode the very foundations of America policy and render U.S military action 
inconclusive." (Elliot, 1993, p.68). 
"The emphasis was not on a military defeat of the United States but rather on 
exhausting the strategic possibilities open to it. The key was to defeat the 
aggressive will (y chi xam luoc) of the United States, a psychological objective 
more than a military one." (Elliot, 1993, p.70). 
The advent of significant numbers of American ground combat troops further 
complicated matters, all of which prompted a full-fledged debate over military 
strategy. 
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"The question was, should the Americans be taken on face to face or should 
guerrilla tactics be given top priority?" (McDonald, 1993, p.206). 
Participation in this strategic debate was top leaders in Hanoi and semor 
military commander in South Vietnam such as Vo Nguyen Giap- Minister of 
Defense, Le Duan- First Secretary of Vietnam Labour Party. Van Tien Dung-
General Chief of Staff of the Army and Nguyen Chi Thanh political head of military 
forces in the South Vietnam. In this debate, Giap' s "iew and Thanh' s \\ere at the 
two extremes, the guerrilla first vs the big unit first. 
Giap argued for the priority of guerrilla tactics. This strategy would avoid 
heavy losses while enticing American troops into the difficult and wasteful task of 
trying to infiltrate in insurgent held areas. Meanwhile, he would gain time to train 
bigger force and infiltrate them into the South. According to McDonald 
"Giap's fundamental tenet about the conduct of the war was that the 
Vietnamese would outlast the United States not militarily but morally . 
.. . Fighting was not the point: the point was to make the United States 
give up politically in the face of stubborn refusal to budge" (McDonald, 
1993, p.207). 
Giap believed that VietCong should revert to guerrilla tactics and avoid set-
piece battles with the Americans, because even though they lacked a political base 
in Vietnam. the American' s superior firepower made it impossible to push them into 
the sea (Lomperis, 1984, p.149). 
Moreover, Giap rightly realized that the guerrilla war would make great 
difficulty for America's pacification program in the South Vietnam. Giap reasoned 
that 
"American reliance on firepower used indiscriminately \\ as self destructi\e 
because it caused heavy ci\"ilian casualties and brought criticism both \\'ith the 
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United States and abroad, let alone among the people whose hearts and minds 
they were trying to win" (McDonald, 1993. p.208). 
This point was confinned by Westmoreland, who said that 
"guerrilla war posed in some ways a more difficult problems for me than the 
regular troops from the North because by harassing U.S and gO\'ernment 
installations they could tie down more and more troops on defence" (McDonald, 
1993, p.208) 
However, Nguyen Chi Thanh strongly disagreed with Giap. Thanh argued that 
the war should be continued with major offensive. He favoured continuing frontal 
assaults on American forces, no matter how bloody, over more protracted fonns of 
guerrilla warfare. In his pen name as Truong Son, Thanh wrote that 
"In fighting the Americans, big unit battles must be pursued, because Americans 
must be kept off balance and because without these large scale operations 
guerrilla warfare would get nowhere" (cited in Lomperis, 1984. p.ISO). 
Thanh even went as far as criticizing Giap (though not mentioned him by 
name) of unclear theories and conservative spirit prevented him from discovering 
new facts, who worked in accordance with the old customs, who mechanically 
copied his own past experiences (McDonald, 1993, p.207). 
By summer 1967. the debate was shelved, partly because of Nguyen Chi 
Thanh's untimely death. Howeyer. it seemed that the good combination between 
these two extremes won the debate. It meant that the military strategy in the South 
Vietnam would be the combination between guerrilla war and big unit confrontal 
battles. North Vietnam followed the strategy of people' s protracted war. but it must 
always be prepared to launch offensi\"e to win decisiye yictory in short period of 
time. This is what Le Duan and Van Tien Dung argued for, and ultimately Giap \\as 
also con\·inced. 
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In an introduction to Le Duan's \\Titing on revolutionary strategy, he 
discarded the three stage resistant: 
"The revolution in the South will not follow the path of protracted armed 
struggle, surrounding the cities by the countryside and ad\'ancing to the 
liberation of the entire country by using military forces as China did, but 
will follow a Vietnamese path." (Le Duan. 1985, p. I 5). 
Le Duan then argued for the combination of protracted guerrilla tactics with 
carefully calculated big unit assault even at the time the revolutionary force still 
weaker than the enemy in order to change the course of the war in short time. 
In his address at the I i h plenary session of the central committee of Lao Dong 
Party in January 1966, Le Duan first analysed the differences between the war 
against French and the war against America then explained the changes in military 
strategy. Le Duan made a comparison between the two wars, just few years in 
between. 
.. I) In both wars, we are the weaker side and fighting against very much stronger 
enemy. However, in the war against America, we had experience of 9 years 
fighting against the French and we had the North as the strong base for the 
revolution in the South. Thus, in term of balance of force, we are still weaker but 
the gap is not as big as that of the war against French 
2) In the war against French, we were isolated when we started the war. But in 
the current war. we have the North as the base and the strong support from 
socialist countries. 
3) The war against French started with defence and evolved through three period 
of strategic defence, strategic contention and counter offensive, The current war 
did not started with defence but with mass uprising in the South. It was the result 
of the combination of political struggle and armed struggle in the early years of 
the \\ar." (Party resolution. Volume 26. p.486). 
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From the analysis the differences between the two wars, Le Duan argued that 
the war against America should followed the strategy of people's protracted war. 
However, on the basis of the people's protracted war. the revolutionary forces must 
be prepared to grasp the strategic opportunity whenever it arises to win the war in 
short time. This is what he called "a high level of people's war". Le Duan \\Tote that 
"Previously, now and in the future, we always stick to the strategy of people's 
protracted war. However. due to the changes of situation in the war against 
America, we must be prepared to launch strike to win a decisive victory whenever 
the strategic opportunity appears, hence to win the war. Following the strategy of 
protracted war does not mean that we fight the war gradually and slowly. If we 
fight the war slowly and miss the strategic moment to win the war, it is terrible 
strategic blunder" (Party resolution, Volume 26, p.487) 
Later in the meeting of Lao Dong Party Politburo III January 1967, the 
Politburo reiterated this strategy in the directive that 
""On the basis of understanding and applying the strategy of people's protracted 
war, at the current specific condition, we must try our best and combine all the 
forces of the North and the South to grasp the strategic opportunity to win decisive 
victory in short period of time in the South battlefield" (Party Resolution, volume 
28, p.125). 
Later in the his book "The Vietnamese Resolution: Fundalmental Problems, 
Essential Tasks", Le Duan wrote that 
""If we strike at the right moment, pick the right target and couple armed 
assaults with popular uprisings, we can make a \ery important leap to 
change the face of war" (Le Duan, 1970, p.67). 
And Van Tien Dung, the General Chief of Staff of VP A also followed the 
strategy of combination of guerrilla tactics with timed shock assault. He proclaimed 
that 
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"We have eliminated every military fonnula according to which attacks can only 
be launched when we posses more numerous and more powerful weapons and 
technical mean than the enemy" (Cited in Lomperis, 1984, p.154). 
Vo Nguyen Giap, the famous strategist of Vietnamese people's army, who had 
defeated French colony in Dien Bien Phu, managed to integrate the people's \yar 
with the strategy of general offensive-general uprising. He gave a set of six 
requirements: 
First, his fonnula was that of a comprehensive, all people's war associating with 
military forces with political forces in a grand armed and political revolution. 
Second, he called for closely coordinate attacks in the three strategic areas. 
Third, he demanded a thorough understanding of the ideology of the strategic 
defensive in a revolutionary war. The implication here was that ret-like offensives 
were an integral part of people' s war, but they should be launched only after 
careful analysis of the concrete conditions). 
Fourth, the new form still required a protracted war strategy that nevertheless 
displayed a willingness to exploit opportunities for larger victories. 
Fifth, while attiring enemy forces continued to be an objective. the new formula 
called for equal attention to building up an administrative power. 
And sixth, he insisted on a rule of self reliance while simultaneously seeking 
international assistance (Cited Lomperis, 1984, p.154). 
In the process of implementing what Le Duan called "a people's war 
developed to a very high level", Vietnamese military leaders initiated a "strategic 
formula": 
Two legs, 
Three points of attacks, 
Three strategic zones, 
Three types of forces. 
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"Two legs" means the combination of military acth'ities and political 
pressure, H'hich are just like two legs of a person. A person cannot walk 
comfortably with one leg, just like the war cannot be won with only military or 
political means. This guideline originated from the grand strategy of Communist 
Vietnam of defeating the aggressive will of the America- a psychological objecti\'e, 
rather than inflicting total defeat on the enemy- a military objecti\'e. 
In Hanoi's point of view, there were only three possible ways for the United 
States to attain its objective in South Vietnam. First was special war- the war was 
carried out by South Vietnamese military force with weapons, military equipment 
aided by the United States and with the help of US military advisers. This is clearly 
the America's most preferable option, so it would be carried out in first place. If this 
kind of war failed, the second choice is limited war. Limited war means the United 
States bring its own armed force in the Vietnamese soil to bear the main 
responsibility for fighting. However, the war was limited within the territory border 
of South Vietnam- a limited war. If the limited war still failed, the United States 
faced with a strategic option between waging a general war, expands to the North 
Vietnam territory and risked Chinese or even Soviet involvement or withdrawing 
from Vietnam. The strategic objective of North Vietnam was "to progressi\'ely shut 
off all avenue of victory to its opponent" (Elliot 1993, p.77), thus force the Unites 
States to choose to withdraw the earlier the better. The most successful strategy 
would be to persuade the America not to intervene in the war by its own forces. 
David Elliot commented that 
"This is an approach that \\as as much political and psychological as military, and 
not based on the necessity of conclusi\ely defeating the opponent on the 
battlefield" (1993. p.70). 
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The most suitable means to achieve the objective of persuading the United 
States to choose withdraw sooner rather than later. or if possible, not intervene at all. 
was the combination between military and political official. During the war, the 
North Vietnam leader emphasized the balance between political approach and 
military pressure. According to the History of VP A, the practice of attacking the 
enemy by combining the political struggle with the anned struggle was first 
employed during the Ben Tre uprisings after the issuing of the 15th Resolution of 
Lao Dong Party Central Committee in January 1959 to allow using of armed 
struggle in the revolutionary movement in the South (History of Vietnamese 
People's Anny. 2003. p.114). Since the 15th Resolution, the Communist leadership 
in Vietnam always emphasize the balance between military struggle and political 
struggle, considering them as two legs of a person. 
The Directive of Lao Dong Party Politburo on 24 January 1961 wrote that 
"Due to the changes in situation, now we must further intensify the political 
struggle, at the same time intensify the military struggle to be parallel with 
political struggle. We must attack the enemy in both political and military fronts." 
(Party Resolution, Volume 22. p.158). 
Then in the Resolution 12 of the Central Committee of the Lao Dong Party in 
December 1965, the Central Committee stated that 
"We can only make the most of military victory if it is combined with the success 
in political struggle" (Party resolution, Volume, 26, p.524) 
Then, the Politburo of the Lao Dong party of North Vietnam on 27 January 
1967 once again reiterated that 
"In the current war, we must understand the motto of combination of political 
struggle and military struggle. Both military and political fronts are crucial to our 
\'ictory. We must intensify the military struggle and at the same time do not 
underestimate the role of political struggle" (Party Resolution. Volume 2R. p.126) 
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After the end of the war, William Duiker commented on the strategy of 
balancing military struggle and political struggle that 
"key to success would be the ability of the party" s forces in the South to bring Sai 
Gon to the point of collapse without at the same time provoking \\'ashington to 
increase the level of U.S involvement in South Vietnam, or ewn take the war to 
the North. For this reason a combination of political struggle with low-Ie\el 
guerrilla warfare was considered most appropriate. The objecti\e would not be to 
defeat the enemy totally, but to create a "no win" situation and lead Washington to 
accept a political settlement and the formation of coalition government including 
the NLF in Sai Gon." (Duiker. 1981, p.207). 
"The three points of attack" are l71ililmy action. political action, and military 
proselytizing. Hanoi's strategy was the combination of all three points of attack to 
weaken the morale of Sai Gon troops. After 1965, when the American troops were 
brought in, Hanoi also aimed proselytizing at these forces. The North Vietnamese 
military leaders highly appreciated the role of military proselytizing. In the book 
'"Local people's war in the resistant war against America" published in 1996 by the 
Vietnam Ministry of Defense wrote that 
"The combination of three points of attack- military. political and proselytizing 
increases the effectiveness of an attack. An attack now not only has direct military 
effectiveness of destroying and killing enemy's anned forces on the battle field. 
but also has indirect impact of making enemy's military unit elsewhere self-
disintegrate. The military proselytizing had profound impact on the morale of 
enemy's troops ..... The elimination of enemy's troops and equipments is 
important. Howe\'er. breaking the \\ill of enemy's armed force is more important. 
The highest level of breaking the \\ill of the enemy"s armed forces is pushing for 
self-disintegration. The best \\ay to push the enemy's military unit to self 
disintegration is through military proselytising. Among the Sai Gon military unit. 
the local level military organization is the most like to be self-disintegrated when 
being prose 1) tised" (p. 165) 
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During the war, North Vietnam not only striked the balance between political 
and military struggle but also paid close attention to the role of military 
prosel ytising. 
In the Directive on 27 January 1967, the Politburo of the Lao Dong Party 
emphasize that 
"We must further promote the proselytising aiming at South Vietnam anned 
forces, combine the proselytising with military and political struggle to make 
South Vietnam anned forces self-disintegrate" (Party Resolution, Volume 28, 
p.141). 
And the Resolution of the Region V Party Committee dated March 1967 
stated that 
"Our current war motto is to combine proselytising with military and political 
struggle to make South Vietnam anned force self disintegrate and destroy morale 
of American forces, long forward to defeat the enemy totally" (Party resolution, 
Volume 28, p.492). 
Ho Chi Minh himself also laid special emphasis on military proselytizing. He 
did a lot of writing to contribute to this effort. One of his writing was '"Letter to 
soldiers of South Vietnamese governmenC. he wrote that 
"I am sure that you have good conscience for our fatherland. But you were 
fooled by America imperialism and its lackey and forced to fire at our country 
fellow men. If now you realize the truth and come back to our people, you still 
deserve for being a Vietnamese country fellow men:' (Cited in Hoang Minh 
Thao, 2004, p.87) 
And Ho Chi Minh reminded Pham Hung and Hoang Van Thai when they went 
to the South that: 
"In order to defeat the pacification plot of the enemy. we must always make good 
combination between military struggle with political struggle. among three points 
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of attack, among three types of forces and among three strategic area" (Cited in 
Hoang Minh Thao, 2004, p.89). 
Another aspect of the combination of three points of attack is the organization 
of the united front which is mainly responsible for carrying out political and 
proselytising attack against enemy. The united front played very important role in 
mobilizing mass movement against Sai Gon government. The mass movement 
contributed to making many Sai Gon military units disintegrated. 
"The three strategic areas" are mountain and forest area; delta and rural 
area; and town and city area. According to the Ho Chi Minh military thought, in 
Vietnamese style people's war, there is no separation between the rear and the front. 
The war is everywhere. North Vietnamese military leaders paid special attention to 
coordinating activities in all three areas. However, each area has its own main focus. 
The mountain and forest areas are suitable for large military unit. In this area, North 
Vietnam's main forces fought against American force in conventional war. The 
North Vietnam's main forces can rely on the mountain and forest terrain to negate 
the advantage of the America force in term of fire power and military equipment. So 
conventional military fighting is the main activities in this area. In rural area, there 
should be good combination between military and political activities. The local 
armed forces carry out small but constant military activities against enemy's 
military forces. Also, North Vietnam paid great attention to political activities in 
rural area to win and maintain support of general civilian population as they 
consider rural area as the great base for their war effort. The forces responsible for 
carrying out these activities are the mass people with the supp0l1 of local and 
guerrilla forces. In towns and cities, political activities played dominant role in 
revolutionary movement. The mass are responsible for these actiyities like 
st demonstration, strike .... In the \\'ar. on 24' January 1961. North Vietnamese 
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Politburo issued a directive that "provided very important strategic guidance for the 
revolution in the South". This directive called for the employment of military 
struggle in the mountain and forest areas, a mix of military and political struggles in 
the delta area and an emphasis on political struggle in town and cities. The book 
"History of the resistant war against America" interpreted this directive as follow: 
"In mountain and forest area: military fighting is the main activity. The main 
task in this area is killing enemy main forces to broaden our base and mobilize 
more forces. 
In delta area: Military struggle and political struggle are equally important. 
However, we should base on the actual situation on the spot to prioritize either 
political or military activities and the level and scope of struggle. 
In towns and cities: political struggle is the main activity, combine legal with 
secret struggle." (History of resistant war against America, Volume 3. 1997. 
p.29). 
The activities In one area support the activities in other area. The military 
action carried out by large unit in mountains and forest area help to relieve the 
pressure to local and guerrilla forces in rural area. Because Sai Gon had to send 
troop to fight against Vietcong main force in the forest area, so there would be less 
troops to carry out pacification program in rural and delta area. The success of 
VP A's military and political activities in mountain and forest and rural areas would 
contribute to the political struggle in cities and towns areas. Generally the struggles 
in three strategic areas are very interrelated. 
The Resolution IV of the Central Office of South Vietnam .March 1966 
emphasized the inter-relations of the revolutionary activities in three strategic areas 
that 
"In the \\ar against America nowadays. delta and rural area. mountain and forest 
area and town and city area are three strategic areas. they haye strong correlations. 
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Understanding the role of each area and the relations among them is an important 
factor to ensure the victory of the revolution" (Party resolution, Volume 27. p.345) 
Then, the resolution wrote that 
"The strategy for three strategic areas now is: Continue attacking enem: in the 
town and city areas and the area under enemy's control not narrow down its base. 
Mobilize the mass for uprising, destroy strategic hamlets and build our own 
authority in rural area. Strengthen our forces in mountain and forest area, make it 
become a strong base for the revolutionary movement in the South." (Party 
Resolution, Volume 27, p.346) 
"The three types 0.[ forces" are main forces, local forces and guerrilla units. 
In North Vietnam's military strategy_ there should be an overall balance among 
these three types of forces and there should be good combination among these 
forces in achieving military targets and eventually win the war. Each type of force 
has its own important role, and the tasks of this type of force inter-relate and support 
the tasks of other types of forces. 
In the war, North Vietnamese leadership paid attention to building the armed 
forces with three types of forces. The Politburo Directive issued on 27 January 1967 
wrote that 
"Our current war against America is people' s protracted war. The forces to carry 
out the war are people's armed forces including regular force, local force and 
guerrilla force and political forces including workers, farmers, youth, women, 
student.. ... (Party resolution, Volume 28, p.126). 
Then Le Duan in his address at the 12th Plenary seSSIOn of the Central 
Committee of the Lao Dong Party stated that 
"We must position the three types of forces logically. And we must combine 
the tasks of these forces. The enemy considered our army as one of the best 
army in the world because, beside our just cause and the great strategy of 
people's \\aT. our anned forces are organised into three types of forces. \\'e 
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understand the strong points of each type of force and coordinate the 
activities of three types of forces very weir" (Party Resolution, Volume 26, 
p.491). 
By organising the anny into three types of forces, the North Vietnam's way of 
war in the war against America was the combination between guerrilla warfare and 
conventional warfare. The task of regular force is to fight conventional warfare 
against enemy's regular force. The regular force mostly operated in mountain and 
forest area. It sometime entered delta and rural area to support the local force and 
guerrilla force there. The task of local force is to carry out battle in the assigned 
area. The local force is the force on the spot and it supported the activities of 
guerrilla forces and regular force operated in its area. The local force also received 
support from regular force and guerrilla force if necessary. The guerrilla force is the 
paramilitary force, it is both civilian and combatant. In Vietnamese language it is 
called Dan Quan (meaning Civilian Comabtant). The guerrilla force is responsible 
for guerrilla warfare. causing instant unrest deep in the enemy's base and defence 
local people. 
As mentioned in the Ho Chi Minh military thought, the only way to achie\'e 
the objective of revolution is the combination of conventional war, carried out by 
main forces and guerrilla war carried out by local and guerrilla force. In writing 
about the role of local people' s war in the resistant war against America, Vietnam 
Ministry of Defense wrote that 
"After the resistant war against French colony. our Communist party withdrew a 
lesson that the rule to \\in our people' s war over enemy is the combining 
conventional warfare with guerrilla warfare. In the war against America. our 
Communist party continues to follow tlus rule. This became the la\\'s of \\'inning 
the \\3r over stronger enemy", (Local people's war in the resistant war against 
America, 1996. p.168.) 
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During the war against America, North Vietnamese military leaders 
acknowledged and made full use of the strong points of guerrilla warfare, carried out 
by guerrilla and local forces. The local and guerrilla forces are responsible for 
constant harassment to enemy's armed forces. They did not allow the enemy to rest 
and regain energy. The enemy must be always in the high alert. This situation made 
enemy troop tired quickly and reduce armed forces' morale. Moreover. the guerrilla 
war force the enemy spread thin to counter the attack from revolutionary force 
everywhere. There is no frontline and no rear, everywhere in the country is the battle 
field. The enemy had to defend the whole country. This made Sai Gon military 
weariness. Though the United States and Sai Gon armed force outnumbered the 
revolutionary force, they still did not have enough troops for pacification campaign 
and carrying out assault on Vietcong main forces. The book "Local People's war in 
the resistant war against America" published by the Vietnamese Ministry of Defense 
made a comparison as follow: 
In Korean war, the total number of American troops were 360,000. And the 
American military leaders in the war were able to send 340,000 troops to the front to 
fight against the main forces of China and North Korea. They needed only 20,000 
troops in the back to secure the rear. In the Vietnam war, the US had the total of 
more than 500,000 troops, mainly came from America, some from allied country 
like South Korea, Australia. Only about 50,000 troops could be sent to the front. the 
rest must be kept in the back for pacification tasks and securing the rear. So only 
10% of the total troops were used for fighting. This was due to the activeness of the 
guerrilla and local forces that forced the America to spread all over the country. 
This also explains why the US generals in the Vietnam war kept on asking for more 
troops. and during the war, the America had to mobilize the resen"e force. 
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However, the guerrilla warfare carried out by local and guerrilla forces had a 
lot of disadvantage, especially when the war developed to a high level. Local and 
guerrilla force are very good at harassing the enemy every day, but they could not 
carry out big unit assault on the enemy. So they can never destroy the enemy and 
thus cannot finish the war. When the war developed to a high level, big unit attacks 
are needed to liberate a large area like a province or even several provinces, expand 
the revolutionary base. This kind of campaign cannot be carried out by local or 
guerrilla forces. So in the later stages of the war, regular forces are needed to make a 
strategic turning point in the path of war. As a result, the most effective strategy in a 
revolutionary war is to combine the activities of all three types of forces. The 
success of the regular force would relieve the pressure on the local and guerrilla 
forces and vice versa. The activities of these three types of forces are highly 
interrelated. David Elliot pointed out that 
"The main forces would cast an umbrella of security over the bases of 
smaller units which, in turn, could operate in areas too constricted or 
exposed for the big concentrated units:" (Elliot, 1993, p.71). 
The chapter has presented the North Vietnam's military strategy in the war 
against America, which North Vietnam called "Vietnamese people's war". This was 
not the three-stage people's war as initiated by Mao Tse-Tung and applied by 
Vietminh in the first Indochina war against the French. In the war against America, 
North Vietnam employed the strategy of Vietnamese protracted people's war. This 
strategy was the good combination between guerrilla war and conventional war. 
Protracted war does not mean that fight slowly and gradually. Instead, it means that 
the anny carry out the people's war. but an) 1ime the strategic opportunity arises, the 
army must tried its best to grasp that opportunity to \\'in a decisive victory in 
relatively short period of time. This strategy called for the "'hole nation to join 
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forces in order to fight against enemy and win decisive battles to end the war. 
Following this strategy of Vietnamese people's \\ar. North Vietnam did not aim at 
defeating American forces militarily, instead North Vietnam aim at defeating 
America's aggressive will. To achie\'e that strategic aim, North Vietnam imented 
the strategic model which can be summarised as: two legs. three points of attacks, 
three strategic zones, and three types of forces. The deep root of the North 
Vietnam's military strategy was the tradition of fighting against foreign aggressors 
in the long history of Vietnam. In modern time, that tradition of fighting was 
combined with the Marxism-Leninism, Chinese people's \yar and guided by the Ho 
Chi Minh's military thoughts. These are the most influential factors to the strategy. 
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Chapter V: Assessing North Vietnam's military conduct in the 
Vietnam war against the law of armed conflicts 
After studying the law of war and the North Vietnam military strategy in the 
war, we should find out whether North Vietnam abided by the law of war in the war 
against America? Did North Vietnam comply with the law of war? If not, was it 
unrestrained in its way of fighting? What were its rules of engagement to its own 
civilian population? These are the questions will be answered in this chapter. 
In the first part of this chapter, I will answer the question whether the law of 
war itself is applicable in the Vietnam War? As there might be argument that the 
law of war was originated in the Western civilization while Vietnam belongs to 
oriental civilization, so it is not applicable. 
In the next part, I would assess North Vietnam's compliance with the law of 
war. I will focus on North Vietnam's military strategy, the North Vietnam's form of 
organization of the armed forces, the North Vietnam's mode of conduct during the 
war and North Vietnam's treatment of prisoner of war. 
In the last part of the chapter, I will point out the rule of engagement of the 
North Vietnam's armed forces. Though North Vietnam violated the basic principles 
of the law of war, it did have very strict rule of engagement to protect civilian and 
minimize civilian casualties in the war. This rule of engagement comes not out of 
the fidelity to the law of war but out of the very basic need of the armed forces. As 
without the support of civilian population, North Vietnam's armed forces would not 
be able to survive, let alone to fight against such an enemy like America. Thus, the 
N011h Vietnamese People's Am1)' had to obey yery strict rule of engagement to win 
and maintain the support of ci\'ilian population. 
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5.1 The applicability of the law of war in the Vietnam war 
To answer the question whether North Vietnam complied with the law of war 
or not, first of all we should ask whether the law of war itself applicable to the 
Vietnam war. There might be an argument that the law of war originated and 
developed in Western civilization and only applicable to the war among countries in 
the West. While Vietnam belongs to the oriental civilization, and there are many 
elements different between the two civilizations thus the law of war does not apply 
in Vietnam. However, in my opinion this argument is not true. 
We can find many basic ideas of the law of war not only in the West but also 
in the Eastern civilization such as India or China. For example, in China, as early as 
in fifth century B.C, there was a widely accepted rule that 
'No war should be begun without just cause; that enemy should be notified of 
pending attacks; that no injury be done to the wounded; and that the persons 
and properties of innocents be respected' (Christopher, 1994, p. 8). 
In the Book of Manu, which was written by Hindu civilization in India about 
the fourth century B.C, there are many rules for regulating land war that are very 
similar to many aspects of present-day international law regarding the conduct of 
war. 
When the king fights with his foes in battle, let him not strike with weapons 
concealed in wood, nor with such as are barbed, poisoned, or the points of which 
are blazing with fire. Let him not strike one who in flight has climbed on an 
eminence, nor a eunuch, nor one who joins the palms of his hands in 
supplication, nor one who flees with flying hair, nor one who sits down. nor one 
who says "I am thine"; nor one who sleeps, nor one who had lost his coat of 
mail. nor one \\'ho is naked, nor one who is disarmed. nor one \\'ho looks on 
\,"ithout taking part in the fight. nor one who is fighting with another foe. nor one 
\\"hosC' \,"C'apons are broken. nor one afflicted \,"ith sorrow. nor one who has been 
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grievously wounded, nor one who is in fear, nor one who has turned to the flight: 
but in all cases let him remember the duty of honourable warriors. (Cited in 
Christopher, 1994, p.9) 
In the modem time, when the laws of war were codified in international 
conventions, the aim of the codification process was not restricted in governing the 
wars among western countries. More importantly, the 1949 Geneva Conventions I, 
II, III and IV aimed at regulating and lessening the ferocity of the war suffered by 
people all over the world. As a result, now there are totally 194 countries, not just 
western ones, have already ratified and become parties to the four 1949 Geneva 
Conventions. 
Vietnam was among the countries ratifying the conventions very early. As 
early as 1957, Vietnam was signatory to the 1949 Geneva conventions. 
Theoretically, Vietnam or more specific Democratic Republic of Vietnam or North 
Vietnam, would abide by the Geneva Convention since 1957. Thus, North 
Vietnam's actual fighting in the Vietnam war. starting in 1960 from North 
Vietnam's point of view, should be under the regulation of the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions. 
The fact that fighting in the Vietnam war was under the regulation of the 1949 
Geneva Conventions was also the official position of International Committee of 
Red Cross (ICRC). As early as 1965 when the America introduced its own troops to 
South Vietnam to bear the direct fighting responsibilities, ICRC sought to promote 
the full compliance by all parties in the Vietnam conflict with the provisions of the 
1949 Geneva Conventions. On June 11, 1965, the Committee addressed the 
following letter to the governments of Democratic Republic of Vietnam, the 
Republic of Vietnam, the United States, and the National Liberation Front of South 
Vietnam: 
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"The hostilities ranging at the present time in Vietnam- both North and South of 
17th parallel- have assumed such proportions recently that there can be no doubt 
they constitute an armed conflict to which the regulations of humanitarian law as a 
whole should be applied. 
All parties to the conflict, the Republic of Vietnam, the Democratic Republic of 
Vietnam and the United States or America are bound by the four Gene,"a 
conventions of August 12, 1949 for the protection of the victims of war, having 
ratified them and having adhered thereto. The National Liberation Front is bound 
by the undertaking singed by Vietnam. 
Pursuant to the common article 1 of the four Geneva Conventions, "The High 
Contracting Parties undertake to respect and to ensure respect for the present 
Convention in all circumstances". It is likewise said in Article 2 that "The present 
convention shall apply to all case of declared war or of any other armed conflict 
which may arise between two or more of the Contracting Parties, nen if the state 
of war is not recognized by one of them" 
In keeping with its humanitarian tradition, the International Committee of Red 
Cross in Geneva reminds the governments of the aforesaid countries and the 
National Liberation Front of their obligations pursuant to the Geneva 
Conventions. 
It is incumbent on them to implement the provisions thereof and to permit the 
ICRC to carry out its mission as neutral intermediary, as laid down in these 
Conventions. 
In particular the life of any combatant taken prisoner, wearing uniform or bearing 
an emblem clearly indicating his membership of the armed forces, shall be spared, 
he shall be treated humanely as a prisoner of war. list of combatants taken prisoner 
shall be communicated without delay to the International Committee of Red Cross 
(Centre Infonnation Agency), and the delegates of ICRC shaH be authorised to 
visited prison camps. 
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In addition, parties to the conflict shall respect and protect civilians taking no part 
in hostilities, they shall abstain from attack against such persons and subject them 
to no form of violence. 
The ICRC is prepared to co-operate with the authorities concerned as far as it is 
able in the loyal and strict application of the Geneva Conventions drawn up by the 
community of nations to alleviate the hardship engendered by war. 
The ICRC conveys the present communication to the governments of the three 
aforesaid countries and will endeavour to deliwr it also to the National liberation 
Front. I would be pleased to know what measures are taken by the governments in 
conformity with the duties developing upon them pursuant to the 
Genevaconventions" (International Review of the Red Cross, 1965, p.417-418). 
Among the four addressees of the JCRe's letter. only the National Liberation 
Front was not the signatory of the 1949 Geneva Conventions. However. in the letter. 
JeRe clearly stated that 
"The National Liberation Front is bound by the undertaking signed by 
Vietnam"(lnternationaI Review of the Red Cross, 1965, p. 418). 
The parties of the Vietnam War were not in agreement on the applicability of 
the 1949 Geneva Conventions to the conflict. The United States supported the 
position of IeRe. On August 10, 1965, Secretary of State Rusk replied to the JCRC 
letter that: 
"The United States has always abided by the humanitarian principles enunciated in 
the Geneva Conventions and will continue to do so. In regard to the hostilities in 
Vietnam, the United States Government is applying the provisions of the Geneva 
Conventions and we expect the other parties to the conflict to do likewise. 
Among the particular measures being taken to implement the Convention at the 
present time, the United States Government is de\eloping plans to assist the 
Government of the Republic of Yietnam to expand and imprO\e facilities and 
procedures to process and care for an increased number of captives taken in 
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combat. The two governments are also increasing program of instruction for 
personnel in the details of the provisions of the Conventions. 
As you are aware, those involved in aggression against Republic of Vietnam rely 
heavily on disguise and disregard generally accepted principles of warfare. From 
the outset it has therefore been difficult to develop programs and procedures to 
resolve fully all the problems arising in the application of the provisions of the 
Conventions. Continues refmement of these programs and procedures in the light 
of experience will thus undoubtedly be necessary."(International Review of the 
Red Cross, 1965, p.477). 
South Vietnam also agreed with the position of America and support JeRe. 
Just one day after the America~s response to JeRe's letter. South Vietnam Minister 
of Foreign Affairs Tran Van Do, in a replied letter, stated that 
"The Government of the Republic of Vietnam is fully prepared to respect the 
provisions of Geneva Conventions and to contribute actively to the efforts of the 
International Committee of Red Cross to ensure their application. It is to be hoped 
that for their part the Vietcong will show the same humanitarian concern. 
Appropriate measures have already been considered by our Government to 
accelerate the promulgation and dissemination of these conventions. 
I should like further to inform you that the Geneva Conventions although not yet 
promulgated in Vietnam have, in fact, always been applied. Vietcong prisoners 
have always received the most humane treatment form our civilian and military 
authorities".(International Review of the Red Cross, 1965, p.478). 
For the part of North Vietnam, on August 3 L 1965, the country's Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, Mr Bui Tan Linh, sent a reply to the request of IeRe. The reply did 
not answer directly to the request of JeRe but instead accused America and South 
Vietnam of "committing crimes in their \var of aggression in Vietnam". Howard S. 
Levie wrote that 
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"The reply received from Democratic Republic of Vietnam was the usual propaganda 
tirade which appears to be endemic in Communist documents, thus making it rather 
difficult to isolate any truly responsive portions." (Levie. 1969, in Richard A. Falk, 
1969, p. 362) 
The reply read in full as follow 
"I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your letter under the date of June 11, 
1965 and to reply as follows. 
As all the world is aware, the United States Governments and its agent in Saigon 
are engaged in committing crimes in their war of aggression in Vietnam, 
undermining peace, violating laws and customs of war and perpetrating acts 
against humanity. 
In order to compensate for its defeats in the undeclared war of aggression in South 
Vietnam, the United States Governments has, without any justification, gi\'en 
orders to its air and naval forces to make surprise attack on the Democratic 
Republic of Vietnam, in flagrant violation of the Geneva Agreements of 1954 on 
Vietnam and the rules of international law. It has employed napalm and 
phosphorous bombs, poisonous chemical products, and its aircraft and warships 
have indiscriminately bombed hospital, schools, roads, transport stations, markets, 
villages, fishing vessels, churches, pagodas, etc., massacring large number of 
innocent civilians and violating the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, for 
the protection of the victims of war, as well as other rules of war. 
The people and Governments of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam consider the 
actions of the United States Governments and its agents in Saigon as acts of piracy 
and regard the pilots who have carried out pirate-raids, destroying property and 
massacring the population of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, as major 
criminals caught in flagrant delicto and liable for judgement in accordance with 
the laws of Democratic Republic of Vietnam, although captured pilots are well 
treated. Authorization had been granted them to correspond with their families, 
Howen::r, the regulations concerning mail with the exterior having been recently 
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infringed, the competent authorities of the Republic of Vietnam haye decided 
temporarily to suspend this correspondence. In future, if those concerned 
demonstrate their willingness to observe the regulations in force in the Democratic 
Republic of Vietnam, the competent authorities could reconsider the question \\-ith 
a view to finding an appropriate solution. 
In South Vietnam, the Government of the United States and its agents in Saigon 
are also undertaking a war of great atrocity, employing against the ciyilian 
population arms and methods of warfare which haye for long been prohibited by 
international law. The Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam 
energetically condemns these barbarous acts committed by the Government of the 
United States and its agents and declares that they must take entire responsibility 
for the crimes which they perpetrated" (International Review of the Red Cross, 
1965, p.527). 
The National Liberation Front did not fonnally reply to the ICRC letter, but it 
stated that it consider the 1949 Geneva Conventions not applicable. Howard S. 
Levie wrote that 
"The NLF. the political arm of the Vietcong, flatly refused to apply the 
Conventions, stating that it "was not bound by the international treaties to which 
other beside itself subscribed .. _ The NLF, however, affIrmed that the prisoners it 
held were humanely treated and that above all. enemy wounded were collected 
and cared for" (Levie. 1969, in Richard A. Falk, 1969, p.362). 
Three years later, due'to many violations of the law of war committed by all 
parties to the conflict, JCRC had to issue a press release on February 9, 1968. The 
press release affinned that all parties to the conflict had to abide by the elementary 
and universally recognized rules of humanity. The press release read: 
"The International Committee of the Red Cross in Geneva is constantly being 
questioned about press news describing inhumane acts committed during the 
fighting now taking place in Vietnam. 
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The ICRC reminds belligerents that in all circumstances they are bound to observe 
the elementary and universally recognized rules of humanity. These demand that 
the lives of combatants who ha\'e been captured be spared, that the wounded, the 
sick and those giving them medical care shall be respected, that the civilian 
population shall not be subject to attack from the air and lastly, that summary 
executions, maltreatment or reprisals shall be prohibited. 
The ICRC has often made known to those taking part in the hostilities the 
obligations they must fulfil. It ardently hopes that they will shortly put an end to 
this blood-stained conflict and meanwhile urgently calls upon them to obser\'e the 
basic rules of humanity." (International Review of the Red Cross, 1968, p.138). 
So, in short, forget about the propaganda, what was the position of North 
Vietnam regarding the applicability of the law of war in Vietnam War? In the reply 
letter to ICRC, North Vietnam attacked on .. the US and its agent in Saigon" \vho are 
"engaged in committing crimes in their war of aggression in Vietnam, undennining 
peace, violating the laws and customs of war and perpetrating act against humanity" 
(International Review of the Red Cross, 1965, p.527). It appears that the argument 
of the North Vietnam was: America was wrong at the beginning in waging the war 
of aggression and also the America itself violated the laws of war, so the American 
troops did not deserve to benefit from the provision of the law of war. In other word, 
North Vietnam would not abide by the laws of war in its fighting against America. 
This position was reiterated by North Vietnam when it participated in the series of 
conference preparing for the amendment of the 1949 Geneva Conventions in 1974. 
In its paper at one of the conference, North Vietnam argued that Gene\'a and Hague 
laws say nothing about justice, therefore it had become obsolete, dangerous and 
unfair. 
"What should be the position of humanitarian la\\ in face of these new war 
conditions \\'hich set unanned or inadequately arnled men and under-de\eloped 
And 
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and ill-equipped peoples against imperialism modem war machine? In our 
opinion, humanitarian law should, first, effectively protect human being against 
the war machine of aggression; secondly, take all possible measures to prevent the 
use of the war machine of aggression by morally condemning it as a war crime ... 
In severely condemning the war machine of aggression as criminal, the rules 
prohibiting means and methods of criminal combat should be as complete and 
details as possible. Similarly, the inadequate and dangerous concepts of 
'unnecessary injury', 'unnecessary suffering', 'due proportion' and 'military 
necessity' should be excluded" (Cited in Best, 1980, p.314) 
"The time has now come to establish clearly to \\hich side the international 
community's assistance will be given-to the combatant who respect humanitarian 
law, or to the combatant who violates humanitarian law. He who violates 
humanitarian law does not have the right to be well-treated under that la\\" (Cited 
in Best, 1980,p.315). 
However. this argument proved to be too simple and most law scholars do not 
agree with. In every circumstance, the law of war should be equally applied to both 
sides of conflict, no matter who wage the war. The law of war should be absolute 
rather than reciprocal. 
Richard Falk wrote that 
"The violations by the other side do not vindicate our own unless committed in 
specific reprisal" (Falk, 1969, p.485) 
Or Christopher Greenwood wrote that 
"A North Vietnam suggestion that aggressor. including any regime seeking to 
preyent a people from exercising its right of self-detennination. should be denied 
the benefits of the jus in bello made no progress" (Greell\\ood, 1983. p.226). 
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Most scholars of the laws of war agree that there should be a distinction 
betweenjus ad bellum andjlls in bello. As noted in chapter I, Michael Walzer wrote 
that 
"War is always judged twice, first with reference to the reasons states have for 
fighting, secondly with reference to the means they adopt.. .... The two sorts of 
judgement are logically independent. It is perfectly possible for a just war to be 
fought unjustly and for an unjust war to be fought in strict accordance with the 
rules" (Walzer, 2006, p.21). 
Another argument that North Vietnam used in order to justify its position was 
that there was not official declaration of war between the America and Vietnam, 
thus the law of war was not applicable. 
"The only specific legal excuse ever advanced by North Vietnam for its 
insistence that the Convention is not applicable, and that persons captured by it 
are not entitled to the humanitarian protection afforded by the Convention, has 
been that there is no "declared war"." (Levie, 1969 in Richard A. Fa1k. 1969, 
p.368). 
This argument based on the common article 2 of the 1949 Geneva Convention. 
The article provided that 
"Article 2: The present convention shall apply to all cases of declared war or of 
any other armed conflict which may arise between two or more of high contracting 
parties, even if the state of war is not recognized by one of them". 
So the argument of North Vietnam was that: because there is no declaration of 
war, the law of war was not applicable. However, this position was soon discredited 
by law scholars. Howard S. Levie wrote that 
"It is surely beyond dispute that there is an '"anned conflict"" in Vietnam between 
1\\'0 or more of the parties to the Convention. Under these circumstances. the fact 
there has been no declaration of war. so that a state of war is not recognized as 
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existing, is completely irrelevant to the requirement to apply the convention. There 
is. then, no validity whatsoever to the sole legal reason put fonvard by North 
Vietnam to justify its refusal to apply the Convention by which it voluntarily 
elected to be bound a number of years before the armed conflict in Vietnam 
reached its present status. The wording used in drafting the fIrst paragraph of 
Article 2 leaves no doubt that it was the intent of the Diplomatic Conference 
which approved it that the Convention be applicable in ewry instance of the use of 
armed force in international relations- and, beyond any shadow of doubt, this 
intent was attained. It appears equally clear that the refusal of North Vietnam to 
apply the Convention under the circumstances which exist in Vietnam-whether or 
not the United States is waging a war of aggression- constitutes a blatant disregard 
of an international obligation, freely accepted." (Levie, 1969 in Richard A. Falk, 
1969, p.368). 
So the North Vietnam's position regarding the law of \\'ar was that the law is 
not applicable in its war against America. Its arguments were that this was not a 
declared war and/or the American forces should not benefit from the law of war 
regulation because they committed war crimes and their war was aggression. The 
position and arguments of North Vietnam was debatable and most law scholars did 
not agree with it. 
5.2 Assessing the law of war in North Vietnam's military 
strategy and conduct in the war against America 
5.2.1 The law of war in North Vietnam's military strategy in fighting 
against America. 
Under the influence of the Marxism-Leninism and inherited from the tradition 
of struggling against foreign aggression. North Vietnam' s military strategy in the 
war against America \\'as the people's war. Vietnam Communist Party mobilized the 
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entire people in the country to fight against foreign invaders. In the resolution of the 
9th Party" s Central Committee meeting in 1970: 
"The enemy is fought not only by the armed forces but also by the population, 
using every means available. Not only do the people intensify production and 
assume combat support duty, they also take direct part in the fighting. We fight the 
enemy not only by armed struggle but also by political actions by the masses, 
persuasion work among puppet. America and other troops. We launch not only 
military attacks but also mass uprisings of various scopes and forms. A new 
characteristic of the people's war in Vietnam at present is the high national and 
class consciousness of the masses, the scientific and tight organization of the 
struggle in the whole country. the flexible method of struggle- which tum all the 
30-odd million Vietnamese into valiant fighters for national salvation" (Resolution 
of Vietnam Communist Party, Vo1.14, p.222). 
Vo Nguyen Giap then concretized the Party's military line that 
"Our line, embodied in the watchword: Let the entire people fight the enemy is 
concretized in the following essential issues: 
- Mobilization and organization of the entire people for war, building of the 
people's political forces and armed forces, the latter including three categories of 
troops constituting the core of the fighting people. 
- Reliance on the political forces of the masses, setting up of resistance bases and 
rear bases of people's war; coordinating the local rear-base with the national rear-
base while drawing support from the international rear-base: the socialist camp. 
_ Creative application of the mode of conduct and the military art of people' s \\ar. 
successfully opposing enemy troops more numerous and better equipped than our 
0\\11, attacking the enemy by the combined force of armed struggle and political 
action in all strategic zones in town and country, and defeating the enemy step by 
step until we gained complete \'ictory 
_ Strengthening of the Party's leadership in the conduct of the war. this being the 
decisive factor of victory" (Giap. I 977a. p.222-23). 
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This military strategy of North Vietnam in the Vietnam War was strongly 
influenced by the Marxism-Leninism and Vietnamese national experience in 
struggling against foreign invaders. North Vietnam official documents confirm this 
influence as written by Vo Nguyen Giap that 
"The military line of our party stems from its correct political line. from the 
Marxist-Leninist theory on war and the army, from the military skill of our 
forefathers and from the advanced experiences of the revolutionary struggle in the 
world. At the same time, it reflects the wealth of precious experience acquired by 
our people in the practice of revolutionary struggle under the leadership of the 
Party in the last forty years" (Giap, 19}7a, p.223). 
North Vietnam's military strategy was actually the realization of the following 
statement of Lenin when he called for mobilization of the entire nation to fight 
enemy 
"Every force in the country must be summoned for this war. The whole country 
must be turned into a revolutionary camp. Everyone must help. ( ... ) The country's 
entire manpower and resources are placed entirely at the sen'ice of reyolutionary 
defence" (Lenin, Collected Works, 1965, p.365) 
With the strategy of mobilizing all people to participate III the cause of 
fighting against America, we can see that the law of war was not abided by North 
Vietnam military strategists. Laws of war require that civilian should be kept away 
from war fighting and the war can only be carried out by professional armed forces 
because the civilian is protected by the principle of non-combatant immunity as long 
as they do not participate in actual military fighting tasks. Once civilian participate 
directly in the fighting, they would lose the right to immunity. The North Vietnam's 
military strategy which caIIed for the participation of the whole nation to tIght 
aoainst America's anned forces violates the basic principle of the law of war. i.e the 
e 
principle of distinction between combatant and non-combatant. 
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In their actual conduct in the war. North Vietnam' s military leaders ah\'ays 
encouraged the civilian to participate in military activities. In almost any big battle 
in the war against America during the war. we can always notice the contribution of 
the civilian population. For example, in Binh Gia operation in January 1965. local 
civilians were used to prepare battle field such as digging tunnel, digging personal 
fighting hole ... while the regular forces were busy with logistic tasks, transporting 
foods, building barricade ... Or in the North BinhDinh operation in 1966, local 
civilians was mobilized to husk rice and provide armed forces with foods. Within 
one night, the local civilians could gather 700 eggs to provide for the wounded 
(History of the resistant war against America, 1999). There are many more examples 
of the participation of civilians in the military fighting tasks during the war. North 
Vietnam armed forces did not coerce the civilian to work for them, they only 
mobilized the civilian support by their propaganda program, not by coercion. 
The encouragement of civilian to participate in war fighting was well 
illustrated in the lessons of Cu Chi. Cu Chi is an area 30km North West of Saigon. 
where America and South Vietnam on the one side and North Vietnam and Viet 
Cong on the other side fought each other severely. In 1965 and early 1966, when the 
American troops were just introduced in South Vietnam, Viet Cong and North 
Vietnamese leaders were uncertain about the way to fight American troops, even 
whether they can fight American or not. In February 1966, a battalion of American 
troops were deployed in Cu Chi to root out the Vietcong forces in this strategic area. 
The Viet Cong organized their forces and mobilized the support of civilian 
population in the area to fight against this American force. The American force. 
though better trained and equipped, failed to fulfil the aim of the battle and suffered 
great loss. After this battle of Cu Chi, Vietcong leaders dra\\' ten lessons for the 
Vietnamese forces to fight against America. The North Vietnamese aml)' leaders 
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then initiated a movement in the whole South Vietnam area to learn the lessons of 
Cu Chi. The Ten lessons of Cu Chi were: 
1 Every one can fight America 
2 Any weapon can be used to fight America 
3 Small number or large number of force alike, one person or one group alike should 
fight America 
4 Fight against America everywhere. Fight America in jungle, in village, in strategic 
hamlet. Fighting would be successful as long as we actively find the America and kill them. 
5 Fight America both in day time and night time. 
6 Take the opportunity of the enemy's counter offensive to kill the enemy 
7 Fight the enemy in the front, in the rear. Fighting enemy everywhere they are, force 
the enemy into passive to fight them. 
8 Fight America in the commune and in the strategic hamlet as well as fight America 
outside commune and outside strategic hamlet 
9 Our armed forces are able to defeat any America forces - army, tank, airplane. and 
special forces. 
10 Fighting America by armed forces, political forces and proselytizing forces. 
(History of the Resistant War against America, vol.4, 1999. p.79). 
These lessons was promulgated and widely learnt among armed forces 
throughout the South Vietnam. We can see in these lessons that North Vietnam 
called upon every Vietnamese people to participate in fighting America armed 
forces. This call of encouragement was actually against the basic principles 
underpinning the laws of war. 
The North Vietnam's military strategy also yiolated the principle of necessity 
in the law of war. The laws of war require that certain kinds of "'eapons be banned. 
because they inflict excessi\'e unnecessary suffering. And also the principle of 
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necessity demand that 'not whatever is necessary is permissible. but that eyer)1hing 
permissible must be necessary' (Lackey. 1989~ p.59). But in their strategy, l'\orth 
Vietnam military leader call on their people to "use eyery mean ayailable" 
(Communist Party Documents) and "Any weapon can be used" to fight America. 
(Lessons of Cu chi in History of the Resistant War against America, volA, 1999, 
p.79) 
This North Vietnam~s strategy was originated from the thought of Engels and 
Lenin on war fighting. Engels once wrote about the war of liberation that 
"A people who want to win back independence for themselves must not limit 
themselves to conventional means of waging war. Mass uprising, revolutionary 
wars, guerrillas everywhere- that is the only way by which a small people can 
defeat a large one. a less strong army can oppose a stronger and better organized 
one".(Engels, Lenin & Stalin, 1970, p.27). 
And Lenin consider the war against imperial aggressor in a socialist country as 
"absolute war" and that 
"The purpose is the communist revolution in all countries of the world: whatever 
serves this purpose is good and just" (Cited in Schmitt, 1963, p.35). 
So we can see that the North Vietnam military strategy was not consistent with 
the principle of the military necessity. 
5.2.2 The law of war in the organization of the North Vietnam's 
armed forces during the war. 
Following the Marxism-Leninism principle of armmg the reyolutionary 
masses in combination with building up the revolutionary army, North Vietnam paid 
great attention to building up a modem regular army and at the same time developed 
strong and extensiye am1ed forces of the masses. 
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Giap wrote that 
And 
"Whatever the circumstances, we must bear in mind the following law of military 
organization of our people: to arm the entire people, to arm the revolutionary 
masses and at the same time to build the people's army, to combine the people's 
army with the anned forces of the masses and vice versa" (Giap, I 977b, p.466) 
"Along with building of the regular. modem people's amlY, we must endeavour to 
develop the armed forces of the masses as a numerous and powerful force." (Giap, 
1977b, p.493) 
And in order to mobilize the force of entire nation to fight the war against very 
much stronger enemy, North Vietnam has organized its armed forces into three 
categories, This is the creativeness of North Vietnam in applying the Marxism-
Leninism in the Vietnamese revolution. This is also a development in the tradition 
of fighting foreign aggression of Vietnam. Vo Nguyen Giap wrote that 
"Our experience in people's war showed that the organization of the armed 
force into three categories-the regular force, the regional force and the people's 
militia- is the best way to mobilize and organize the whole nation for combat; 
that great attention must be paid to the building up of regular troops while 
seeing to the setting up of regional forces and the people's militia; that's close 
coordination should be achieved between the building of regular forces and 
regional forces, of forces "on the spot" and mobile force. This is a new 
development of our ancestral traditions in the organization of the nation's anned 
forces". (Giap, 1977a, p.232-33). 
The people's militia- guerrillas and se(f- defence squads- is made up of large 
forces of the toiling people at the grassroots level. Without getting divorced from 
production work, it is the instrument of the dictatorship of the people's po\\"er at the 
base. Set up in hamlets and villages, factories, street, etc., to meet the needs of 
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combat and the characteristics of each region, those forces form a vast network 
which covers the whole country; they always stand ready to fight, and to fight well, 
with all appropriate weapons, both rudimentary and modem, and with highly 
effective methods, in this way they ensure the people's protection directly, 
safeguard and expand political bases, play their role as shock groups in production 
and supply good cadres and fighters to regional and regular forces. 
The regional troops form the core of armed struggle in a given region. Set up 
in accordance with the requirements and real conditions of each battlefield and each 
region, they were equipped with the necessary weapons, capable of operating either 
alone in the region or in close coordination with guerrillas, partisans and regulars, 
and of fulfilling these missions: to annihilate the enemy, step up guerrilla warfare, 
defend the popUlation, and safeguard the people's power. 
The regular troops are the mobile forces which operate everywhere in the 
country or in certain given strategic areas. They include various armies and armed 
services, essentially a land army of adequate strength, an air force and a navy in 
appropriate ratio. They had high combativeness and constitute real fist of steel; they 
were capable of waging large-scale annihilation battles and deal the enemy hard 
blows: Once involved in combat, they would liquidate big enemy units and bring 
about important changes in various theatres of operations. 
Vo Nguyen Giap pointed out the advantages of organizing the armed force 
into three categories that 
"The coordination between the regular forces, the regional forces and the militia 
and guerrilla forces, between regular war and guerrilla war is an outstanding 
feature ofa people's war making it possible to mobilize the entire peoples against 
the enemy, and to use the added power of fighting a just \var. the liberation war. 
on one' s own territory. It prevented a professional army \\ ith a large number of 
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troops and modern equipment from waging a classical war and making the most of 
its strength and capabilities. The aggressors had to deal not onl\' with the 
revolutionary army but also with an entire people who had risen up to join their 
revolutionary armed forces in a resolute resistance in all fields. The aggressor 
troops were submerged in the ocean of the people's war. They faced a \\ar without 
front line and without rear, with a battlefront which was nowhere and everywhere. 
The inherent contradictions of all aggressive wars, between dispersal and 
concentration, occupation and mobility, further deepened. The large aggressiYe 
army, well-equipped with modern arms, became ineffective. Not only were they 
unable to destroy the people's armed forces, but in addition they were increasingly 
decimated and were finally defeated by three categories of the people's anned 
forces supported by the entire people." (Giap, I 977b. p.4ll) 
The way North Vietnam organized its armed forces was in violation of the law 
of war. The law of war require that each person must take a single identity. It means 
that a person can only be either combatant or civilian, non-combatant. Nobody can 
be both combatant and non-combatant at the same time. Because civilian non-
combatants have the right to immunity and they are not allowed to participate 
directly in war fighting. While combatant can participate in war but they lost the 
immunity right as civilian. 
In North Vietnam's three types offorces~ the militia and self-defence forces do 
not take single identity. In Vietnamese they were called Dan Quan. Literally 
translated into English, it means Civilian Soldier forces. This force plays very 
important role both in North Vietnamese strategy and conduct during the war. But 
they are half civilian and half combatant. They are an armed force not detached from 
production. They take a direct part in production as well as in combat to defend 
production and defend lives and properties of the local population. Vo Nguyen Giap 
wrote that 
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"As an armed organization linked with production, being at the same time the 
army and the people, the militia and self-defense forces are not the regular armed 
forces and, as such, are to be distinguished from the main force and the regional 
army which are regular anned forces",(Giap, 1977b, p.494) 
The militia and self-defence forces are the broad armed forces of the masses 
giving a most concentrated and direct expression to the mass character of the 
military organization of the proletarian state. This is the armed force with the closest 
and most direct link with the political forces. Its combat strength directly stems from 
the force of the masses in the locality where it operates. 
North Vietnam considered militia and self-defence forces as important as 
regular forces, it is one of the three categories of the people's armed forces. North 
Vietnam emphasized that 
"We must expand the militia and self-defence forces throughout the countryside 
and the towns, making them into a very big force with continuously improved 
quality and combat strength, suited to the all-round developments of our country 
in the building of socialism and to the ever higher combat requirement of the 
people's war. a war to defend our socialist fatherland in the conditions of the 
present time" (Local People's War in the Resistant War against America, 1996, 
p.493) 
Thus, we can see that the North Vietnam's military organization itself violated 
the laws of war as there is a type of forces- militia and self-defence forces, which do 
not take a single identity. This problem put law of war in the danger of non-
applicability. 
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5.2.3 The law of war in the mode of conduct of North Vietnam's 
armed forces. 
The most popular mode of conduct of North Vietnam military force in the war 
against America was the combination between guerrilla warfare and con\'entional 
warfare, and gradually advanced guerrilla war toward conventional war. 
Following the line of Marxism-Leninism and national experience III the 
military strategy and armed force organization, North Vietnam mobilized people to 
participate in the fighting against America. North Vietnam armed forces was 
organized into three categories- the regular forces, the regional forces, and local 
militia or guerrilla force. With this military strategy and the form of organization, 
the most suitable and effective mode of fighting for North Vietnam was close 
combination between guerrilla warfare with conventional warfare. Vo Nguyen Giap 
wrote that 
"Because we had a modem regular people's army and extensive forces of the 
masses, regular warfare and guerrilla warfare were from the beginning waged 
simultaneously and in close coordination" (Giap, I 977b, p.426), 
Guerrilla warfare is the form of armed struggle of the large masses of people. 
The North Vietnam's military strategy was entire people up in arms. With this 
characteristic, Vietnamese people's war makes guerrilla warfare deyelop 
extensively, deeply, vigorously and multifariously. Using guerrilla fighting, the 
various popular strata and ethnic groups fight the enemy in their own localities. \\'ith 
their own weapons and means available, in all places and at all times. Hence 
guerrilla warfare develops a great strategic action by wearing down and destroying 
the enemy's forces. dispersing them to the utmost and upsetting their strategic 
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battle-array, while creating an advantageous strategic posture for regular anned 
forces, and protecting and tempering the revolutionary masses. 
Not only is guerrilla warfare of great strategic importance. it has also a great 
revolutionary significance: it enables the revolutionary masses to start partial 
uprising and wrest back power at grassroots level. 
However, North Vietnam well understood that guerrilla alone cannot succeed 
in driving away the America forces then stationed in the South Vietnam. Guerrilla 
must well- coordinate with conventional warfare and advance to conventional 
warfare. 
Vo Nguyen Giap wrote that 
"Guerrilla warfare must advance to regular warfare and the two must be closely 
coordinated. This is a general law of our protracted revolutionary war. The 
problem in the conduct of the war is to know when and where to tum guerrilla 
warfare into regular warfare, to co-ordinate them closely and appropriately in 
each period and on each battlefield so as to enable them to develop unceasingly 
and increase their strategic efficacy." (Giap, 1977a, p.282). 
So guerrilla warfare constituted the basis of regular warfare. Conventional 
warfare must always be closely co-ordinated with guerrilla warfare and foil all the 
enemy's efforts so as to help guerrilla warfare maintain and develop. Only when 
guerrilla warfare expands can regular warfare fully develop and progress. 
With the emphasis on the guerrilla warfare as a part of its mode of conduct, 
North Vietnam again violated the law of war. As we have seen how the guerrilla \Var 
put great pressure on the law of war in the chapter II. In the North Vietnam' s 
military strategy. guerrilla warfare played an essential part. We can see the 
importance of guerrilla warfare in the North Vietnam's military strategy debate 
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between North Vietnam's Minister of Defence Vo Nguyen Giap and Head of 
Political Bureau of North Vietnam's People Army in the South Vietnam Nguyen 
Chi Thanh in chapter IV. In their fighting during the war. guerrilla force usually 
failed to distinguish themselves from civilian. This would create great difficulties 
for the opponent to fight discriminately. 
According to the book titled "A Summary of Military Operations in the 
Resistant War against America from 195..f. to 19'""'5" published by People's Army 
Publishing House in 2001, during the Vietnam war, North Vietnam carried out 
totally 39 big operations, and in every operation there was always the combination 
between the regular forces with militia and self-defence force. For example, in the 
An Lao Operation in December 1964, the North Vietnam's military Zone 5 used the 
forces of: Special force battalion 409, army battalion 93 and army battalion 95 of the 
regional forces, these regular army units were responsible for fighting against enemy 
in the main battle front. And the local militia and self-defence forces were used to 
deceive the enemy in diversionary direction and to fight the enemy when they 
withdraw. 
Moreover, North Vietnam military manoeuvring had to rely on the using of 
militia and self-defence force. In some operations where the militia force was not 
strong enough, the military leaders of North Vietnam had to divide regular forces 
into small unit to act as the militia and self-defence force. Without militia and self-
defence force, the regular armed force could not bring into full play their 
effectiveness. For example, in the Tay Ninh operation, in fighting America's 
Junction City operation, North Vietnam had to use regular armed forces as militia 
force. The battle area was in the west of Tay Ninh province, along the bank of the 
Vam Co riYer. The population in this area was small and scattered. Thus the militia 
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and self-defence forces were \·ery weak. In order to counter the America' s operation 
of Junction City, the anny command centre of North Vietnam had to reorganize 
three guard battalions into self-defence unit (Sumary of Operations in the resistant 
war against America from 1954 to 1975, 2001. p.177). These forces operated as 
local self-defence forces on the spot, and they operated very effectiyely. 
This creativeness later was developed into military art: 
"The typical military art of this operation \\as the successful applying people's 
war tactics in an area where little population liyed and the militia and self-defence 
forces were very weak." (Summary of operations in resistant war against America. 
2001, p.170). 
We can see that III the military strategy during the Vietnam war, North 
Vietnam heavily relied on the operation of guerrilla force. However, these forces 
usually failed to distinguished themselves from ciyilian. Thus, North Vietnam also 
violated the laws of war in its mode of conduct. 
5.2.4 North Vietnam's treatment of the prisoner of war 
North Vietnam's military strategy. anny organization and the mode of conduct 
were not consistent with the basic principles of the laws of war, especially the 
principle of distinction between combatant and non-combatant. Regarding the 
treatment of American prison,ers of war, North Vietnam did not consider the 
American prisoners or South Vietnam prisoners captured in the North Vietnam as 
prisoner of war according to the intemationallaws of war. On 22nd April 1965. The 
General Department of Politics. Vietnamese People' s An11Y issued an instruction 
no.1l/CT -H regarding the way to deal with captured enemy combatant. The 
instruction read in full as follow: 
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"To avoid confusion and mistakes in handling with captured American pilob 
while they attacking the North and to implement correctly the guideline of our 
Party, Government, the General Department of Politics instruct that: 
1 From now on, we will not call the enemy prisoners (both foreign and South 
Vietnam prisoners) the "prisoners". The word "prisoner" will no longer be used in 
the propaganda. When explaining to them, we do not use the expression "the 
policy of tolerance toward prisoners", so that they will not be able to rely on 
international humanitarian laws to refuse providing us with necessary information 
and insist on the treatment of POW. 
We will call them captured enemy pilot, commandos .... so that we will be able to 
treat them according to our laws. 
2 Our policy to them is: No beating, no fIring, no killing; Providing them with 
proper food: Treating the wounded; However, we are strict and highly cautious 
with them and at the same time we should re-educate them. 
3 When capture anyone, people must inform their senior immediately. After 
capturing, people should search carefully and collect all the e\'idence, especially 
map and papers, to prevent the enemy from destroying these stuffs or being lost. 
4 After capturing, only army offtcers, militias or public security offtcers (those 
who have the responsibility of detaining and escorting) have right to contact with 
the captured ones. 
5 The quarantine and escorting should be done very carefully in secret and safety. 
We should be vigilant against the case that they would escape or be rescued or 
killed by the enemy forces, 
6 We should bury carefully those died and mark the place of burying. The 
evidence, documents and personal stuffs of the death must be sent to General 
Department of Politics." (General Department of Politics, The Work of Civilian 
Mobilisation and Special Propaganda in Vietnam People's Anny, p.34:::!) 
We can see clearly that North Vietnam do not want to be constrained by the 
intemational laws of \\'3r. Though North Vietnam al\\'3ys emphasized that captured 
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enemy combatants were to be treated humanely, it did not call them POW. North 
Vietnam wanted to treat the captured enemy combatant according to its own laws. 
From the above discussion, we can see that, though North Vietnam had been 
signatory of 1949 Geneva Conventions, international law of war played no 
important role in the North Vietnam's military strategy making process. On the 
contrary, Marxism-Leninism on war and military and Vietnamese experience in 
fighting against foreign aggression had strong influence in the military strategy, the 
organization and the way of conduct of the North Vietnam during the war. 
North Vietnam official documents always attributed the success in the war to 
only two factors: creative application of Marxism-Leninism military thoughts in the 
case of Vietnam and the inheritance and development of national experience of 
fighting against foreign aggression. Vo Nguyen Giap wrote that 
"The creativeness of our party and people with respect to the anning of the 
revolutionary masses and building of the people's anny springs from Marxist-
Leninist thesis on military organization by the proletariat and the continuation and 
development of our ancestor's experience on building anned forces. Our party has 
closely combined modem proletarian military science with our own original 
national tradition, correctly applied this science and this experience to the realities 
of our people's struggle in the new circumstances and historical conditions of our 
era." (Giap, 1977b, p.449). 
In North Vietnam official perspective, the success of the Vietnamese side in 
the war was attributed to the Vietnam Communist Party's creativeness in applying 
the Marxism-Leninism military thoughts in the specific case of Vietnam and the 
Party's inheritance and development of the tradition of people's ,var against foreign 
aggressors in the past. Vo Nguyen Giap, the Minister of Defense of North Vietnam 
during the Vietnam war, wrote that: 
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"Th is success (in the fight against the Japanese fascists. French colonialist, and 
US imperialist) is possible because our party has mastered the full theory of 
Marxism-Leninism on military organization in armed uprising and revolutionary 
war. because it has inherited and brought to a new level our people's tradition of 
nation-wide resistance and experience in organizing the armed forces during 
national insurrections and national wars in former times and because it has 
selectively learned from the experience of the world people. Our Party has 
creatively applied such theory and experience to the practice of insurrection and 
war in our country that is to the condition of a small country facing the strong 
forces of aggression of imperialism and colonialism, with a \'iew to achieving 
the goals of our revolution set forth by our party." (Giap, 1977b, p.315-316) 
In every respect of the North Vietnam's military strategy. it is the combination 
of application of Marxism-Leninism military thought and national tradition of 
fighting against foreign aggression that result in success. Also Vo Nguyen Giap 
wrote that 
"Creatively applying Marxism-Leninism to the specific conditions of the 
revolutionary in our country, inheriting and developing the national tradition 
of glorious struggle against foreign aggression, our Party and our people 
have brought armed uprising and revolutionary war to a new level of 
development, and haw giwl1 it a new content and a new quality, as regards 
political aims, as regards the forces involved and methods of struggle, and on 
account of its extremely great offensive power"' (Giap, 1977b, p.378) 
And in terms of organizing the force, Giap wrote that 
"With regard to the forms of organization of the forces, our Party has 
creatively applied the Marxist-Leninist thesis on the military organization of 
the proletariat and inherited and develop the national experience of the past 
in organizing the anned forces" (Giap, I 977b, p.385). 
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Due to the strong influence of Marxism-Leninism and Vietnamese national 
experience and the limited role of the law of war in the military strategy making 
process and actual conduct, the central principles of the law of war was not proper! y 
observed. Firstly, North Vietnam violated the principle of distinction between 
combatant and non-combatant. North Vietnam military strategy did not distinguish 
the North Vietnam's anned forces from civilian. They call on all people to 
participate in the war and also organise a militia and self-defence forces, which is 
both civilian and combatant at the same time, as one in three types of forces. In its 
mode of conduct, North Vietnam encouraged and actually relied heavily on the 
mode of guerrilla warfare. And North Vietnam also encouraged its anned forces and 
people to use all means available to fight against America, ignoring the principle of 
military necessary. With these characteristics, we can see that North Vietnam's 
military strategy war was not consistent with the law of war. 
5.3 North Vietnam's rule of engagement in military conduct 
In relations with Vietnamese civilian population, North Vietnam anned forces 
followed very strict rule of engagement. North Vietnam always stressed the 
importance of the people's war with the participation of the whole population in 
fighting enemy. In North Vietnam's military strategy of people's waL winning the 
support of civilian population is vital to anned forces, not only for the anned forces 
to fight enemy but also for them to sustain. Thus since its foundation, People' s 
Anny of Vietnam was trained very carefully about the rules and principles in 
dealing with civilian population. 
First and foremost, every member of anned forces has to be faithful to the Ten 
Swears of People's Army. The People's Army of Vietnam was founded on 22nd 
December 1944. Before the foundation ceremony, General Vo Nguyen Giap, 
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General Command of People's Army of Vietnam, had composed Ten Swears of 
People's Army Officer. During the foundation ceremony, every participant had to 
read aloud these swears. In the Ten Swears, the swear no.9 is one of the most 
important ones, dealing with the relationship between people's army with civilian 
population. The swear no.9 read as follow: 
No_ 9: Strictly follow these dos and don'ts in relations with people 
- Three "dos": Respect people, Help people and Protect people 
- Three "don'ts": Steal from people, Intimidate people, and Pester people. 
To win the love and trust in people toward army, fulfil the motto army and 
people unites in one determination to kill enemy and sa,-e the country_ 
(Ten Swears ofYietnamese People's Army) 
These Ten Swears are now still in force. Every people's army officer, in active 
or reserve, have to learn by heart and strictly follow these swears. In any flag 
saluting ceremony, all officers have to shout out loud together these swears. The 
Ten Swears remain the same during the resistance wars against French colony and 
America. After the war, there was a slight change in the swear no.9 as follow: 
No_ 9: Strictly follow these dos and don'ts in relations with people 
- Three "dos": Respect people, Help people and Protect people 
- Three "don'ts": Steal from people, Intimidate people, and Pester people. 
To win the love and trust in people toward army, fulfil the motto army and 
people unites in one determination_ 
(Ten Swears ofYietnamese People's Army) 
Beside the Ten S\\-ears, People's Army of Vietnam has its o\\n specific 
discipline in relations with people. Every Vietnamese People's Anny Officer has to 
follow Twel\e Disciplines of Army Officers in relations \\-ith people. These 
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disciplines were also promulgated very early, Three years after the formation of 
Vietnam People~s army~ in the nationwide conference of the political commissariat 
from 14th to 16th February 1947~ the army leaders set out Twelve Disciplines 
regarding the relations with people as follow: 
1 Never steal anything, even the needle and thread, from people. 
2 Purchasing with people must be fair. 
3 Asking for permission before borrowing anything from people, returning to 
people after use, compensating ifbreak or lost. 
4 No pestering people when stay at their houses, keeping people's house and 
garden clean and tidy. 
5 Strictly obeying the ethnic policy, respect for the freedom of belief and customs 
and habits 
6 Closely uniting with people, respecting the old, loving children and being polite 
toward woman 
7 No intimidating or abusing people 
8 Protecting facilities of the collective and state 
9 Uniting, respecting and supporting organizations of local people, local party 
branches and local armed forces. 
10 Making example of following the guidelines, policy of the Party and laws of 
the State. 
11 Actively doing propaganda, mobilising and helping people to carry out the 
guidelines, policy of the Party and laws of the State. 
12 Keeping the anny's secrets and mobilising people to keep the state's and 
anny"s secrets. 
(History of Department of civilian mobilisation, 2007. pA5) 
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In the resistant war against French colony or the first Indochina war. there \\-as 
also the Ten Disciplines of Saving Country Anny. These disciplines applied to the 
guerrilla forces in its early days. 
1 Fully obey military orders 
2 Never steal anything, even needles or thread, from people 
3 Purchasing with people must be fair 
4 Never take the public assets as private assets 
5 Behave well 
6 When stay in people's house. keep their houses and gardens tidy 
7 Return after borrowing anything from people 
8 Compensating if break anything of people 
9 No bathing in front of woman 
10 Say no to alcohol, gamble and drug 
(History of Vietnamese People's Anny, 2003, p.67). 
We can see that in relations with civilian population, North Vietnamese anned 
forces have their own rule of engagement. People's Anny of Vietnam has to follow 
strictly many rules, disciplines when contact with people. These rules of 
engagement not come out of the fidelity to the laws of war but out of the very basic 
demand of the anny-the survival. Without the support from civilian population. 
North Vietnam's anned forces could not sustain. let alone fought against such an 
enemy like America. 
Moreover, North Vietnam leaders always stressed and taught the people' s 
armed force to respect people, protect people and behave well toward people to \\-in 
their loye and support. In the National Conference of Guerrillas and Local Force on 
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24th May 1947, president Ho Chi Minh gave an address that called for the respect 
toward people: 
"Guerrilla, safeguard and local forces are the forces of the people, the force of 
champion, the iron wall of the father land. However strong and aggressive it is. 
the enemy will be the looser if encounter that wall. ( .... ). Howe\er. we should 
never be arrogant. Instead, we must follow these disciplines: 
1 Soldiers must share all the burden as well as the sweet thing, strictly obey the 
disciplines, train hard, keep secrets, be calm in front of the enemy as there is no 
enemy at all, patrol seriously when far away from the enemy as if the enemy is 
nearby. 
2 In relations with people, soldiers must protect people, help people, win the heart 
and mind and the respect of people 
( .... ) 
4 In relations with enemy, soldiers must be determined, brave. well planned, and 
compete each other in the killing of enemy soldiers and grab their weapons. However. 
we must treat the prisoner of war humanly". (Ho Chi Minh, 1995, Selected works, Vol. 
5, p.132-133) 
General Vo Nguyen Giap, in his thesis "To arm the revolutionGlY masses, to 
build the people's army", wrote that: 
"With regard to the people, our officers and men serve, respect and help them with 
devotion, fight selflessly to defend the people' s interests, and strictly respect the 
discipline of the masses." (Giap, I 977b. p.473). 
North Vietnam's emphasis on the relations between armed forces and ciyilian 
was also reflected in its actual conduct during the \\'ar. North Vietnam' s rule of 
engagement in the fighting is that soldiers must try their best to protect ciyilian liYes 
and assets and minimize ciyilian casualties e\'en if they had to accept more harm to 
themselves. In actual war fighting. we can see many times the army tried their best 
- 212 -
to protect civilian, and were willing to accept more harm to themselyes. It is true 
that North Vietnam People's Army used of civilian support in their battle 
preparation and fighting. However, North Vietnam Army leaders always tried their 
best to send the civilian out of the battle area before actual fighting broke out. This 
is especially true when the North Vietnam took the initiative and ambushed the 
enemy in the village or dense population area. The veteran soldiers I met and 
interviewed during my field trip to Vietnam told me that: in battle, ordinary soldier 
was not informed of the exact time of starting the battle beforehand. However, they 
always knew almost exactly when the battle was to start. Because, shortly before 
starting any battle, the civilian supporters were always asked to leave. So there is a 
rule that: when the civilian supporters left, the battle was about to start. And all they 
need to do were to get themselves ready and waited for the order from higher 
officers. One example was the battle of Ap Bac, in January 1963. Ap Bac was a 
small village in My Tho province, about 40 km in South of Saigon. Ap Bac was the 
first battle that the Vietcong guerrilla forces defeated South Vietnam's regular army 
with the strong support of American military equipment and firepower such as 
helicopter and armoured vehicles M 113. In this battle, the Viet Cong guerrilla forces 
with the command by North Vietnam trained military leaders, set the defence battle 
and waiting for South Vietnam armed forces to attack at the Ap Bac villages. During 
the battle preparation time, many local civilians helped the armed forces in digging 
tunnels, digging personal fighting position, preparing foods .... However, before the 
battle started, the Viet Cong forces had brought all the civilians out of the \'illage. 
During the battle, no civilian was allowed in the battle area. The book "HistOf)' ql 
the Department of Civilian Mobilisation /i'om 1947 to 20() 7" describes that: 
- 213 -
"'Before the fighting broke out, the elderly. woman and children, \\ ho currently 
living in the village, were sent out to safe area. Few hours later, the enemy 
approach our ambush area". (2007, p.192) 
In this battle, the Viet Cong won, opening a turning point in the war. After Ap 
Bac, Viet Cong force became more confident that they was fully able to defeat the 
Sai Gon armed forces even if they got a lot of support from America. 
Another example is the ambush battle in Gia Huu commune, Chuong Hoa 
district, Binh Dinh province in January 1966. In early 1965, America, facing with 
the possibility of losing the war, Johnson decided to send American troops in South 
Vietnam to bear the direct fighting tasks. North Vietnam did expect that America 
might send troops in South Vietnam but was still surprise with the pace and scale of 
troops sent in. The book "HistOlY of the resistant 11'(/r against America to s{lre the 
countl)'" wrote that 
"'That Johnson administration sent American troops and troops from America's 
allied countries into South Vietnam to carry out the fighting tasks in the war did 
not make our party and leadership surprise. However, what made us surprise 
was the pace and the number that American troops were brought in. Within 8 
months, 200,000 American and allied troops heavily equipped were present in 
South Vietnam soil.'· (1999, Volume 4. p.31). 
North Vietnam was well aware that America was very powerful and was 
uncertain how to fight against its forces. However, North Vietnam leaders 
determined that they would find the way to defeat American armed forces sooner or 
later. In May 1965, the Central Office of South Vietnam had a meeting to reaffirm 
the determination to fight against America. In the meeting, general Nguyen Chi 
Thanh stated that "Let's fight American forces, and we will find the way to defeat 
them" (History of the resistant \\ar against America to save the country. \' olume 4. 
1999. p.40). Thus, North Vietnamese military leaders organized a series of battle in 
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late 1965 to test the strength and find out the way to defeat America. American 
forces suffered some losses in this first round of fighting in part due to unfamiliarity 
with the terrain, and in part due to the weather, which was in rainy season that 
America could not make full use of their advanced weapons and military equipment. 
In early 1966, America started counter-offensive in most part of South 
Vietnam. Battle of Gia Huu, Chung Hoa was a battle in Binh Dinh province, in 
which America forces attacked a stronghold of Vietcong forces. American forces 
did not know the exact position of North Vietnam and Vietcong forces, they forced 
the civilians in nearby village to go in front, using these civilian people as human 
shield. North Vietnam and Vietcong forces were organising the ambush. Howe\,er. 
Vietcong soldiers were ordered not to shoot at civilian. Instead, they fired in the sky 
to let the civilian peoples know that there was ambush and run away. This act also 
revealed the ambush position of the People's Anny and stripped the People's Anny 
off the factor of sudden. But North Vietnam anny chose to do that to protect the life 
of civilians, even though they knew that this would hann their battle fighting. The 
book "History of the war against America to saH'> our country" wrote that 
""An America battalion and two battalions of South Vietnam army forced people 
to go ahead of them, made them human shield. In order to protect civilian 
people, our soldiers were ordered to fIre in the sky so people can run back out of 
the battle fIeld. Then we fIred at the enemy as norma]" (History of the \\ar 
against America to save our country. \'oJ. 4, p.94) 
Or in the battle of Van Tuong in 1965. the North Vietnam military forces. 
although they were surprise by the time of the attack, tried to move all ci\'ilian out 
of battlefield before the fighting broke out. The book "Summary qlmilitary 
campaigns in the resistant H'ar against America 1954-1975" wrote that 
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"At night 17th August, 1965, fi\'e America warships and six landing ship from 
the sea near An Cuong village, suddenly fired into the population area. Judging 
that the enemy fired to prepare for landing, our armed forces quickly move the 
elderly, woman, children out of battle field and repair tunnel and get ready for 
fighting against enemy." (Summary of military campaigns in the resistant war 
against America 1954-1975, p. 44 ). 
These were only three among many examples that Vietnamese forces tried 
their best to protect civilian people during fighting and were willing to accept more 
harm to themselves in order to protect civilian. 
So, in conclusion, North Vietnam military strategy and conduct during the war 
were strongly influenced by the Marxism-Leninism military thoughts and 
Vietnamese national experience in fighting foreign aggression. The laws of war 
played no important role in North Vietnam's military strategy making process. 
However, North Vietnam armed forces had its own very strict rule of engagement in 
relations with civilian people in everyday life as well as in war fighting. In e\'eryday 
life, the Vietnam People's Army had to behave well with the people, strictly abide 
by the 10 Swears of the Army and 12 Disciplines of the Army in relations with 
people and other rules. In actual war fighting, armed forces first tried to remove 
civilian out of battle field and then tried their best to protect people and minimize 
civilian casualties, even if they had to accept more harm to themselves. 
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Chapter VI: North Vietnam's perspective on the cause and 
justness of its war against America and the way it won support of 
Vietnamese civilian population. 
The prevIOUS chapters show that North Vietnam was a party to the 
1949 Geneva Conventions and the international laws of armed conflict did 
apply in the case of the Vietnam War. We also learn that North Vietnam's 
military strategy in the war was not in conformity with the laws of war 
because it failed to distinguish North Vietnamese armed forces combatant 
from civilian non-combatants. The military strategy of people's war, which 
did not distinguish between soldier and civilian, put Vietnamese civilian 
population at risk. Then the next questions should be asked are: What was 
North Vietnam's perspective on the justness of its war against America? 
How did North Vietnam persuade its people to accept its way of war and 
win support of the civilian population for its war effort? This chapter will 
answer these questions. In the first part of the chapter, I will present the 
North Vietnam's perspective on the cause and justness of its war against 
America and then I will use the traditional ad bellum criteria (e.g. just 
cause, last resort etc) to say how it was justified. Then in the second part, I 
will focus on the work of the Department of Civilian Mobilisation of the 
People's Army of Vietnam, which helped P A VN and Vietcong to win and 
maintain the support from civilian population during the war. 
6.1 North Vietnam's perspective on the cause of the 
Vietnam war and the justness of the Vietnamese side of the 
war 
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6.1.1 The North Vietnam's perspective on the cause and justness of 
its war against America 
Writing about the Vietnam War, many authors were struck by a \'ery 
fundamental and, ironically, disputable question: Why did the United States commit 
a half of a million troops in a small country in Asia, which is a half of globe away. 
Many authors tried to give the answer such as Lloyd Gardner (Approaching 
Vietnam), George McT. Kahin (Intervention), Arthur Schlesinger (The Bittl!r 
Heritage: Vietnam and American Democracy, 1941-1966), Anthony Short (The 
Origins of the Vietnam War) etc. However, all these answers only reflect the 
America thinking. No Western authors ever wrote about how the Vietnamese 
Communists viewed the causes and the justness of their war. This might be the 
result of difficult access to the Vietnamese archive about the war. David W.P. Elliot 
wrote that 
"The works on Hanoi's strategy have usually been written by and for specialists 
on Vietnam and have only infrequently reached out to diplomatic historians, who 
study U.S decision making in the Vietnam conflict. Vietnam's own writings on the 
history of the conflict have generally been accessible only to specialists on 
Vietnam" (1993, p.67). 
This chapter will fill in that literature gap by presenting the Vietnamese 
official perception of the cause, the nature and the characteristic of the war. This 
will be draw from the Vietnamese sources such as the 7 volumes of "HistOlY of the 
resistant war against America to save the countly". published by People' s Anny 
Publishing House in 1997. Vietnam Communist Party's archi\'e. and Party's 
Documents recently published etc. 
According to Vietnamese official \'lew. Vietnam is situated in a strategic 
geographical position in Asia Pacific and during its history. Vietnam faced man\' 
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foreign aggressions. Vietnam is on the maritime trade line from the West to the East, 
on the connection between Indian Ocean and Pacific Ocean. Vietnam is the 
foremost point of the continental South East Asia. Spencer Tucker (1999) \\Tote "as 
a crossroads of Asia, Vietnam was destined for a stormy histori' (p.2). 
In modem time, Vietnamese believed that, with its strategic position, it is an 
area for which both Communist bloc and Capitalist bloc competed. If the Soviet 
leaders want to spread Communism to South East Asia, they would need the support 
of Vietnam. Also, if the US wanted to stop the Communism expansion into South 
East Asia and even South Asia, they would need to put a hedge in Vietnam. As Vo 
Nguyen Giap, a leading Vietnamese military general and strategist wrote that 
"Our people stand in the vanguard of the world's people fighting against 
imperialism headed by America imperialism. A member of the socialist camp, the 
Democratic Republic of Vietnam is also its forward post in Southeast Asia" (Vo 
Nguyen Giap, 1977a, p.256) 
Vietnamese leaders strongly believed that Vietnam enJoy a strategically 
important position in the America grand strategy of Communism containment. The 
book "HistOJ:l' of People's Army of Vietnam" published by The Institute of History 
of People' s Army (2003) wrote that 
"Vietnam is considered being a strategically important position in the frontline of 
the America's global strategy of Containment" (p.232). 
After the World War II, the allied country, though victorious, were heavily 
destroyed except the America. German, Italia and Japan lost the war and were even 
more seriously destroyed. Soviet Union made great contribution to defeating 
fascism and was also devastated heavily. In that context. the United States became 
the most powerful country in the \,"orId. It was the "only economic superpo\vcr after 
World War II" (History of Vietnamese People's Am1Y. 2003 p.231). As the only 
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super power, the strongest country after the WW II, the United States initiated and 
implemented the grand strategy of Containment, spearheaded at the Soviet Union 
and other Communist countries. The aim of the strategy Containment was to prevent 
any further expansion of Communism. After the victory of communist China in 
1949, the United States feared that the Communism would spread all over Asia. 
According to domino theory, if the whole Vietnam fell into the Communism, then 
South East Asia and even India would follow to be Communist countries. As early 
as September 1951, the French General Jean de Lattre de Tassigny spoke in 
Washington that "Once Tonkin is lost, there is no barrier until Suez" (Tucker. 1999. 
p.48). 
Thus, Vietnamese leadership believed that in the America strategic point of 
view, Indochina and specifically Vietnam had an important strategic position in the 
grand global Containment strategy. So, one reason for the US to intervene in 
Vietnam was due to its geographical position which is very important in the 
America's global strategy in containing the spread communism. 
However, the main cause of the war, in the Vietnamese perspective was that 
the United States "did not take into account the age old burning aspiration of the 
Vietnamese for freedom and self-determination" and "wrong U.S perception that 
identified many post war liberation movements with communism" (Tran Van Ira, 
1993, p.233). 
During the later phase of the first Indochina war. the United States wanted the 
French to continue fighting to keep the Indochina countries out of the orbit of 
Communist countries. Thus the United States increased material assistance for 
France to continue the war. According to the sources of Vietnamese people's aml) 
history, the United States assistance for France accounted for 78% of the \\'ar 
expenditure. Howe\,er, despite recei\'ing great support and assistance from the 
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United States, the France was not able to continue the war for long. After French 
was defeated in the battIe of Dien Bien Phu, an international conference was held in 
Geneva to end the war. The Indochina phase of the Geneva Conference \\'as 
convened on May 8th 1954 with the participation of the Soviet Union, France, 
Britain, America, Laos, Cambodia, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. the State 
of Vietnam. and the People's Republic of China. The Geneva conference concluded 
an Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in Vietnam, signed on July 20, 1954 by 
the Commander-in-Chief of the French Union Forces in Indochina, Brigadier-
General Deteil and the Commander-in-Chief of the People's Army in Vietnam, Vice 
Minister of National Defence, Ta Quang Buu. The Geneva Conference also adopted 
a Final Declaration endorsing the main points of the Agreements on the Cessation of 
Hostilities in Vietnam. The Final Declaration was not signed but accepted orally by 
Britain, France, the Soviet Union, the Chinese People's Republic and the 
Democratic Republic of Vietnam. The Final Declaration was not accepted by the 
United States and the State of Vietnam. However, the State of Vietnam declared that 
it would not use force to resist the cease-fire. and that it "would make and support 
every effort to re-establish a real and lasting peace in Vietnam" (Partan, 1968, 
p.205). 
The Agreement declared the complete cessation of the hostilities throughout 
Vietnam and the 1 i h parallel was taken as a "provisional military demarcation line". 
The forces of French Union "shall be regrouped" to the South of the provisional 
military demarcation line and the forces of People's Army of Vietnam shall be 
regrouped to the North of the provisional military demarcation line. (Agreement 
articles 1-15 and Final Declaration paragraph 1-2). 
The Agreement also mentioned the arrangement for future of Vietnam 
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"Pending the general elections which will bring about the unification of 
V ietnam, the conduct of civil administration in each regrouping zone shall be in 
the hands of the party whose forces are to be regrouped there in virtue of the 
present Agreement" (Article 14 (a)). 
Paragraph 7 of the Final Declaration endorsed this point that 
"'The Conference declares that, so far as Vietnam is concerned, the settlement of 
political problems, affected on the basis of respect for the principles of 
independence, unity and territorial integrity, shall permit the Vietnamese people to 
enjoy the fundamental freedoms, guaranteed by democratic institutions established 
as a result of free general election by secret ballot. In order to ensure that 
sufficient progress in the restoration of peace has been made, and that all the 
necessary condition obtain for free expression of the national will, general 
elections shall be held in July 1956, under the supenision of an international 
commission composed of representative of the member states of the International 
Supervisory Commission, referred to in the agreement on the cessation of 
hostilities. Consultations will be held on this subject between the competent 
representative authorities of the two zones from 20 July on\vards" (Final 
Declaration, paragraph 7). 
The result of the Geneva Conference could not be totally satisfactory to 
Vietminh-the alliance forces under leadership of Vietnamese Communists Party had 
just defeated French forces in Dien Bien Phu. However, if the Agreements were 
strictly abided by all parties, the result was acceptable as it was suitable to the 
majority Vietnamese population' s desire of peace and national reunification 
(Asselin, 2007 & 2011). As Tra (1993) pointed out that 
"The wish of Vietnamese people is peace, national independence and unity. 
general \\'elfare and happiness". (p.235) 
However. South Vietnam government declared that it \\'as not bound by the 
Geneva Agreements because it did not sign or orally accepted the Final Declaration. 
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And America also supported this position of the South Vietnam. Charles Chaumont 
wrote that 
"On August 9th , 1955, Ngo Dinh Diem declared that his Government did not 
consider that it was bound in any way by the Geneva Agreements, to \\·hich it 
had not be a signatory, and the United States. through the \·oice of Mr. Foster 
Dulles, affirmed their agreement with the Diem Government"" (Chaumont, 1969. 
p.133). 
According to Vietnamese people's army history, Vietnamese leaders 
interpreted this move of the South Vietnam and the United States as its effort to 
prevent the revolution of Vietnamese people. 
"'The aim of the United States administration \vas to check the further expansion of 
communism in Asia and Vietnam was chosen to test the United States global 
strategy. The United States strategic objectives in Vietnam are: 
- To repress Vietnamese revolution and permanently divide Vietnam into two 
countries with South Vietnam become an independent non-communist country fall 
in the orbit of capitalist bloc. 
- To push back Communism in Indochina and South East Asia. 
- To circle and deter communism and revolution movement in Asia and then 
destroy this movement". (The History of Vietnamese people's army. 2003, p233. ) 
Thus, in the view of Vietnamese leaders the United States' engagement III 
Vietnam was a part of its global strategy and ambition. America ignored the 
legitimate aspiration of Vietnamese people to self-determination and peaceful 
reunification. Vietnam was just the victim of the America's global strategy. As 
General Tran Van Tra, a high ranking Vietnamese military official who 'vas 
responsible for the insurgency in the South Vietnam during the war, concluded that 
"Vietnam, a small, poor and backward country, ruled by France for nearly hundred 
years, now became the victim of the Cold \\'ar." (Tran Van Tra, 1993. p.234). 
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Accusing America of aggression, the Vietnamese leaders hold that their war 
was the war of national liberation. The North Vietnam did not cause the war, it was 
forced to fight the war to drive the foreign invaders out of its country, to gain 
national independence and reunification. 
The book "History of People's Army" wrote that 
"On the America side, lasting for more than 21 years, this war was in fact the 
invasion of America's neo-colonialism, which was camouflaged under the pretext 
of "nationalism'" by the South Vietnam government. On the side of Vietnamese 
people, this is legitimate war to gain and to safeguard the national independence 
and unification, a legitimate desire of any nation or people in the world." (History 
of Vietnamese People's Anny. 2003, p.265). 
Recently, in the talk with President Clinton in his visit to Hanoi in 2000, the 
then Vietnamese Communist Party General Secretary Le Kha Phieu said that 
"I agree with you that we should not forget the past, we cannot redo the past. But 
the important thing is to understand it correctly, in particular here, to understand 
the nature of our resistance war against invasion.... The resistance war against 
America brought the Vietnamese people independence and reunification to 
advance country to socialism'" (Vietnamese Embassy in the US website, accessed 
on December 16th 2009). 
In the South Vietnam, the United States created a puppet government and 
carried out the subjugation of Vietnamese people through the puppet government. 
The United States also brought its armed forces in the South Vietnam to fight 
against the Vietnamese people and the liberation forces. The main task of the 
revolutionary armed forces of Vietnamese people in the South Vietnam was to dri\'e 
America's anned force away and liberate the country. So the war in the South was 
the national liberation war. 
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In the North Vietnam, the war embedded the nature of safeguarding the 
national father land. The America did not bring its troops to the North Vietnam. 
They carried out the war against North Vietnam by their air force and using na\"y to 
block the Vietnamese sea ports. The America used air force to destroy North 
Vietnam's infrastructure and facilities in order to prevent and stop its effort to assist 
South Vietnam in the liberation war. The main task of North Vietnam anned force 
was to fight against America air force and safeguard the country. 
So, on the whole, the Vietnamese considered their war against America was 
the war of national liberation. The aim of that war was to gain national 
independence and to reunite the country. 
Vietnamese leaders also view their war as an integral part of the world 
revolutionary movement against imperialism. The war in Vietnam got the support 
from the world revolution movement, especially the socialist camp, and also it 
would contribute to the world struggle against imperialism. General Giap wrote that 
'"The Vietnamese revolution is part and parcel of the world revolution and is 
closely bound up with the revolutionary movement of the world's peoples" 
And that 
'"Our people stand in the vanguard of the world's people fighting against 
imperialism headed by America imperialism. A member of the socialist camp. the 
Democratic Republic of Vietnam is also its forward post in Southeast Asia" (Vo 
Nguyen Giap, 1977a, p.256 & 272) 
So, in their view, North Vietnam considered its war against America was both 
the national liberation war and an integral part of the international struggle against 
imperialism led by America. 
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With this perception III mind, North Vietnam leaders, who foIl 0\\. the 
Marxism-Leninism on war and army, hold that their war was just. General Giap 
himself wrote that 
"Our war is a just war- a war for national liberation or a war for national defence-
waged against an unjust and aggressive imperialism and aimed at implementing 
the political line of the Party and achieving the goals of the revolution in the 
interests of the Vietnamese people and nation and for the sake of world 
revolution" (Vo Nguyen Giap, 1977a, p.214). 
Vietnam Communist Party adopted the Marxism-Leninism on war and anny 
for their military line in the resistance war against America. According to Greg 
Lockhart (1989) 
"Under the specific circumstances of the Vietnamese revolution, the ideology of 
Marxist-Leninist internationalism was the only one to define successfully the force 
of the nation" (pA). 
The North Vietnamese leaders judged the justness of their war under the light 
of Marxism-Leninism. As Marxism-Leninism pointed out that 
"Any war that is waged by a people for the sake of freedom and social progress, 
for liberation from exploitation and national oppression or in defence of its state 
sovereignty, against an aggressive attack, is just war." (Marxism-Leninism on \\·ar 
and army, Moscow, 1972, p.87). 
So for the Vietnamese leaders, their war is just. And according to the Lenin 
theory of "absolute war"', when their war is just. there is no restraint in the \var. This 
is the war against absolute enemy. General Giap wrote that 
'With an appropriate mode of conduct of the war and military art, the 
Vietnamese people have won great victories, brilliantly materialising this 
profound thought expressed by Engels 120 years ago "A people eager to wrest 
back independence should not confine themse hes to routine modes of war 
prosecution. Mass insurrection, revolutionary warfare, ubiquitous guerrilla 
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detachments, such is the only method which makes it possible for a small nation 
to beat a bigger one, a weaker army to resist a stronger and better organized" 
(Giap, 1977a, p.294). 
However, there are authors criticized this position of North Vietnam. They 
argued that South Vietnam was not bound by the Geneva Agreements and South 
Vietnam government did not have the obligations of consult with the North 
counterpart to hold the general election in July 1956 as regulated in the Final 
Declaration. There were in reality two Vietnams. North Vietnam and South Vietnam 
has become two separate international entities and North Vietnam waged an 
aggressIOn war against South Vietnam. The following part will investigate these 
arguments. 
* First~v, lvas South Vietnam bound hy Gem!1'(l Agreements? 
In North Vietnam' s perspective. though the State of Vietnam refused to accept 
the Final Declaration at Geneva Conference, the Republic of Vietnam should be 
considered to be bound by the Geneva accords. However. there is counter-
arguments that South Vietnam was not bound by Geneva Agreement, more 
specifically South Vietnam did not have the obligation to cooperate with the North 
Vietnam to hold general election to reunify the country. For example John Norton 
Moore wrote that 
"For the State of Vietnam objected and refused to be bound by the agreements 
prior to Gene\'a. at Geneva, and after Geneva, a position which \\'as certainly 
clear to all of the participants at the Conference .... The consistent position of the 
Republic of Vietnam was that it was not bound by the provision of the Accords 
other than to refrain from disturbing the cease-fire by force. and specifically lend 
credence to its position that it was not bound by the election provisions of the 
Accords." (Moore, 1968. p.260). 
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Or in the United States' Department of State's "Legality of the Unites States 
Participation in the Defense of Vietnam". the Office of Legal Adviser wrote that 
"As indicated earlier. South Vietnam did not sign the cease-fire agreement of 
1954, nor did it adhere to the Final Declaration of the Geneva Conference. The 
South Vietnamese Government at that time gave notice of its objection in 
particular to the election provisions of the Accord" (1966, p.l 099). 
However, there was a strong argument that South Vietnam should be 
considered to be bound by the Geneva Accords due to its succession of 
responsibilities from France. At the Geneva conference, the State of Vietnam was a 
member of the French Union, and it was France that was ultimately responsible for 
the foreign affairs of the State of Vietnam. Although the State of Vietnam declined 
to accept the Final Declaration at the conference, France did. When France 
withdrew from Indochina, it transferred its full control to the State of Vietnam. 
which then became Republic of Vietnam on 26th October, 1955. Then, the Republic 
of Vietnam should carry with it the responsibilities of France when it accepted the 
Final Declaration at Geneva Convention. This is the arguments of Daniel Partan in 
his 1968 article entitled "Legal aspect of the T'ietnam conflict ". Partan pointed out 
three points '"reasonable beyond controversy" that should be considered when 
decided whether South Vietnam should be bound by the Geneva Accord or not. He 
wrote that: 
"First. the provision quoted from the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities 
in Vietnam and from the Final Declaration of the Geneva Conference 
demonstrate that the Conference understood that the French would be leaving 
Vietnam. and apparently contemplated that the pro\"isions of these agreements 
could be carried out in South Vietnam by the successors to the French 
authorities. Second. the unilateral declaration by the State of \0 ietnam 
demonstrate that although Saigon go\Oemment did not wish to accept the letter of 
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the Geneva Agreements, it intended to accept the cease-fIre and to co-operate 
with efforts to achieve a peaceful settlement. Third, assuming that at the time of 
the Geneva Conference the French had the authority under international law to 
determine the international relations of the State of Vietnam, the objections 
expressed by the Saigon Government ought not to suffIce to relieve it of 
whatever obligation it might not have as a successor state to carry out 
arrangements made by French. If protest alone could avoid responsibility. there 
would be little reality to the obligations the a successor state under international 
law." (Partan, 1968, p.211) 
Then he concluded that 
"Considering the purpose of the Geneva Agreements was to bring an end to 
hostilities so that the political future of the area could be decided by a process of 
self-determination through general elections, and that this purpose is in accord 
with the aims of the world community as expressed in the United Nations 
Charter. it would make better sense to regard the obligations of the Geneva 
Agreements as the type of obligations that devoh'e upon successor states than to 
permit a successor state to avoid these obligations because it was not a party to 
the agreements". (Partan, 1968, p.212). 
This position was widely shared by other law scholars such as Eliot D. 
Hawkins, Quincy Wright, F.B. Schick ... and even the International Commission for 
Supervision and Control in Vietnam established by the Agreement on the Cessation 
of Hostilities in Vietnam. For example, in his 1968 article entitled "Legal aspect of 
the Vietnam situation", Quincy Wright wrote that 
"Although the Government of the republic of Vietnam (Bao Dai) was not a part: 
to these agreements, France was, and the Diem go\ernment established in the 
Southern Zone as successor to France was bound by them'" (Wright. 1968. p.283). 
Or F.B. Schick in his article "Legal Control'ersies m'er US Inl'olvemen/ 117 
rie/nom .. wrote that 
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"The conclusion may be in order that these agreements are expressive of a 
general public interest of a large number of states in the restoration and the 
maintenance of international peace and security in the region previously known 
as Indo-China. In view of this general public interest in the restoration and 
maintenance of international peace and security, any government succeeding in 
this area the original signatories of the Geneva Agreements, although not a 
signatory of them, must be considered as being legally bound by the provision of 
these agreements" (Schick, 1969, p.200). 
The International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam, in its 
report in 1962, accused South Vietnam of violating article 16, 17 and 19 of the 
Geneva Agreements. This implicitly acknowledges that the Commission considered 
South Vietnam be bound by the agreements. The report wrote that 
"Taking all the facts into consideration, and basing itself on its own observations 
and authorized statements made in the United States of America and the Republic 
of Vietnam, the Commission concludes that the republic of Vietnam has violated 
articles 16 and 17 of the Geneva Agreement in receiving the increased military aid 
from the United States of America in the absence of any established credit in its 
favor. The commission is also of the view that though there may not be any 
formal military alliance between the Governments of the United States and the 
Republic of Vietnam, the establishment ofa U.S Military Assistance Command in 
South Vietnam, as well as the introduction of a large number of U.S military 
personnel beyond the stated strength of the MAAG (Military Assistance Advisory 
Group), amount to a factual military alliance, which is prohibited under Article 19 
of the Geneva Agreement" (Cited in Partan, 1968, p.208). 
By accusing South Vietnam of violating Geneva Agreements, the International 
Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam actually considered that the 
South Vietnam government be bound by the agreements. 
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* Next question is that was South Vietnam justified in refusing to implement 
the election provision o/the Geneva Accords? 
The America was of the view that South Vietnam was not bound by the 
Geneva Accords, so it was justified in rejecting to cooperate with North Vietnam in 
holding the general election to reunify the country. The Department of State in 1966 
wrote in "Legality of the Unites States Participation in the Defense of Vietnam" that 
"Even on the premise that these provisions were binding on South Vietnam, the 
South Vietnamese Government's failure to engage in consultations in 1955. with 
a view to holding election in 1956, involved no breach of obligation. The 
condition in North Vietnam during that were such as to make impossible any 
free and meaningful expression of popular will" (1966, p.l 099). 
However, Charles Chaumont persuasively argued that the condition in North 
Vietnam cannot be an excuse to block the general election before it happened. The 
American's support to Diem government to reject the election was "not only a 
breach of the engagement undertaken by the United States, but equally interference 
in the internal affairs of Vietnam" (1969. p.141). Charles Chaumont clearly pointed 
out that 
"The arrangements set up at Geneva, therefore. should have been implemented. If 
in the event the elections might haw seemed to have taken place in conditions 
open to criticism, or that circumstances at that time either materially prevented 
them or compromised the results, or if some of the results were contested, then. 
and only then, the countries which took part in the Geneva Conference. in 
conformity with Article 13 of the Final Declaration, could "consult one 
another. .. on such measures as may prove necessary to ensure that the agreements 
are respected. 
Nothing in these documents. therefore, pern1its the United States to raise obstacles 
in adl'l111c{' to the process of elections as prescribed. It was on/\' after the e\ent 
- 231 -
that, together with the other powers, they could study the situation if they believed 
it incompatible, not indeed with their own concept of elections, but with the 
Geneva Agreements" (1969, p.141). 
Quincy Wright also argued that the fact that the situation in North Vietnam 
might be unfriendly with the free election was well-known to the members of 
Geneva conference, but these members still endorsed the general election with delay 
of two years time, Quincy Wright wrote that 
"The conditions in Vietnam which might impair the freedom and fairness of 
elections were, however, well-known to the members of the Geneva Conference 
when they provided categorically for the holding of elections in July, 1956, for 
their supervision by the International Control Commission, and for consultation 
to prepare for them beginning on July 20, 1955. The delay of two years was "in 
order to ensure that sufficient progress in the restoration of peace has been made, 
and that all the necessary conditions obtain for free expression of the national 
will". (1968, p.280). 
So, we can see that, though the State of Vietnam did not accept the Final 
Declaration at Geneva Conference, the Republic of Vietnam still should be 
considered as to be bound by the agreements as it was successor of France, which 
accepted the agreement, and as for the general public interest in the restoration and 
maintenance of international peace and security, And that South Vietnam 
government, supported by America, refused to consult with North Vietnam to hold 
the general election was a violation of Geneva agreement and went against the will 
of the Vietnamese people, 
* Was there one Vietnam or two Vietnams? 
To answer the question whether North Vietnam waged an aggreSSIOn war 
against South Vietnam or not, we first answer the question whether Vietnam was a 
"single state" or .. t\yO states", Contrary to North Vietnam's claim. there were 
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authors argued that North Vietnam and South Vietnam were at least t\\'O de facto 
international entities. For example, Eliot D. Hawkins wrote that 
"It is submitted that the actions taken within the international community toward 
and by North and South Vietnam at least since 1956 show substantial acceptance 
of a status of de facto statehood for both entities and have displaced the provisions 
of 1954 Accords \vhich bear on statehood. '" (Hawkins. 1968, p.I77). 
Or more clearly John Norton Moore wrote that 
"Whether or not the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the Republic of 
Vietnam are full-fledged de jure states under international law. and there are 
substantial expectations that they are, they are at least separate international 
entities with respect to the lawfulness of the use of force. In these circumstances 
the D.R.V may not unilaterally resort to force against the R.V.N consistent with 
the vital expectations of the peoples of the world about the preservation of 
minimum world public order and the minimization of destructi\e modes of 
change'" (Moore. 1968, -.240). 
However, in North Vietnam's VIew, Vietnam was one state as always 
reaffirmed by Hanoi government. 
"Vietnam is one, the Vietnamese people are one. The U.S imperialist having 
encroached on the territory of the Vietnamese fatherland, e\ery Vietnamese is 
duty bound to fight against them for national salvation" (cited in Partan, 1968, 
p.221). 
The Geneva Agreements clearly did not intend to permanent separation of 
Vietnam. Article 1 of the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in Vietnam 
speaks of a "provisional military demarcation line'" as the dividing line bet\\een 
North and South Vietnam. Paragraph 6 of the Final Declaration of the Geneva 
Conference states explicitly that "the military demarcation line is provisional and 
should not in any way be interpreted as constituting a political or tenitorial 
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boundary". More clearly, in paragraph 11 and 12 of the Final Declaration. the 
countries accepting that Declaration pledged to respect .. the so\erei ~nty. the 
independence, the unity and the territorial integrity" of the state of Vietnam. So. at 
the Geneva conference, Vietnam was considered explicitly as a single state. 
The United States refused to accept the Final Declaration, but in an unilateral 
statement, the U.S representative at the Geneva Conference, Mr. Bedell Smith, 
considered Vietnam as a "nations divided against their wilP' and declared that his 
government 
"wiII refrain from the threat or the use of force to disturb the agreements" and 
having in addition "taken note" of the Agreements. (Cited in Chaumont, 1969, 
p.131). 
South Vietnam government itself did not advocate the separation of North and 
South Vietnam. On the contrary, it viewed Vietnam as a single state. Partan pointed 
out that 
"As to the republic of Vietnam, the Saigon government has not sought to repudiate 
the view that the entire area of Vietnam constitutes one state rather than two. To 
do so would mean a recognition of the partition, which the Saigon Government 
refused to do at Geneva, and at least an implicit recognition of the authority of 
Hanoi as the government of a separate State of North Vietnam. To the contrary, 
the position of the Republic of Vietnam has been that Hanoi is at most a de facto 
regime exercising control over North Vietnam by force. and that Vietnam remains 
a single divided state divided against its will" (Partan, 1968, p.217). 
So there was no doubt that Vietnam was considered as a single state at the 
Geneva conference. Quincy Wright shared this idea and wrote that 
""It seems clear that the Conference recognized Vietnam as one state and 
provided that it should be united by one government in 1956." (Wrig.ht. 1968. 
p.278). 
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And Charles Chaumont also agreed that 
"There is single Vietnamese people. there is a single Vietnamese nation; and the 
movements of the population and forces taking place from North to South and 
from south to North are moyements within this people and this nation, whose 
profound unity cannot be abolished by a decision from without" (Chaumont, 
1969, p.136). 
It was obvious that the participant at Geneva conference considered Vietnam 
as single state and both North Vietnam and South Vietnam did not advocate 
permanent separation of North and South Vietnam. 
* Then, there come the question that 'which government, Xorth Vietnam's 
government or South Vietnam's g01'ern177ent, lI'as more legitimate and had morc 
support from Vietnamese people? 
There was argument from the America that North Vietnamese regime was an 
oppressive dictatorship and should not be permitted to extent its rule to the South. 
For example the United States' Department of State \\Tote in the document "The 
Legality of the United States Participation in the Defense of Vietnam" that 
"General Giap, currently Defense Minister of North Vietnam. in addressing the 
Tenth Congress of the North Vietnamese Communist Party in October 1956, 
publicly acknowledged that the Communist leaders \\'ere running a police state 
where executions, terror and torture \\ere commonplace" (1966, p.11 00), 
However, not only North Vietnam but also there are Western authors reject 
this kind of arguments. There are arguments that North Vietnam gm'ernment was 
more legitimate than the government in the South Vietnam. which \vas created by 
America and lack the support from Vietnamese people. For example, Charles 
Chaumont wrote that 
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"'In so far as North Vietnam is concerned, so much has already been written on it 
by numerous investigators, so much can be perceived from afar of the 
unconquerable energy of the population and its leaders under the intense 
bombing to which they have been subjected for past two years. that the 
wholehearted adherence of the population to their regime and their struggle 
cannot be doubted" (Chaumont, 1969, p.145). 
Or Quincy Wright wrote that 
"After Ho's forces in a seven-year war had defeated France at Dien Bien Phu in 
1954, Ho was in a position to establish his authority over the whole of Vietnam 
and that he agreed to the cease-fIre line, established by the Geneva Conference 
of 1954, because the compromise settlement would prevent further foreign 
intervention and the temporary division of Vietnam would be terminated by an 
election to be held in July, 1956 which would result in union under his 
government" (Wright, 1968, p.273). 
The fact that North Vietnamese government won more support from 
Vietnamese people than the government in the South Vietnam after Geneva Accords 
was also shared by America leaders. After the Geneva Conference, there was strong 
belief that if the election was to be held in July 1956 as regulated in the Final 
Declaration, North Vietnam would win. As President Eisenhower wrote in his 
memoir - "'Mandate for Change" that 
"'I am convinced that the French could not win the war because the internal 
political situation in Vietnam, weak and confused, badly weakened their military 
position. I have never talked or corresponded with a person knowledgeable in 
Indochinese affairs who did not agree that had election been held as of the time 
of fIghting, possibly 80 percent of the population would have vote for the 
Communist Ho Chi Minh as their leader rather than Chief of State, Bao Dai. 
Indeed, the lack of leadership and driw on the part of Bao Dai \\as a factor in 
the feeling prevalent among Vietnamese that they had nothing to fight for". 
(Cited in \\'right. 1968, p.273), 
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Quincy Wright commented on these writing that 
"It is unlikely that this estimate, if correct for 1954, \\-ould have changed 
radically by 1956." (Wright, 1968, p.273). 
So, although there are arguments that North Vietnamese government was 
oppressive, after Geneva conference, Democratic Republic of Vietnam was able to 
win support from Vietnamese people to the extent that if a general election was held 
in 1956, North Vietnamese government would win. 
On the other hand, there were arguments that South Vietnamese government 
was just a creation of the United States and lack wide support from the Vietnamese 
people. Quincy Wright wrote that 
"Diem's government, although supported by United States economic. 
educational and military aid, was not able to eliminate Viet Cong, \\'hich in 1960 
organized the South Vietnam National Liberation Front in control of much of the 
Southern Zone outside the major cities_ Diem became increasingly dictatorial 
and unpopular and was assassinated on Noyember 1, 1963. The succession of 
unstable governments which have followed him haw ne\-er controlled half of the 
territory of South Vietnam" (Wright. 1968, p.279) -
Sharing this idea with Wright Charles Chaumont argued that the 
establishment and then strong development of the National Liberation Front was 
evidence that the majority of population did not support the South Vietnam 
Government. He wrote that 
"The establishment of the National Liberation Front in October 1960 and its 
development on large scale. providing ground for the assumption that the 
majority of the population of South Vietnam supports Vietnamese unity and 
independence .. _.. The war in Vietnam is at present time essentially a war 
between the United States on the one hand and the National Liberation Front an 
the Democratic Republic of Vietnam on the other. i.e .. between the American 
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and the Vietnamese ...... The military submergence of the government of South 
Vietnam before the United States meant that on the one hand America 
intervention had deprived this government of nay military freedom and that. on 
the other, it was not sufficiently representative to be allowed if" (Chaumont. 
1968, p.134). 
Then he concluded that 
"In the light of later, well-known events, the artificial nature of the Diem 
government, and generally speaking, all the governments of South Vietnam which 
followed it, is very clear" (Chaumont, 1968, p.134). 
Michael Walzer also argued that South Vietnamese government lacked the 
legitimacy to rule in the South Vietnam. He wrote that 
"A government that receives economic and technical aid, military supply, 
strategic and tactical advice, and is still unable to reduce its subjects to obedience, 
is clearly an illegitimate government" (Walzer, 2006, p.99). 
The fact that South Vietnam government lacked the support of from 
population was also the reason why America had to intervene deeper and deeper in 
the Vietnam War. In early 1960s, South Vietnam government was on the verge of 
collapse after the wide spread mass uprising in the delta area, starting with the 
uprising in Ben Tre province. America, then under the Kennedy administration. had 
to increase its aid to South Vietnam in economic and military to keep this 
government to stand. Then, III 1964-1965 South Vietnam government, although 
received great support from America, but lacked the support of population. was 
losing the war. America had to send its troops in South Vietnam to bear the direct 
fighting tasks and stop the loosing tendency. And most obviously. in 1975, just t\\'o 
years after America withdrew from Vietnam. South Vietnam govemInent collapsed 
because it could not stand the attack from the Vietcong and North Vietnam am1cd 
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forces. The weakness of South Vietnam government revealed that its lack of support 
from its own population. 
* Was there an aggression on South Vietnam by North lTietnam? 
There is an argument that North Vietnam waged an aggression war against 
South Vietnam, then America had to intervene in collective defense of South 
Vietnam. The United States "White Paper" published in 1965. entitled "Aggression 
from the North: The Record of North r";etnam's Campaign to conquer South 
Vietnam" wrote that 
"South Vietnam is fighting for its life against brutal campaign of terror and armed 
attack inspired, directed, supplied, and controlled by the Communist regime in 
Hanoi. This flagrant aggression has been going on for years. Above alL the war in 
Vietnam is not a spontaneous and local rebellion against the established 
government. 
In Vietnam a communist government has set out deliberately to conquer a 
sovereign people in a neighboring state. And to achieve its end, it has used every 
resource of its own government to carry out its carefully planned program of 
concealed aggression." (Cited in Partan, 1968, p.222). 
Or John Norton Moore, who strongly supported official America's position 
regarding the war in Vietnam, argued that the Republic of Vietnam (R VN) and 
Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) are separate international entities and there 
was an unlawful armed attack on RVN by DRV. He wrote that 
"The use of the military instrument by the D.R.V against the R.V.N is not a 
minor aggression nor one effectuated by non-coercive means such as 
propaganda. It is not a mere political dispute and it is not a minor frontier 
incident. Nor does the attack raise the questions of the right to preyent an 
armed attack before it occurs. Instead. the attack. whether initiated and 
controlled by the D.R.V or merely substantially assisted by the D.R.\·. is a 
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senous. sustained and detennined attack on the territorial and political 
integrity of the R.V.N." (Moore, 1968, p.247). 
However, as noted above, Vietnam as a single state so that it cannot asserted 
that North Vietnam invade South Vietnam, on the contrary it was America that 
waged an aggressive war against the Vietnamese people as a whole. For example, 
William Standard in his article entitled "United States interl'ention in Vietnam is not 
legal" argued that Vietnam as a whole is a single state, thus it cannot be saying that 
North Vietnam waged an aggressive war against South Vietnam. He wrote that 
that 
"It cannot be asserted that South Vietnam is separate 'country' so far as North 
Vietnam is concerned" (cited in Moore, 1968. p.240). 
Quincy Wright also shared this view about the conflict in Vietnam. He wrote 
"South Vietnam was clearly regarded as part of Vietnam before 1954 and as a 
"zone" of that state separated by a temporary cease-fire line by the Geneva 
Conference, and it seems not to have acquired sufficient government authority, 
stability. public support, or recognition to become an independent state under 
international law since then. Consequently, apart from Cease-fire Agreement and 
America intervention, hostilities in Vietnam should be regarded as civil strife." 
(Wright. 1968, p.280). 
Charles Chaumont argued that American intervention in Vietnam was not in 
"collective defense" of South Vietnam against the aggression from North Vietnam. 
It is in fact the America's aggression war against Vietnam as a whole. He wrote that 
"The war in Vietnam is at present time essentiaIly a war between the Unites 
States on the one hand and the National Liberation Front and the Democratic 
Republic of Vietnam on the other, i.e., between the Americans and the 
Vietnamese" (Chaumont, 1969. p.134). 
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* Then. 11'hat 11'aS North T 'ietnam's strategy to reunifo the count,)' ajler the 
Genera Conference? 
After Geneva, the aIm of North Vietnam was to reunify the country by 
peaceful means, if possible, i.e. through general election or political struggle. As 
General Tra noted that .. the national aspirations of the Vietnamese people are to 
achieve peace. independence. unity. and territorial integrity" (Tra, 1993, p.235). To 
achieve the goal of reunification by peaceful means, North Vietnam was very 
restrained with the reprisal measures of Diem. Tran Van Tra wrote that 
"It is hard to describe accurately how a nation angered to the extreme by the 
ruthless and barbarous repression of the Diem government could abide strictly by 
the instruction of President Ho Chi Minh and the leadership of the Vietnam 
Worker party. At that time, those who resorted to arms to defend themselves were 
disciplined by the Party for erratic behaviour, while those who refrained from 
violence were captured and/or killed" (Tra, 1993, p.n5) 
At the same time, North Vietnam tried very hard to call for the South Vietnam 
puppet government of Ngo Dinh Diem to respect the Geneva agreement and to 
cooperate in holding a general election in both North and South Vietnam to reunite 
the country. At the initial phase of the struggle. Vietnam Worker Party (the official 
name of the Vietnam Communist Party, which had returned to operate in secret) 
always emphasized the political struggle and tried to avoid military actions. From 
September 5th to i h 1954, Vietnamese Worker Party's Politburo met to discuss the 
6th Central Committee Resolution. The Politburo stated that 
"The party's tasks in the South Vietnam in this period is: leading South Vietnam 
people in the struggle for implementation of ceasefire agreement, strengthening 
peace. carrying out freedom and democracy. improving people's living standard. 
reunifying and gaining independence" (Cited in History of the resistant war against 
America to save the country. "01. 2.1993. p.13). 
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In the first few years after Geneva Accords, North Vietnam communist leaders 
wanted to solve the problem of national reunification through political means. The 
Politburo's Resolution in June 1956 wrote that 
"The fonn of struggle in the whole country now is political struggle not anned 
struggle" (Cited in History of the resistant war against America to save the 
country, vol. 2, 1993, p.228). 
Communist leaders in North Vietnam were even accused of over-restrained by 
some military leaders of the revolutionary force in the South Vietnam. For example. 
in a letter to Nguyen Van Linh, the Party General Secretary of Southern Regional 
Committee, Le Duan had to reassured his comrades in the South that: 
"I have reminded you that you comrades must be patient and take the direction of 
relying on political forces and political struggle to advance to the general 
uprising" (Ellitot, 1993, p 75). 
The fact that the North Vietnam's main approach was political struggle rather 
than military struggle was mentioned not only by Vietnamese authors but also by 
many Western authors who studied about the Vietnamese side of the war. Some of 
the famous names are William Duiker, Ang Cheng Guan, or David W.P. Elliot... For 
example Ang Cheng Guan(2002) wrote that 
"According to the directive (Poliburo directive on 19th June 1959), the struggle at 
that point of time was necessarily a political and not a military one. Therefore they 
should resort to anus only in circumstances that called for self-defence" (p.17). 
Ang Cheng Guan(2002) also pointed out the date when the North Vietnam 
leaders thought of reunifying the country by military. He wrote: 
"All these activities (modernisation of VPA) indicated that up until March 1958 a 
military campaign for reunification was still not in the cards and was not imminent 
till at least after 1960" (p.26). 
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So, we can see that in the North Vietnam's perspective. North Vietnam 
wanted to reunify the country in peace, it did not want to use forces against America 
and South Vietnam government. But South Vietnam government. supported by 
America, did not abide by the Geneva agreements and use repressive measures 
against Viet Cong forces. This was the roots of the war. The war was the last resort 
for the North Vietnam leadership. The book entitled "HistOlY of People's .irmy of 
Vietnam ., wrote that 
"The causes of this war were totally from the America. In other word, the strategic 
objectives of the American global strategy of containment and its arrogant policy 
against the legitimate will of Vietnamese people to independence, peace and 
national reunification are the roots and the direct causes of the war" (History of 
Vietnamese people's army. 2003, p.234). 
Another important reason for North Vietnam to choose peaceful means in 
reunifying the country was that it was afraid of America's inter\'ention in the war. as 
North Vietnam was fully aware of the strength of America as the world's most 
powerful country. In other word, North Vietnam wanted to reunify the country, at 
the same time it did not want to have to encounter with American forces. When the 
America forces already intervene. North Vietnam wanted to limit America's 
intervention as little as possible. In explaining why North Vietnam did not apply the 
strategy of three phase people' s war in the Vietnam War. Dayid Elliott \\Tote that 
"The nature of the task in the Vietnam war had changed from military defeat of an 
already entrenched colonial ruler to the prevention of the United States from 
following in their footsteps. The best strategy was ob\iously one that would 
forestall deeper American involvement. if at all possible" (Elliott. 1993. p.68). 
The aim of North Vietnam in the war was to defeat South Vietnam 
government without triggering American intervention or, in later phase. dissuading 
America from deeper inten·ention. North Vietnam envisaged that there "'ould be 
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three strategic options for America in the Vietnam war. The first option was special 
war. This meant that America would rely on South Vietnam government to achieve 
its objectives. This was obviously a low cost option for America. If special war 
failed, America would have to choose between withdraw or send American troops in 
South Vietnam to bear direct fighting. By sending troops in South Vietnam, 
America engaged in a local/limited war. If this war also failed, America still had two 
options, either withdraw or escalate the war to the all over Vietnam. North Vietnam 
assumed that these were the only options for America. And their strategy was to 
force America withdraw from Vietnam as early as possible. Elliot wrote that 
"This strategy was designed to force a choice between disengagement and 
escalation on the United States, and was based on the assumption that these were 
the only strategic options open to the United States. If these options were all 
eliminated, the strategy would succeed. Of course. the strategy would be most 
successful if the United States could be convinced or compelled to choose 
disengagement at a low level of involvement. As it turned out. the war passed 
through the special war and limited war phases. escalating to le\el of 
unprecedented devastation before president Johnson finally acknowledged that the 
cost of further escalation were unacceptable" (Elliott. 1993, p.69). 
The biggest problem for North Vietnam in carrying out this strategy was how 
to achieve its objective, i.e., defeating South Vietnam government and reunifying 
the country, without causing America's further escalation. As Elliott wrote that 
"They were faced with the problem of minimizing the extent of U.S im'ohement 
while maximizing the pressure on Saigon" (Elliott, 1993. p.75). 
So the North Vietnamese strategy, in essence, was not to defeat American 
military force directly, but actually to defeat the America's aggressi\'e will. Le Duan 
wrote that 
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"We say we will defeat America, this does not mean that \\e will defeat 
America's global strategy, defeat it military power in the world. \\e only mean 
to defeat its aggressive war in South Vietnam. Even, in the war in South 
Vietnam, we do not intend to shatter its military forces or killed all the America 
soldiers in South Vietnam. Our strategy is to defeat the enemy's aggressive will. 
let America understand that they could not escalate or continue the aggressive 
war and finally had to withdraw from Vietnam" (Le Duan's address at the 
Plenum of Central Committee 12, Vietnamese Worker Party, December 1965). 
One thing obvious from this strategy was that North Vietnam always wanted 
to avoid fighting American forces, if possible. North Vietnam understood how 
asymmetric it was between its army and the America's army. Thus, they did not 
choose to encounter America forces directly, but rather defeated its aggressive will. 
William Duiker wrote that 
"key to success would be the ability of the party's forces in the South to bring 
Saigon to the point of collapse without at the same time provoking Washington to 
increase the level of U.S involvement in South Vietnam, or e\en take the war to 
the North .... The objective would be not to inflict a total defeat on the enemy, but 
to create a "no-win" situation and lead Washington to accept a political settlement 
and the formation of a coalition government including the NLF in Saigon" (Cited 
in Elliott, 1993, p.75). 
So, North Vietnam wanted to reunify the country by peaceful means because 
firstly it strongly believed that it would win if a general election was held in July 
1956 as regulated at the Final Declaration of Geneva Conference. And more 
importantly, North Vietnam was afraid that its use of armed struggle \\'ould trigger 
American forces to intervene, thus North Vietnam choose to use political struggle 
with the hope that it would not have to encounter America military forces. 
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Generally, we can see that South Vietnamese government was bound by the 
Geneva Accords, especially the election provision of the Final Declaration. And the 
South Vietnam was not justified in rejecting consultation with North Vietnam to 
hold the general election to reunify the country. Vietnam was a single state. so it 
cannot be asserted that North Vietnam wage an aggression war against South 
Vietnam. Between the two governments in the North Vietnam and in the South 
Vietnam, North Vietnam had the support of Vietnamese people while South 
Vietnam government was illegitimate and lack support from South Vietnamese. 
North Vietnam did not want to use violent to reunify the country. Actually. North 
Vietnam was reluctant to resort to force in achieve it legitimate aim of national 
reunification. 
6.1.2 North Vietnam's war against America and jus ad bellum 
* Legitimate authority 
In the Vietnam War, there were two Vietnamese governments, North 
Vietnam's government and South Vietnam' s government, both claimed to be the 
legitimate authority of the whole Vietnam. South Vietnam government enjoyed the 
recognition of more than 60 nations and was member of at least 30 international 
organizations. North Vietnam government had the recognition of about 24 nations 
and participated in a number of international conferences (John Norton Moore, 
1968, p.239). However, Michael Walzer argued that foreign states cannot establish 
or disestablish the legitimacy of a government, he wrote "What is crucial is the 
standing of that government with its own people" (2006, p.98). In the case of 
Vietnam, where 
"Democracy is unknO\m and election are routinely managed. the te~t for 
government, as for insurgents. is self-help" (2006. p.98). 
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There are many authors, such as Michael Walzer. Douglas Lackey, Charles 
Chaumont, Quincy Wright etc. arguing that South Vietnam government did not pass 
the test of self-help. For example, Douglas Lackey wrote that 
"No government in Saigon could have held power for six months were it not 
for massive and continuous infusions of American aid" (1989, pA6). 
On the other hand, North Vietnamese government, gaining its credentials in 
the first Indochina war against French colonial rule, was able to sustain and won 
support from its people. As I pointed out in the above part, if an election was held in 
1956 according to Geneva agreement, North Vietnam would win. This fact shows 
that North Vietnam had a substantial support from Vietnamese people. When the 
war in the South Vietnam broke out, in 1960s, North Vietnam government still 
enjoyed the support of the people. Charles Chaumont wrote that "the wholehearted 
adherence of the population to their (North Vietnam's) regime and their struggle 
cannot be doubf' (1969. p.145). 
So, the legitimacy of the North Vietnam government came from the support of 
people. and between the two governments. North Vietnam's one \\as more 
legitimate to have the authority all over Vietnam. Thus, North Vietnam was the 
legitimate authority. 
* Just cause 
In North Vietnam's perspective, its war against America in the South Vietnam 
had just cause, it was the war for national reunification and self-determination. As I 
argued in the above part, Vietnam was a single state, and North Vietnam was a 
legitimate authority, it cannot be said that North Vietnam invaded South Vietnam as 
the argument of America. North Vietnam and South Vietnam were not t\\O states. 
they were two zones in a single state of Vietnam. 
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North Vietnam's war against America \\as continuation of Vietnamese 
people's effort to gain independence and reunify the country. which had been started 
in 1946 against French colony in the first Indochina war. The South Vietnamese 
govenunenfs violation of Geneva agreement especially the violation of election 
provision, renders North Vietnam with the right to suspend the cease-fire line and 
continue this effort. This is a principle in international law. The United States' 
Department of State wrote that 
"The international law principle that a material breach of an agreement by one 
party entitles the other at least to withhold compliance with an equivalent. 
corresponding, or related provision until the defaulting party is prepared to 
honor its obligations" (Legality of the United States Participation in the Defense 
of Vietnam, Department of State, 1966, p.1098). 
This argument was also shared by Quincy Wright III his discussion about 
North Vietnam's position regarding its war against America. He wrote that 
"After Ho's forces in a seven-year war had defeated France at Dien Bien Phu in 
1954, Ho was in a position to establish his authority O\U the whole of Vietnam 
and that he agreed to the cease-fIre line, established by the Gene\·a Conference 
of 1954, because the compromise settlement would prevent further foreign 
intervention and the temporary di\·ision of Vietnam would be terminated by a 
election to be held in July 1956, which would result in union under his 
government. On the basis of these facts, North Vietnam contends that the Diem 
Government in South Vietnam succeeded to the obligations of France under the 
Geneva Agreement (article 27), even though Bao Dai's representative reserved 
on them at Geneva, and that it violated those obligations by refusing to 
implement the provision concerning elections and by accepting United States 
military contingents in South Vietnam and establishing a de facto alliance. Ho 
Chi Minh is therefore convinced that these continuing yiolations of provisions of 
the Geneva Agreement which had induced him to accept it. justified him by 
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1958 in considering the cease-ftre line suspended and in continuing his efforts. 
begun against France in 1946, to unite Vietnam b) force" (Wright, 1969, p"~73). 
Also, it can be argued that in South Vietnam, it was Diem gm'ernment that 
used forces first. After consolidating his power in South Vietnam, Diem carried out 
a reprisal program against people who had supported or participated in Vietminh 
front to fight against French colony in the First Indochina war. 
"In 1955 and 1956, thousands of cadres and leftist sympathizers in the South was 
subjected to arrest, torture, prison and execution by Diem government" (Lacke). 
1989, p.48). 
While at that time, North Vietnam was of the view that reunification should be 
achieved by peaceful means through political struggle. Armed struggle was not 
allowed. Tran Van Tra wrote that 
"It is hard to describe accurately how a nation angered to the extreme by the 
ruthless and barbarous repression of the Diem government could abide strictly 
by the instruction of President Ho Chi Minh and the leadership of the Vietnam 
Worker party. At that time, those who resorted to arms to defend themsel\"es 
were disciplined by the Party for erratic behaviour, while those who refrained 
from violence were captured and/or killed" (Tra, 1993, p"~35) 
So it can be said that in the South Vietnam, Diem government resort to force 
first. Douglas Lackey wrote that 
"In these years, what we have in Vietnam is a police action- indistinguishable in 
a dictatorship from military operations- against a political movement. Since the 
NLF did not begin its campaign of violence on any scale before 1961. the ftrst 
use of force in the South was by the regime in Saigon" (Lackey. 1989. pAR). 
* Last resort 
The principle of last resort requires that war must be the last resort. waged 
after no other means could achieve a satisfactory solution. Ho\\"ever, we should not 
interpret this principle too strictly. If war must truly the last resort, then all war must 
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be rendered unjust. force would never be licit. because one can always continue to 
negotiate. Alex Bellamy wrote that 
"Last resort does not require the exhaustion of eWf\ means short of force 
. . 
Instead, last resort demand that actors carefully evaluate all the different 
strategies that might bring about the desired ends, selecting force if it 
appears to be the only feasible strategy for securing those ends" (Bellamy. 
2006, p.123). 
In the case of the Vietnam War, North Vietnam at first chose to unify the 
country by peaceful means through political struggle. As I argued above, this was 
because North Vietnam strongly believed that it had clear advantage over South 
Vietnam in political struggle. And North Vietnam chose peaceful means because it 
did not want to trigger America's introduction of its troops to Vietnam. as North 
Vietnam was fully aware that America was the most powerful country in the world 
at that time and it would be great difficult for them to fight against American forces. 
Only when the political struggle failed to achieve the just cause of national 
unification and self-determination did North Vietnam consider the use of force. The 
National Liberation Front was established as late as 1960. North Vietnam started to 
send a full regiment for fighting in South Vietnam as late as mid-1964. ten years 
after the Geneva conference. 
The fact that North Vietnam carried out peaceful political struggle to reunify 
the country, and only when this struggle failed, did North Vietnam use military 
struggle shows that war was the last resort in North Vietnam's strategy. 
* Reasonable chance of success 
Reasonable chance of success demands that leaders must carefully undertake 
the risk assessment before going to war. In the case of the Vietnam War. when 
North Vietnam started its political struggle after the Geneva conference in 195-L 
North Vietnam had clear chance of success. Both North Vietnam and America 
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shared the view that if a general election was held in July 1956 as regulated in the 
Final Declaration of the Geneva Conference it was almost certain that North 
Vietnam would win. William Duiker wrote that 
"One reason that Hanoi preferred the political option is that party leaders \\ere 
convinced from the start that here they possessed a clear advantage o\er 
enemy" ( 1993. p.34). 
In 1960, when North Vietnam started its military struggle to reunify the 
country, North Vietnam had reasonable chance to win the war. To examine the 
chance to success of North Vietnam, we can look at how America assessed it. In 
1961, President Kennedy sent Walt Rostow and Maxwel Taylor to South Vietnam 
for a fact-finding trip. Returning to America, these two men recommend Kennedy to 
introduce 8000 American combat troops to South Vietnam. which shocked the 
president. Rostow-Taylor report stated flatly that "\\"ithout such a commitment 
Vietnam could not be saved" (Stoessinger. 2008, p.1l3). So it is clear that in 1961, 
if America did not step up its assistance to South Vietnam, North Vietnam had clear 
chance to win the war. 
Even after Kennedy administration greatly deepened American commitment 
in Vietnam by increasing the military advisors more than 15 times since Eisenhower 
administration, from 900 to 16000, North Vietnam still had chance to win the war. 
According to William Duiker 
"By the fall of 1964, U.S intelligence estimates were predicting a Communist 
victory within six months in the absence of a major U.S response" (Duiker. 
1993, p.32). 
So we can see clearly that even America had to admit that North Vietnam had 
clear chance to win the war at several points of the war if the America did not 
deepen its intervention. 
* Proportionality 
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The ad bellum proportionality stipulates that the violence used in the war must 
be proportionate to the harm suffered. The harm suffered in the case of the Vietnam 
War was the division of the country and the denial of national self-determination. 
Then, the question is that was the division and the denial of national self-
determination proportionate to the use of force? Answers to this general question are 
variable. There is always argument that national unification and self-determination 
is not important enough to wage a war. However, in world history. it does not lack 
examples of countries go to war for national self-determination, such as America' s 
war against British empire, Algerian force against French, Palestinian war against 
Israel etc. 
In the case of Vietnam, gIven the strong Vietnamese nationalism and the 
country's long time under foreign rule. the country's division and denial of national-
self-determination was proportionate to using violent force. Vietnam has long 
history of fighting against foreign rulers to gain national independence and self-
determination. Taylor wrote that "no theme is more consistent in Vietnam history 
than the theme of resistance to foreign aggression" (1983, p. xviii). Vietnamese 
people are very sensitive to the issue of national independence and self-
determination. 
Moreover, III 1950s Vietnam had been divided and dominated by French 
colonialism for nearly a century. Tran Van Tra stated that "Vietnamese people had 
the will and the determination to sacrifice everything for independence and 
freedom" (Tra, 1993, p.234). Thus. at that time Vietnamese people had a burning 
aspiration for national reunification and self-determination. 
The aspiration of Vietnamese people for independence and self-determination 
was reflected in the Declaration of Independence of the Democratic republic of 
Vietnam in September 1945, Ho Chi Minh wrote that 
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"The entire Vietnamese people are determined to mobilize all their spiritual 
and material forces, to sacrifice their lives and property, in order to safeguard 
their right to liberty and independence" (Ho Chi Minh, 1945). 
Ho Chi Minh reiterated the aspiration of Vietnamese people in 1966 when he 
stated that "Nothing is more precious than independence and freedom". (Ho Chi 
Minh, 1966). 
So in the case of Vietnam, given its strong sense of nationalism, the use of 
force was proportionate to the harm suffered which is country division and denial of 
national self-determination. 
* Right intention 
The criterion of right intention means that war must be waged for the common 
good, not for self-aggrandizement or because of hatred of the enemy. In the case of 
North Vietnam's war, the war was waged for the national reunification and self-
determination. After 1954 Geneva Agreements, Vietnam was temporarily divided 
into two zones, subjected to reunify in a general election to be held in 1956. 
However, South Vietnam, supported by America, rejected its responsibility to 
cooperate with North Vietnam in holding the general election. Thus the country was 
divided. North Vietnam first sought to reunify the country by peaceful means. Then, 
when political struggle did not produce desired result, North Vietnam resorted to 
war. 
"This war ultimately led to the realization of the long held national aspirations 
of the Vietnamese people, that is to achieve peace, independence, unity and 
territorial integrity" (Tra, 1993, p.nS). 
With this aim, the war passes the test of right intention. However, according to 
Douglas Lackey, America argued that North Vietnam's \\ar \vas to spread 
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Communist to the South Vietnam. "to establish a communist gmernment in South 
Vietnam, regardless of South Vietnamese attitude" (1989. pA 7). Even :";orth 
Vietnam sometime referred to itself at the forefront of communism in Asia. 
However, given that North Vietnam desperately need assistance from Soviet 
Union and China, it is easy to understand when North Vietnam connected its war 
with Communism. The real purpose of the North Vietnam's \\"ar was to reunify the 
country. As Charles Chaumont wrote that 
"The war in Vietnam. in the eyes of the Vietnamese people, appears less a \\ar 
of rival blocs than an essential denial of their own rights, and Vietnamese 
resistance. despite its dominant ideological colour, is not basically different 
from the other fonns of nationalism which contributed to the disintegration of 
the classic type of colonialism" (1969, p.149). 
The aim of the war was for national unification is also reflected in the official 
name of the war in Vietnamese language~ which is "Resistant war against America 
to save the country". This is the war to save the country, the war for national 
reunification and self-determination, not the war for spreading communism. This 
war passes the test of right intention. 
In this part, I have investigated how North Vietnam' s war against America can 
be judged under jus ad bellum criteria. Though the war was not publically declared, 
on balance, it was just under jus ad bellum. 
However, the Vietnam War was very controversial. There are authors 
acknowledge this facts, for example Michael Walzer wrote "r doubt that it is 
possible to tell the story of Vietnam in a way that \\"ill command general agreement" 
(2006, p.97). Likewise. North Vietnam's justification of its war against America is 
also very controversial. 
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6.1.3 North Vietnam's justification of its way of war 
In previous parts, we saw how North Vietnam dewed the cause of war and the 
justness of its war against America. Now we will see how North Vietnam justified 
their way of war to its own people? 
First~r. North Vietnam justified its way of war by the just cause of its war 
against America. In North Vietnam's perspective. the America's \\ar \\as the 
aggression war, and the Vietnamese war as a war of national liberation. The war \\'as 
for independence and national reunification. This was the just cause of the \\'ar. 
Under the influence of Marxism and Leninism on war and military, North Vietnam 
used the end to justify the means, meaning that as long as the cause is just, measures 
available to fulfil that just cause can be justified. Actually, in the resolutions and 
documents, Vietnam Communist Party always called upon Vietnamese people to 
used everything available to fight against the enemy. For example, in the appeal for 
the whole nation to stand up and fight enemy, Ho Chi Minh said: 
"Men and women, old and young. regardless of religious creed, political 
affiliation and nationality, all Vietnamese must stand up to fight the French 
colonists to saw the Fatherland. Those who have rifles will use their rifles. those 
who haw swords will use their swords, Those who have no sword will use 
spades. hoes or sticks" (Ho Chi Minh, Selected Works, yol. 3, p.274), 
Or Vo Nguyen Giap stated that 
"One of the leading principles of our military art is to use eyer) means to 
annihilate the enemy" (Giap, 1977a, p.278) 
There used to be debate about which side have just cause in the Vietnam \\' ar. 
Many American laws scholars had argued that South Vietnam \\'as actually an 
independent state, and the North Vietnam, under the instruction from Soviet Union 
and Communist China, im'ade South Vietnam \\'ith the aim of spread Communi~m 
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around the region. However, as I have just argued above, the Vietnam War against 
America on balance can be considered as just under traditional criteria of jus ad 
bellum of just war theory. And many scholars such as Douglas P. Lackey, Ovadia 
Ezra, Alex J. Bellamy .... agreed that just cause is on the side of North Vietnam. 
The just cause of the North Vietnam's war against America is the basic point 
from which North Vietnam can persuade their own people to accept their way of 
war. North Vietnam always stressed the just cause to win support from their people. 
that: 
In the book "National Liberation 11'ar in T'ietnam ", Vo Nguyen Giap wrote 
"Ours is a just war- a war for national liberation and a war for national defence-
waged against an unjust and aggressi\'e war by imperialism and aims at 
implementing the political line of the Party and achieying the goal of re\olution in 
the interest of the Vietnamese people and nation and for the sake of world 
revolution" (Giap, 1977a, p.214). 
Or in the book of Military History of Vietnamese People's Army. the author 
wrote that 
"It is a just war, waged against the aggressive war by America imperialism. After 
21 years, America changed their war strategy one by one and Sai Gon 
Government and Anny existed under the pretext of "nation" or "people" but the: 
cannot change the fact that their war is an inyading war of imperialism. On the 
side of our people. this is the war to win back and consolidate our freedom. 
independence and national liberation- a sacred cause that any legitimate nation or 
people in the world strive for. Thus our war against America to sa\e the country is 
the just war. (Vietnam Military History, 2003, p.265). 
The book "Local People's war in the 11'ar against America to s(Il'e Ihe 
COllnll), .. wrote that 
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"On the enemy side, the overall characteristic of the war is the invading war of 
the imperialism country against another country. On our side, the most 
prominent characteristic is the just war against foreign invader. The aim of our 
war is to win our national independence" (The Local People' s war in the war 
against America to save our country, 1996, p.l2). 
Secondly, North Vietnam justified their way of war by the age old tradition of 
fighting against foreign aggression. To fight and win the just war against America 
and to reunify the country. North Vietnam's military strategy was to mobilize the 
forces of the whole nation to fight against the enemy. North Vietnam highlighted the 
fact that this strategy was an age old tradition of the country. In the past, Vietnam 
had to encounter many foreign aggressions. During these struggles, as Vietnam was 
always on the weaker side, Vietnam used the strategy of the whole nation joining 
forces, in which everyone became soldier to fight against enemy. This kind of 
strategy became the tradition of war fighting in Vietnam. As Vo Nguyen Giap 
pointed out that 
"Our people possess a long record of uprisings and people's wars waged to 
liberate and defend the country" (Giap, 1977a, p.no) 
North Vietnam used this age old tradition of the country to justify their way of 
war. For example in the book "To arm the rel'olutionmy masses to build the 
people's army" Vo Nguyen Giap wrote that 
"A striking difference in the building of the armed forces of the feudal State in our 
country and many feudal States in Europe is the system of "everyone a soldier" 
instead of that of"mercenaries". (Giap, I 977b, p.357) 
And that 
"The tradition of "the whole nation joining forces" in the fight against foreign 
aggressors, the experience of people's insurrection including both the national 
anny and the anned forces of the people have been a very valuable tradition and 
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experience of our people. They have also been quite original feature:-; rarely 
found in the military history of other nation"( Giap, 1977b, p.375). 
In the book .. r;etnam Military HistOlY", when discussing the expenence 
fighting foreign invaders, the author wrote that 
"Every people contribute his or her force into fighting and driyin£ the enemy 
~ . 
away, that's why our country can win the strong and aggressive enem: and 
Increase its general power and position" (Vietnam Military History, .200.3. 
pAI5). 
Moreover, in order to persuade people to accept their way of fighting, North 
Vietnam not only emphasized the just cause and the tradition of the whole nation 
joining forces to fight against enemy, but North Vietnam also argued that war was 
the last resort and its way of war is the only viable choice. North Vietnam always 
argued that it did not want war, it wanted to reunite the country in peace through 
general election. However, the peaceful means of reunification failed due to South 
Vietnam's non-cooperation and North Vietnam had no other choice but involved in 
a war to gain national unification and integrity. Moreover, fighting against the 
enemy by the force of the whole nation under the motto "everyone is a soldier" is 
the only way that North Vietnam can sustain and win the war to fulfil the just cause. 
This is because the asymmetry of power between North Vietnam and America. 
North Vietnam used the power asymmetry to justify their way of war. 
Vo Nguyen Giap wrote that 
"It was a war of resistance waged by a small country with a bacb\Oard agrarian 
economy, a country with embryonic anned force:-; \\"hich wa:-; besieged in the 
beginning by imperialism on all sides. but heroically fought and defeat the nearly 
half a million strong professional aggressiye aml)' of the imperialist power many 
time superior to it in armament and technique" (Giap, 1977a. po207). 
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And that 
"Our war against foreign aggression at present and in the past, has always been 
fought against the invading annies of countries definitely greater than ours in size. 
population and with overwhelmingly superior military forces. But while in the 
past, the invading countries had the same feudal regime as ours. today the 
aggressors are imperialist powers which are not only by far superior to us in area 
and population, but also possess highly developed industries, huge economic and 
military potential and modern annaments, while our country is not wry large in 
area and population, and is moreover an economically underdeveloped fonner 
colonial and semi-feudal country"(Giap, 1 977a, p.207). 
The book "Vietnam Military History" also wrote that 
"Vietnam, a small and under-developed country. has to counter America 
imperialism which is very much superior III tenn of economic, military and 
technology. So, in order to win the war, besides the detennination and 
creativeness, we must mobilize the force of entire people:'(History of Vietnamese 
people's anny, 2003, p.268) 
The book "Local people's 11'01' in the resistant war against America to sare 
the country" wrote that 
"Vietnam is a small country but have to fight against \ery much stronger enemy-
the America. Our population is only about one sixth of America's: our GDP is 
only 111000 of America's. To win that war, we have to bring into full play the 
strength of the entire nation, of the whole people." (Local people's war in the 
resistant war against America to save the country, 1996, p.17-18). 
Now we can see clearly the arguments of the North Vietnam to persuade their 
people to accept their way of war run as follow. The Vietnamese \\'ar against 
America is a just war to save the country, aiming at achieving the goal of national 
reunification and self-detem1ination. To fulfil the just cause, using \'iolent forces is 
the last resort. In the war, Vietnam did not ha\'e any other choice except fought by 
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the force of the whole nation under the motto of "everyone is a soldier". This is 
because the asymmetry in power of Vietnam and America. Moreover, this way of 
war is also an age old tradition of Vietnam in fighting against stronger foreign 
invaders in the past. 
6.2 Civilian mobilisation in the Vietnam War 
6.2.1 The importance of civilian mobilization in the North Vietnam's 
military strategy during the Vietnam War. 
The North Vietnam's cause is just, its way of war is the only viable choice and 
it is inherited from age-old tradition. However, this cannot remove the fact that 
North Vietnam's way of war put its own civilian people at risk. The civilian 
population might agree with the just cause to fight against America but they did not 
automatically support the armed forces. To win support from civilian population, 
People's Army of Vietnam laid special emphasis on the importance of civilian 
mobilization work. In the army, the Department of Civilian Mobilisation is in charge 
of the job of civilian mobilisation. This Department belongs to General Department 
of Politics. It is one of the most important departments in the General Department. It 
was established as early as in 1947, just three year after the formation of the 
People's Army of Vietnam. During the war. this department monitored, initiated 
policies to direct the issue of civilian mobilisation and propaganda of people's arm y 
units. 
The book "Some basic issues of the civilian mobili::ation in the people's 
armedforees" pointed out that: 
"Base on the class struggle point of view. mass point of view, violent re\'olution 
point of vie\\' and military and political guideline of our Party and base on the 
situation and tasks of our re\olution no\vadays. the armed forces' civilian 
- 260 -
mobilization works are very important. It pushes forward the Party' s mass 
mobilization in general and makes great contribution to the revolution. to the 
armed struggle, to our national defence and to building our armed force~. The 
civilian mobilization reflects the revolutionary nature and the good tradition of 
our army and show that the army is not only a fighting unit but also propaganda 
and producing unit. The civilian mobilization is also an important part of the 
political work of our armed forces. ( ..... ) 
We have to fully understand the role of civilian mobilization in the armed forces , 
regarding it a political task. an essential activity of the armed force~ and a 
political duty of every army officer. The VPA must carry out the ciyilian 
mobilization work properly. no matter how strong and modem it is, no matter 
where it fights domestically or internationally. The VP A must pay great 
attention to civilian mobilisation in any strategic area, in war as well as in peace. 
at front as well as at rear, when the revolution situation good or bad:' (Some 
basic issues of civilian mobilisation in people' s anned forces. 1971, p. 16-17) 
* Civilian mobilisation is vital to the slilTival of the armed (()rce. 
North Vietnamese leaders strongly stressed the importance of civilian 
mobilization because for the North Vietnamese armed forces to survive, not to 
mention to fight against such a powerful enemy like America, the support of civilian 
population is crucial. 
"People have been and will al\\ays be mother of the armed forces. People supply 
arn1ed forces with food, \vith cloth and also is a source of spiritual enhancement" 
(Some basic issues of civilian mobilisation in people's anned forces. 1971, p. 13) 
In the early phase of the war against America, the People's Army of Vietnam 
were still in short of many things. According to those I interviewed during my field 
trip to Vietnam, army units often had to rely on civilian for food supply for various 
reasons. For example, in preparation for any battle, soldiers were ordered to bring 
with them enough food for the whole length of the battle. Ho\\'e\'er. in many cases. 
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the actual fighting lasted longer than planned due to many unexpected problems. 
And this situation happened quite often in the war. In that case, the army unit then 
would not have enough food for its soldiers, especially for the wounded. In that 
case, usually the army had to rely on civilian nearby for food supply. Because in the 
condition of fighting, there were not enough soldiers to do the job of transporting 
food from the main headquarter to the battlefield. Even worst, if they were being 
circled by the enemy, they could not go out to get food. In that case, they totally 
depended on the local people for food. 
That is in the condition of fighting. In everyday life of soldiers, they also 
needed the support of civilian. Soldiers of People's Army of Vietnam, in the early 
phases of the war, usually lack of many things. especially cloth. There were not 
enough clothes, especially warm cloths, to supply to all army units. Soldiers usually 
helped themselves by exchanging less necessary armed equipment for cloth with 
civilian people. This support from people actually helped the army a lot in their 
everyday life. 
* Civilian mobilisation is crucial to the succes's of the strategr o{people 's 11'ar 
During the war against America the civilian support proved to be essential to 
North Vietnamese armed forces. As the Vietnam Communist Party adopted the 
strategy of people's war to fight against America forces, the first and foremost 
condition to carry out this war strategy was the support of wide civilian population. 
Without the support of wide range of people, North Vietnam could not implement 
the strategy of people's war. Civilian mobilisation made people understand the just 
cause of the war and the reasons why the strategy of people's war \\as adopted. 
Thus, civilian mobilisation helped the armed forces to \\'in the support of civilian 
population. 
- 262 -
The book "Some basic issue of the civilian mobilisation in the people's armed 
forces" wrote that 
"The Party's people's war strategy is to mobilize and ann all people. call upon 
them and encourage them to participate in anned uprising and carry out the 
revolutionary war. Not only the anned forces but also the whole population fight 
against enemy. People fight against enemy not only by pushing forward 
producing, helping anned forces. but also by direct participation in the war such as 
joining guerrilla warfare, political struggle and military proselytising. \V e attack 
the enemy by various means and methods." (1971, p.8) 
So, to implement that strategy, Party had to mobilize the whole population to 
build the wide political forces of the mass, and to build the armed forces with three 
types of forces bearing the main tasks of fighting the enemy. The party also needed 
to attach the armed forces with organized political forces of the mass, and the 
revolutionary forces of the whole nation. That is the only way to bring into full play 
the strength of the people's war. 
* Civilian mobilisation helped to build strong rear {or the armed {orces in the 
In the war against America, in order to ensure the success of people's \\ar 
strategy, North Vietnamese anned forces must rely on a strong rear. North Vietnam 
played the role of the great rear for the whole war, while in South Vietnam, in each 
area and battle, North Vietnam armed forces always sought to build a strong rear for 
their forces. Without a strong rear, both for the whole war and for each battle and 
area, the strategy of people's war could not achieve victory. 
North Vietnam hold that a strong rear is an important factor for the victory of 
the people's war. a source of recruitment and material for armed forces to fight 
- 263-
against enemy, and the political and moral support for the front. The stronger the 
rear, the bigger the victory in the front. 
In order to build a strong rear, North Vietnam armed forces must build 
political base and revolutionary force of the mass and push forward the people's 
revolutionary movement. North Vietnam armed forces also had to make people 
understand the just cause and support it voluntarily. The wide support of people was 
the strongest base. 
We can see that the army's civilian mobilization was extremely important to 
the survival and the victory of the North Vietnam People's Army in their people's 
war. The book "Some basic issue of the ch'ilian mobilisation in the people's armed 
forces" wrote that 
"The civilian mobilization of the people' s war is a part of the revolution in our 
country, it is a principal issue of building and strengthening the people's army in 
order to win the final victory in the war against America" ( 1971, p. 12). 
And then it pointed out that 
"Armed forces must do well with civilian mobilization, they have to carry out this 
task wherever the ciyilian population exist. Also they need to develop the political 
force and struggle movement of the mass. All actiyities of re\olutionary armed 
forces must be in accordance with people's interest and for the people's interest. 
The anned forces must always rely on civilian population" (1971, p.13) 
During the war against America, the importance of the civilian mobilisation 
was proved in reality. At any turning point of the war, leaders of the People's Army 
of Vietnam always issued instructions to highlight the civilian mobilisation \\'ork. 
As early as 1959, just before the general uprising of people in the South 
Vietnam, the Am1\"s General Department of Politics, by the order of the ~orth 
Vietnamese Ministry of Defence issued an instruction no 13 leT -H on inten~i fying. 
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civilian mobilisation work. The instruction pointed out the shortcoming of ciyilian 
mobilization and then asked that the whole armed forces to strengthen the job of 
civilian mobilization in the following fields: 
1) Educate every member of e\'ery army unit of the importance of the civilian 
mobilisation. Army unit should encourage people to actively participate in the 
socialist work, especially to join co-operatives to increase the production, 
2) Mobilize people all over the country to support the struggle against Diem 
regime and to reunite the country. 
3) Push forward the propaganda campaign to make people acti\'ely participate in 
the cause of strengthening national defence, building the rear. Make people 
understand about the good nature of the army and believe in the strength of the 
armed forces. 
4) Regularly educate and monitor armed forces in realizing the discipline in 
relations with civilian, and lead by example in abiding by the party's line and 
laws of the state. (History of the Department of Civilian Mobilization, 2007, 
p.68). 
In December 1965, after America decided to bomb North Vietnam and sent 
their troops to bear direct fighting tasks in South Vietnam, Vietcong and North 
Vietnamese armed forces in the South of Vietnam were very concerned about 
whether they could fight American troops and how to fight them'? Many people 
doubted that the People's Army of Vietnam could fight against America armed 
forces. At that moment, the General Department of Politics issued the instructions 
No. 32CT -H to strengthen the civilian mobilization work in the new situation. In 
this instruction the General Department of Politics especially stressed the need to 
strengthen the solidarity between army and people. In yery harsh condition when 
the America introduced its troops to South Vietnam and its superior military 
technology and power together \\'ith the support of South Vietnam anny, the 
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People's Army of Vietnam needed to build and strengthen the confidence of general 
population to the final victory of Vietnam and showed them that People's Army of 
Vietnam could defeat American armed forces. In order to do so, firstly, the army 
needed to consolidate the solidarity between army and civilian population. (The 
Work of Civilian Mobilisation and Special Propaganda in Vietnam People's Army. 
2003, p.344) 
In 10/1968, after Tet offensive, the General Department of Politics, agam 
issued another instruction about promoting the civilian mobilization, strengthening 
the solidarity between civilian and army, promoting the army spirit to protect 
civilian and continue fighting against America. In this instruction. the General 
Department of Politics ordered that military units have to strengthen civilian 
mobilization works to help people clearly understand the party and the army's 
strategy and clearly distinguish between the enemy forces and our armed forces, 
make people be aware of the counter-propaganda campaign of the enemy. (The 
Work of Civilian Mobilisation and Special Propaganda in People' s Army of 
Vietnam, 2003, p.354) 
In November 1974, in order to prepare for the last campaign to end the war, 
the General Department of Politics issued an instruction No.16/CT -H on 
strengthening the relationship and solidarity between civilian and armed forces. 
(The Work of Civilian Mobilisation and Special Propaganda in Vietnam People' s 
Army, 2003, p.381) 
We can see that in any turning point of the war, the civilian mobilization was 
always emphasized. The North Vietnamese military leaders always paid great 
attention to strengthening the solidarity between anny and people. making people 
understand the armis strategy and encourage them to support the army. Ci\'ilian 
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mobilization was highly appreciated in the North Vietnam's military strategy in the 
war against America. 
During the war against America, following these instructions" People" s Army 
of Vietnam implemented the civilian mobilization not only to general population but 
also to families and relatives of soldiers in the armed forces of Republic of Vietnam. 
North Vietnam army officers went to houses of soldiers serving in Republic of 
Vietnam"s army, carried out propaganda with their wives, their parents and asked 
these people to call and advise their husband, their sons not to cooperate with South 
Vietnam government and come home. In order to get the cooperation from families 
and relatives of South Vietnamese soldiers, North Vietnam armed forces must do 
the work of civilian mobilization very well. For the success of military 
proselytizing, the civilian mobilization must success first. In 1973, the civilian 
mobilization department of Vietnamese people"s army had a series of papers 
highlighting the importance of military proselytising and that the military 
proselytising is actually the civilian mobilization. For example, in his paper. Vo Van 
Thoi a researcher at the Department noted that 
"The real work of military proselytising is the civilian mobilization, the 
revolutionary mobilisation of the mass leading to stronger cooperation of 
workers, fanners and soldiers" (History of the Department of civilian 
mobilisation, 2007, p.506) 
6.2.2 The aims of civilian mobilisation work 
The importance of the civilian mobilisation work IS also reflected In its 
purposes set by the leaders ofPeople"s Army of Vietnam as follow. 
First~r. the civilian mobilization must make general population understand the 
plot of the enemy and enable them to distinguish the people"s revolutionary am1ed 
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force from the enemy's armed forces. Then, the civilian mobilization work should 
make civilian popUlation feel a vindictive hatred for the enemy and increase the 
people's tradition of patriotism. Civilian mobilisation work must make people aware 
of the real face of the America and South Vietnam government. The ciYilian 
mobilisation work must make people understand that American came to Vietnam 
was to subjugate Vietnam under the neo-colonialism. The America stripped the 
independence off the Vietnamese people and blocked the process of the country 
reunification. The South Vietnam government and its armed forces were the lackey 
of the America. It was a corrupted government and was not able to stand on its own. 
The civilian mobilisation must get people understand this and gradually won the 
support for the just cause of the North Vietnam. The book of "HistOlY 01 
Vietnamese people's army" wrote that 
"The intention of America was to smash the revolution in Vietnam, permanently 
divide our country, contain the Communism in Indochina and South East Asia and 
threaten socialist countries" (History of Vietnamese people's army, 2003, p.233). 
The book "Some basic issues of the ci1'ilian mobilisation in the people's 
armedforees " wrote that 
"Our people is very heroic, our nation has tradition of h'Teat patriotism and 
solidarity, The people's armed forces must carry out the civilian mobilization 
work in order to enrich and strengthen that re\olutionary attitude and great 
tradition of our people, because people is the base and the source of the strength of 
the army to fight against any enemy" (Some basic issues .... , 1971, p.19) 
Seeolld~1'. the civilian mobilization must be carried out properly to mcrease 
solidarity between civilian and armed forces, making ciyilian population 100"e their 
arn1ed forces and support them to fight against foreign aggressors. If the anny only 
focused on its military tasks, separated from civilian mobilization tasks, it would not 
- 268-
be able to bring into full play the strength of the whole nation. thus limit the general 
strength of the army itself, and then eventually it would fail to fulfil its own military 
tasks assigned by the Party. 
The civilian mobilisation work of the armed forces must contrast the bad 
image of the enemy with the good image of the people's army. The People's Aml: 
of Vietnam is the army of the people, for the people. The army fight enemy is to 
save the normal life of the people. The people"s army fight against enemy is for the 
people not for anything else. The work of civilian mobilisation must make people 
understand the good nature of the army, thus increase the solidarity between army 
and people. The book of "Some basic issues of the cirilian mobilisation in the 
people's armedforees " wrote that 
"The army is of the people and for the people. The army have very good tradition 
and nature. The army fight against enemy bravely. The army is very well-
disciplined. In relations to the people, the army is al\\ays ver) polite and fair" 
(Some basic issues of the civilian mobilisation in the people's armed forces. 1971, 
p.52). 
The book "Civilian mobilisation - textbook for army and reserl'e .forces .. 
wrote that 
"Civilian mobilization works must strengthen and increase the military-civilian 
solidarity as "fish and water", making that solidarity become a good tradition of 
our anny. helping the anny to fulfil successfully their tasks"( Civilian 
mobilisation- text book for army and reserve forces, 1968, p.6). 
Third~y. the civilian mobilization is to win back the support of the part of 
population being deceived and enticed to follow the enemy. thus increase the 
strength of revolutionary and at the same time decrease the strength of the enemy. 
North Vietnam believed that a part of civilian population \\'ere terrorised and 
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provided with wrong information so they followed the enemy. The job of civilian 
mobilization of the armed forces is not only to mobilize ordinary people but also to 
make people who had wrongly believed in and followed the enemy, understand the 
just cause of people's army and win back their support. 
The book "Winning back the people" wrote that 
"Nowadays, there is a part of civilian population living under enemy regime. 
Every day they are terrorized, deceived and propagandized wrongly, thus they 
misunderstand the just cause of our nation and follow the enemy and work for 
them. That means the enemy takes that part of population from us, and use them 
to strike against our people's anny. So our task is to seize back that part of 
population in the hand of enemy and to unite them with other part of population 
to fight and win against enemy. (Winning back the people, 1958, p.2) 
The book also pointed out clearly that 
"The more we win back the support from people in the hand of enemy, the bigger 
the victory of our armed forces. The quicker we win back the support from people 
in the hand of the enemy, the quicker we come to victory" (p.2) 
So from the specific revolutionary situation in Vietnam, as well as the strategy 
of people's war. the civilian mobilization became an essential part in the 
revolutionary strategy of North Vietnam. North Vietnam had to rely on the support 
of civilian population to carry out its military strategy and win the war. Otherwise. if 
it failed to win people' s support. it would not be able to survive, not to mention to 
fight the enemy. 
6.2.3 The content of civilian mobilisation work 
Fully realized the role of civilian mobilisation in their war strategy. 
Vietnamese people's army leaders pointed out \yhat eyery military unit has to do in 
civilian mobilisation work as follow: Fully abide by the Army's twehe disciplines 
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in relations with civilian people; Protect and help people; Support and help local 
organization; Carry out propaganda to people 
* Fully abide b)' the Arm)' 's twelve disciplines in relations 11'ith cirilia}] people 
Army's Twelve Disciplines in relations with civilian were promulgated since 
very early days of Vietnam People's Army. The Twelve Disciplines are the standard 
that every army officer or soldier must observe in the relations with people. After 
several times of changes, the Twelve Disciplines in relations with people are: 
1) Never steal anything, even the needle and thread, from people; 2) Purchasing 
with people must be fair: 3) Asking for pennission before borrowing anything 
from people, returning to people after use, compensating if break or lost; 4) No 
pestering people when stay at their houses, keep people's house and garden clean 
and tidy; 5) Strictly obeying the ethnic policy, respect for the freedom of belief 
and local people's customs and manners; 6) Closely uniting with people, respect 
the old, love children and polite toward woman; 7) No intimidate or abuse 
people; 8) Protecting facilities of the collective and state; 9) Uniting, respecting 
and supporting organizations of local people, local party branches and local 
anned forces: 10) Making example of following the guidelines, policy of the 
Party and laws of the State; 11) Actively doing propaganda, mobilising and 
helping people to carry out the guidelines, policy of the Party and laws of the 
State; 12) Keeping the anny's secrets and mobilising people to keep the state's 
and army's secrets. (History of Department of Civilian Mobilisation, 2007, pAS). 
Vietnamese people's army consider these disciplines as the foundation of their 
relations toward civilian population and it is the responsibility of every member of 
People's Army of Vietnam to fully understand and seriously abide by these 
disciplines. People's Amly of Vietnam hold that these disciplines make the 
difference betv,/een Vietnamese people's army and the army of the South Vietnam's 
and America. 
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The book "Some basic Issues of the dvilian mobilisation work in people's 
armed jorces ., wrote that 
'"The army's twelve disciplines in relations with people are the basic disciplines 
regulate the relations between armed forces with people and other re\'olutionary 
organizations. The disciplines reflect the revolutionary nature of our armed 
forces. These disciplines are a crucial part of military discipline and ensure the 
solidarity between military and civilian population ..... 
These disciplines also reflect the ethical criteria of the armed forces. the virtue of 
revolutionary people and the duty of communist which is \vritten in the 
Communist Party regulations" (Some basics issues ..... 1971. p.35) 
The book "Civilian mobilisation- text book jar army and reselTed forces" 
wrote that 
'"The twelve disciplines in relations with people reflect the good nature of our 
armed forces, those disciplines also highlight the basic difference between our 
army and the enemy's army. These disciplines would make people to love. to 
believe and to support our armed force and to implement the party's revolutionary 
tasks" (Civilian mobilisation .... , 1968, p.9) 
People's Army of Vietnam fully understands the importance of following 
these disciplines, especially in the condition of the war against America. Because 
they know that in the war against such a strong and powerful enemy like America. 
winning support from wide range of civilian population is crucial. The North 
Vietnam's military strength cannot be compared with America's. So the only way to 
fight against America is to combine the strength of armed forces and ci\ilian. in 
other word, the combination of the strength of the whole nation. In that situation, 
every armed force member must follow the disciplines in relations with people to 
win their support. 
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The book "Civilian mobilisation- text book for arml' and reselTed forces" 
wrote that 
"Nowadays in the war against America to save our country, any attitude. action of 
any military personnel in relations with people has great political significance. In 
any event, each soldier must be alive to and act according to t\\'elw rule~ in 
relations with people. The more difficult and hash the situation and area are, the 
more seriously the soldiers must abide by these rules. The soldiers must ah\'ays act 
accordingly to show the good nature of our armed forces, thus to strengthen the 
military-civilian solidarity and win the civilian support. (Civilian mobilisation .. ". 
1968, p.9). 
The book continue that 
"During march, operation, station or in battle, any dangerous situation broke out, 
the army must try their best to protect people even if they must accept harm to 
themselves. When operate in rural or urban areas which are recently liberated, 
armed forces must follow the rule and regulations of the liberated area. When 
operated in religious or ethnic minority area, armed forces must respect people's 
belief, their manners and customs. 
The army must not take the advantage of the dangerous situation, or fighting 
situation, or the prestige of the army, or the people's good feeling toward arm). to 
disregard the local authorities, violate local people' custom and manners. or cause 
hann to life of ordinary people." (Civilian mobilisation- text book for anny and 
reserved forces, 1968, p.10). 
So we can see that the twelve disciplines of the army in relations with people 
are very important in the North Vietnam People's Army's discipline. E,ery army 
personnel must fully understand and act according to these rules in any case. In the 
dangerous situation, the aIm)' must accept danger to themsel,es to protect people's 
liyes and materials. 
* Help and protect people 
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North Vietnam anned forces not only have to fully abide by the twelye 
disciplines in relations with people but also have to actiYely help and protect people 
against enemy both in front as well as at rear. The tasks of the people's armed forces 
are not only fighting against enemy but also to help people and protect people, 
because eventually fighting enemy is also to ensure the happiness for the people. 
The Department of Civilian Mobilisation stated that 
"Helping people is a good nature and tradition of our army. B: acting 
accordingly and helping people enthusiastically, the armed forces will be loved 
by people. The people will believe in the Party's military line. This would create 
favourable condition for the propaganda work, and the people will support the 
army more and more in fighting the enemy. Helping people also contribute to 
building and strengthening the great rear for the army to fight in the front. 
(History of the department of civilian mobilisation, 2007, p.l 0). 
The anny's General Department of Politics requested that 
"In order to carry out the job of mobilization in the front well, armed forces 
should be educated that protecting and helping people are as important as 
fighting enemy. Each army unit must have plan to carry out the civilian 
mobilization in every battle, ensuring that soldiers understand and consciously 
implement the work of civilian mobilization." (Instruction to the Department of 
civilian mobilisation, :21/511966) 
The book "Some basic issues of cirilian mobilisation in the people's armed 
forces ., pointed out what need to be done in the front to help and protect people 
1) Fighting must go hand in hand with protecting people and winning back 
people's support. Army should support people in their effort to demolish enemy 
base and station. encourage them to kill enemy and create favourable condition for 
the mass to rise and struggle for the self-determination right and help the mass's 
guerrilla forces to develop. 
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2) Help and guide people in everyday life to ayoid destruction of enemy strike. 
help people to reduce the consequences of the war. At the same time. mobilize 
people to fight against enemy operation and recruitment. Cooperate with local 
security forces to search and destroy the enemy's special forces, agent to protect 
local people. 
3) In fighting, army must choose the way to minimize the harm to people both in 
term of materials and lives. Army must try their best to protect people's lives 
during operation, station or fighting. (Some basics issues of ciyilian mobilisation 
in the people' s armed forces, 1971, pA5). 
The book "Civilian mobilisation- text book for army and reserved forces .. 
mentioned what need to be done to help people at rear 
In the field of politics, the army must help local people authorities in the 
propaganda effort to make people fully understand the revolutionary line, and the 
line of fighting against America to save the country. The army also need to help 
local authorities to develop local political base, organize the mass and strengthen the 
mass movement. 
In the fields of military, the army must help local people: Guide and help 
people in improving and strengthening local people's armed forces; Guide and help 
people's self-defence forces, guerrilla forces in their training and other tasks. 
Cooperate with these forces to search and destroy enemy's Special Forces and agent 
operating in local area; Guide and help local people and local armed forces to make 
and use primitive weapons against enemy, to build village into fighting base and to 
clear and deactivate mine; Help the youth and self-defence forces to get used to 
military life, so create the source for future recruitment. 
In the field of economics, the army must promote the propaganda and help 
people in fam1ing work to produce more food. The army can help people in seeding. 
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harvesting, ploughing etc. ; In case of natural calamity, army must help people to 
overcome quickly and return to their ordinary lives. If necessary, army must share 
food with local people. 
In the field of culture, the armed forces must actively participate in local 
people cultural activities in order to build good image of the armed forces and good 
relations with people (Civilian mobilisation-textbook for army and resen'ed force, 
1968). 
* Support and help local people 's organi~alioJ1s 
Local authorities and organizations are the tools of the communist party to 
implement and realize the Party's policies and instructions, to achieve the goal of 
bringing happiness to people. The army is a violent organization of the Party to 
protect the party and to ensure that the party's policies and instructions are carried 
out correctly. So, the army must support the local organization to make them as 
strong as possible. The party's policies and instructions cannot be implemented 
effectively and correctly if the local authorities and organizations are weak. Thus, 
eventually the people's everyday lives will be badly affected. On the other hand, if 
the paIiy's policies and instructions are realized correctly, people's living standard 
will be improved and they would support the party and the army. Especially, people 
will understand and support the communist party's cause of national liberation and 
its military line in the war against America. 
The book "Some basic issues of civilian mobilisation in people"s armed 
forces ., wrote that 
"The party lead the revolution, implement the guideline. policies through local 
authority and mass union. So uniting with. respecting and supporting local 
party's committees. local authorities and mass organization are important 
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political tasks of our anny. Only when these organizations are strong. can the 
party's policies and resolutions be implemented correctly" (Some basic issues of 
civilian mobilisation in people's armed forces, 1971, p.38). 
Local authorities and mass organization are the reflection of the strength of 
local people. Vietnamese revolutionary strategy always base on mobilization of the 
strength of the whole population. The army have to help local authorities and mass 
organizations to develop the strength and also orient their strength in the direction 
which is useful for the revolution and for the party. The army must help local people 
and the local authorities to build a strong rear for them to be able to focus on 
fighting task in the front. 
"The strength of the mass not only come from individual person, but also 
come from the organizations. Only when the mass organizations are strong. 
can they bring the strength of people into full play. Then, only when the mass 
organizations are strong, can they support the revolution the best." (Some 
basic issues of civilian mobilization in the people's anny. 1971, pA3). 
So the army helped and supported local and mass organizations to de\l~lop 
power of the mass and make full use of the power for the party's strategy in general 
and the armed forces military strategy in particular. The army must consider helping 
and supporting local authorities and mass organizations as an important political 
task. 
* Actively propagandi:.e and mobili:.e people to support re1'olution 
In civilian mobilization work, People's Army of Vietnam paid special 
attention to propaganda. The book "Civilian mobilisation- text book fiJ,. army and 
reserved forces" wrote that 
"Doing propaganda toward people contributes to enlightening people with 
revolutionary strategy. making people consciously follow the party's line and 
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detenninedly support the anned forces to fight against enemy and to save the 
country. (Civilian mobilisation- text book for anny and reserved forces. 1968. 
p.10) 
The book "HistOlY of the department of civilian mobilisation" point out the 
following area of the propaganda work: 
1) Propagandize and enlighten people with revolutionary strategy and mobilize 
people for anned fighting against enemy 
2) The first and foremost aim of propaganda is to help people fully understand 
the true interest of the nation; clearly determine who is enemy and who is friend; 
fully understand the revolutionary situation, the strategy and the party' s 
detennination of fighting; understand the need of solidarity with anny to fight 
against enemy and understand properly the way of fighting. 
3) The anny should also regularly strengthen the people's confidence in final 
victory of the revolution and show the people the good experience of fighting 
and help the mass to understand the enemy's \\ay of \\ar, thus base on that the) 
can find out their own suitable way of war. 
4) Encourage people to participate actively in implementing party's militar) 
tasks and take up anns to fight against enemy to save the country. Only when 
people consciously and voluntarily fight against enemy. can the people's war be 
successful because at that moment the people are fully understand their role, 
their enemy and the way to defeat the enemy, thus the movement of the whole 
nation fight against enemy can spread in the whole country. 
5) The anny also have to guide people how to fight enemy from its own 
experience. The anny must show the people that they can fight the enemy 
effectively by real example so that they can enhance the people's confidence to 
fight enemy. The anny also have to pay attention to combining their 
conventional fighting with people's guerrilla war. helping to develop guerrilla 
war when necessary. 
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6) Propagandize and mobilize people to follow party's policy and the la\\ s. The 
army must be an example in following party's policy and abiding by laws. When 
people do not understand clearly the party's policy or instruction, army must 
cooperate with local organization and carry out propaganda to make people 
understand. The army rely on the support of civilian a lot also it means that thev 
have a lot of time in contact with civilian thus they must learn how to do 
propaganda properly and effectively. Also, the army should know that their 
activities and attitude toward people had great significance. If they lead by 
example, people would follow them voluntarily. 
7) Propagandize about the nature and the tradition of the people's armed forces. 
Generally, people's army received much good feeling from people and people 
always care for the army's activities. The anny must show to people their good 
nature and tradition, so that they received more 100e and support from people. 
(History of the department of civilian mobilisation, 2007, p.47) 
6.2.4 Critics of shortcoming in the civilian mobilisation work 
Considering civilian mobilisation was an important job, the People's Army of 
Vietnam not only pointed out what needed to be done to win support from people 
but also stated what needed to avoid or in other word, the "don'ts" in the civilian 
mobilisation work. According to the Department of Civilian Mobilisation of 
People's Army of Vietnam, following are the most popular shortcoming in civilian 
mobilisation work. 
The most popular mistake committed by armed force was causmg loss to 
people's property. During their march, soldiers, intentionally or unintentionally, 
destroy people's fa1111. When people complain, the army unit not only not 
compensate for them, but argue that their military affairs are more important than 
the fan11s, thus, people should not complain about the loss. They consider the fann 
loss as a contribution to the military affairs. Or during their duty, soldiers stay in 
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people's house, using their food without thanking them. When people complain, 
soldiers argued that because of the emergency of military tasks, soldiers ha\·e the 
right to stay and eat in the house of civilian. And people should be willing to 
welcome soldiers as they are doing their job to defence the country. 
Another mistake of the anned forces was borrowing properties of people but 
not return. For example, soldier borrow people's door to make bed in their barrack, 
or use the door to bury their comrade and do not return. Or soldiers borrow fanning 
tools from people during their stay in or near the village, but when they leave to 
other place they bring these tools with them and not return or compensate to people. 
(History of the Department of Civilian Mobilisation, 2007, p.220). 
These are very common mistakes committed by many military units and there 
are a lot of complaints from people about these mistakes. 
The book "Winning back people" pointed out these specific mistakes and 
recommend that leaders of every anny unit should ask their soldier to avoid these. 
The book stated that 
'"If we do not correct these mistakes, people will be unwilling to welcome our 
anned force, though they will still help the army. This would hann the solidarity 
between anny and people. Thus, when the enemy come, it provides people with 
wrong infonnation about our anny and carry out counter propaganda against our 
anny, the people will gradually lose their love and belief in our anned forces and 
then eventually they would change to support the enemy. If this scenario happen 
widely, we win finally lose the war" (Winning back people. 1958. p.5) 
Another important point is that the people's army should never neglect the 
task of protecting civilian population. If people were left unprotected, the enemy 
would frighten and terrorize them and the enemy would force people to follmv them 
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and \vork for them. Thus. Vietnam People's Army will lose people, and get weaker 
and weaker. 
The book "Winning back people" wrote that 
"Many military unit mobilize people to fight against enemy, after wmmng a 
specific battle, they go to other area. Then when the enemy go back to the \'illage. 
our armed forces had gone already and the ci\'ilian population were left 
unprotected against the enemy. The people would be terrorised, jail, e\'en 
tortured .... After sewral times like that the people will be wry reluctant to help 
our armed forces because they are afraid of being left unprotected again. 
Gradually, our armed force lost more and more support from people. (Winning 
back people, 1958, p.6) 
In some areas, armed forces did not pay proper attention to propaganda and 
mobilizing people who were forced to work for the enemy. Not c\crybody who 
worked for the enemy is the same. There are people actively cooperate and follow 
the enemy to go against the interest of our people. However, there are also people 
forced to work and cooperate with the enemy. People's Army of Vietnam asked 
their army unit not to treat every enemy personnel the same. The army should fight 
against those who actively work for enemy and should try to win back the support of 
those who were unwilling and forced to work for the enemy. The book .. Winning 
back people ., criticized some military units of the following mistakes: 
1) Some military units did not pay proper attention to explaining and 
propagandizing the tolerance policy of P A VN toward captured enemy combatant 
or the surrendered. This would cause members of enemy not understands our 
tolerance policy, so we could not encourage them to surrender more. 
2) Some military units did not care for the wounded enemy soldiers captured in 
the battle field. So \\'hen these soldiers get \\'elL they went back to their \'lllage 
and spread the bad story about our anny, And they would encourage people not 
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to follow our anny. This would cause a lot of difficulties for us in doing 
propaganda and winning support from the people. (Winning back people, 1958. 
p.15). 
6.2.5 How North Vietnam get the civilian mobilisation work done? 
Fully aware of the importance of the civilian mobilisation works in the 
strategy of people's war and the role of armed forces in carrying out the job, P A VN 
leaders managed to find many methods to do this job effectively. 
First of all, P A VN leaders used the North Vietnam's propaganda machine to 
do civilian mobilisation. During the war against America, they mostly used radio 
which was considered to be the most convenient means to do propaganda. The 
Department of Civilian Mobilisation, of General Departments of Politics is 
responsible for running the civilian mobilisation programs on the radio. 
In the program called "North-So lith Connection" which was broadcasted 15 
minutes every day, the Department composed many short stories, songs, short drama 
etc. about the good tradition of People' s Army Vietnam, the solidarity between 
military and people. This program was broadcasted steadily until the end of the war, 
and when the war grew fiercer, its broadcasting time was increased up to 30 minutes 
every day. 
Besides this program, there was a program called "Finding relatives throllgh 
radio" for people to find and inform their relatives. This program was very useful 
for those who have their families back in the South but they themselves regrouped in 
the North after the Geneva accord. The Department of Civilian Mobilisation 
collected letters from soldiers and other officers now in the North to broadcast to the 
South to infom1 their families in the South. During the broadcasting time. they 
usually added some propaganda information about the good society in the ~or1h 
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Vietnam. Also, members of Department of Civilian Mobilisation in the South, came 
to houses of soldiers who currently regrouped in the North to inform their family 
members and collected the letters to send to their loved ones in the North. Through 
these jobs, they also did the propaganda work, and gradually won support from this 
group of people. These families would more likely to support the Viet Cong or 
People's Army of Vietnam. 
The propaganda job of Department of Civilian Mobilisation on the radio was 
very effective and it was highly appreciated by the General Department of Politics. 
Besides using propaganda machine for the purpose of civilian mobilisation, 
P A VN also paid very much attention to mobilizing people by their concrete act and 
attitude. Every army unit had to implement civilian mobilization. It was a part of 
everyday training of the army. 
From my interviews with the veterans in the war. I learnt that the army, on 
their long way march, if they arrived at a forest at night they spent the night in the 
forest. However, if they came to a village at night, they spent the night in village. 
Generally each group of 3-5 soldiers stayed in one civilian' s house. During their 
stay, soldiers did not take the food from the host family but they cooked for 
themselves. Sometime they ate together with the host, sometimes they ate 
separately. Normally, when leaving, soldiers paid a small amount of money to the 
host for the fuel, space .... However, when the war got more and more fierce. soldiers 
usually stayed in civilian people's house for very short time (usually one or two 
nights), and the host then did not receive money from soldiers. 
If their stay in the village was short (less than a week), soldiers usually helped 
the host family with some common jobs like farn1ing, gardening, harvesting. rooting 
etc. Everyday soldiers had to help the host in cleaning and tidying up the house. 
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doing garden work etc. These concrete activities helped civilian people understand 
more about the army and the military life, and then they gradually loved and 
supported the people's army when necessary. 
If the army intended to station near a village, soldiers usually stayed in civilian 
houses for some time before they could build their own barracks. When they stayed 
in a village for more than a week, besides helping people with the ordinary jobs as 
mentioned above, the military unit usually helped local organizations with such jobs 
as road building, house building, militia training etc. During the soldiers' stay, there 
were always some activities, joint organized by the army unit and the local 
authorities. These activities helped two sides know more about each other and 
increased the sympathy from the people toward the army. Even when the military 
unit finished building their own barracks and soldiers moved to live in their 
barracks, everyone or two weeks, soldiers were asked to visit their host families to 
see whether they needed any help. This strengthened the relations between the 
military unit and the civilian people. Even in some case, when the military unit 
moved to different area already, but they still kept contact to the village they used to 
live. When this army unit went, next units would come. And everything was being 
repeated. 
By doing the mobilization work through everyday contact and help people, the 
army won the hearts and minds of the people and they got the support from them. 
Thus the solidarity between civilian and military was increased and strengthened. 
That was the way Vietnamese People's Army carry out their civilian 
mobilization when there was no fighting. Generally the aim of the army \\JS to \\in 
the suppOli from wide range of people and strengthen the military-civilian solidarity. 
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During the fighting, anny tried to protect people and minimize the loss to 
civilian population. This was one of the most important requests of the civilian 
mobilization work. 
In planning for any battle, the people's ann\' usually considered the factor of 
. . 
civilian population living nearby. In any battle plan, the first part was always about 
general situation of the battle which includes the terrain, the area, the local 
people .... Although the local civilian population was not the decisive factor to decide 
how the battle would be fought, it was a considering factor. For example, the battle 
plan of Thuong Duc battle wrote that 
"Thuong Duc was liberated area, though enemy manage to control the region, 
we have a lot of active agent in this area. People in Thuong Due belong to many 
different parties, religions, classes however most of them have good sympathy to 
our Communist party. We should not let the battle harm everyday life of local 
people, if possible. (A summary of military campaign in the resistant war against 
America 1954-1975, p.44). 
Or another example, the plan of battle Lang Vay-Khe Sanh wrote that 
"Local people, being sympathy to people's armed forces, did not cooperate with 
South Vietnam's army. Local people were forced to live in strategic hamlets, 
thus they could not provide us with information about enemy. The battle should 
be fought to liberate the area and destroy the strategic hamlet"". (A summary of 
military campaign in the resistant war against America 1954-1975, p. 62) 
In actual fighting, North Vietnam's People's Ann)' followed strict rule of 
engagement that: 1) Remove civilian out of battle field before fighting start, 2) 
During fighting, try at best to protect civilian and minimize civilian lives and assets. 
These rules of engagement are consistent throughout the North Vietnam's military 
operations during the war. The rules are applied in different battles v,:ith ditTerent 
tactics such as defensive. offensive, ambush etc. as noted in examples in chapter V. 
- 285-
This chapter has presented the North Vietnam' s perspective on the cause and 
the justness of its war against America. In the North Vietnam' s point of vie\\'. the 
war was caused by America's ignorance of the legitimate Vietnamese aspiration, i.e. 
the right of self-determination and the right to independence and integrity. It \\'as the 
America who caused the war. North Vietnam did not want the war because it was 
fully aware of the power of American armed forces and did not want to have to 
encounter that armed forces in South Vietnam. So using military forces \\'as the last 
resort of the North Vietnam leadership. North Vietnam strongly believed that its war 
against America was just. The cause of the war was to fulfil the legitimate aspiration 
of Vietnamese people. With that firm belief in its just cause, North Vietnam carried 
out the war. As its strategy was people's war, North Vietnam paid great attention to 
winning support of the civilian population. The support of civilian population was 
crucial for People's Army of Vietnam both in terms of survival and in terms of 
successfully carrying out the war strategy. The job of winning support from civilian 
was entrusted to the P A VN' s Department of Civilian Mobilisation. Winning the 
support of civilian was the everyday works of any army unit. In the fighting, the 
army had to try its best to protect civilian's life and assets, even if soldiers had to 
accept more harm to themselves. 
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Chapter VII: Conclusion and the implications of the research 
about Vietnam War and the law of war 
7.1 Conclusion 
The Vietnam War. or the "Resistant war against America to save the country" 
as literally translated from Vietnamese, was the longest war that America committed 
outside the country in the 20th century. This war. which arguably had the most 
impact on public opinion of the West during the Cold War period. is "one of the 
wars best documented" (DeGroots, 2002, p.2). However, as many scholars noticed. 
there is an imbalance in the literature about the war. While literature about the 
America experience in the war is extensive, Western literature about the other side 
of the war, i.e. the Vietnamese side, is not appropriate. Moreover, the gap in 
literature continues to widen as the United States is currently involving in the wars 
in Iraq and in Afghanistan, more and more scholars look back to the Vietnam 
experience to draw lessons or analogy for the contemporary wars. The research 
about Vietnam War and the laws of war, which focuses on the North Vietnam's 
compliance with the laws of war, its rule of engagement and its way to win support 
from civilian population, aims at increasing the understanding about the war on 
Vietnamese side. 
The research confirms the hypothesis that North Vietnam's military strategy 
was not consistent with the basic principles of the laws of war, but it was not 
unrestrained and North Vietnam had its own rule of engagement to win and 
maintain support of civilian population. 
As noted in the chapter I Introduction, the first part of research question \\"a~ 
whether North Vietnam complied \vith the laws of \var in its \\"ar against America. 
chapter IV and V shows us that North Vietnam's military strategy was not 
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fonnulated out of the fidelity of the laws of war. International humanitarian laws 
played no important part in the strategy making process in North Vietnam. 
North Vietnam's military strategy is inherited from its ancestors in the long 
history of fighting against foreign invaders, who were usually \"ery much stronger 
than Vietnamese national forces. From the history of frequent struggles against 
enemies, Vietnamese people fonnulated their own way of war for the weak against 
the strong. Their way of war is "everyone is a soldier" and "the whole nation joining 
forces" to fight against foreign aggression. 
In the modern time, under the influence of Marxism- Leninism, the North 
Vietnam's military doctrine is the combination of the tradition and Marxist-Leninist 
military thoughts. Marxism pointed out that in class struggle, to achieve the end of 
proletariat's victory, any means is acceptable. As Engels \'.Tote that 
"A people eager to wrest back independence should not confine themselves to 
routine modes of war prosecution. Mass insurrection, revolutionary warfare, 
ubiquitous guerrilla detachment. such is the only method which makes it possible 
for a small nation to beat a bigger one, a weaker anny to resist a stronger and 
better organized one" (Cited in Vo Nguyen Giap, I 977a, p.291). 
When discussing the justice of the war, Lenin wrote that 
"There are just and unjust wars, progressive and reactionary wars, wars waged b: 
advanced classes and wars waged by backward classes. \\'ars waged for the 
purpose of perpetuating class oppression and wars waged for the purpose of 
eliminating oppression. Reactionary, aggressive wars cannot be just, and unjust 
wars retard historical progress. Just wars have progressive aims. The political 
content of a just war is to liberate a people from oppression and exploitation. 
which hold back socio-economic development" (Lenin Collected \\"orks. Vol. 29. 
p.343). 
Inhel;ted from the tradition of .. the \,"hole nation joining forces" to fight 
against foreign enemy and influenced by the Marxist-Leninist military thoughts. 
- 288 -
North Vietnam's military strategy was not consistent with the basic principles of the 
laws of war. For example, the most central principle of distinction bet\\"een 
combatants and non-combatants in the laws of war was not respected. On the 
contrary everyone is encouraged to participate in the war effort to fight against 
enemy. People not only produced necessaries, supplied soldiers with food, shelter, 
helped the wounded in the battle field, carried out logistical work and other chores 
but also participated in actual fighting. 
The second part of the research question is that if basic principle of the laws of 
war were not respected, did North Vietnam follow any rule of engagement and how 
did it win support from civilian population. Chapter V & VI of the thesis show that 
North Vietnam had its own rule of engagement in relations with civilian in everyday 
contact as well as at the time of fighting to protect civilian and minimize civilian 
casualties and that North Vietnam paid great attention to winning and maintaining 
support from civilian population. 
North Vietnam's inconsistence with the basic principles of the law of war does 
not mean that People's Army of Vietnam was unrestrained. PA VN had its own strict 
rule of engagement. In everyday life, P A VN soldiers must abide by such rules as 
Ten Swears, Twelve Disciplines in relations with people etc. These rules of 
engagement were consistent throughout the war and are still now valid in the 
PA VN. In fighting, North Vietnam army paid great attention to protecting ordinary 
people's lives and assets even if soldiers must accept more harm to themselves. 
P A VN tried to minimize civilian casualties by sending civilian supporters out of the 
battlefield before the battle start, or taking into account of civilian li\"ing around in 
planning any battle, choosing the way of fighting with least damage to ci\"ilian etc. 
Given that North Vietnam's military strategy is Vietnamese style guerrilla 
warfare, winning support from civilian population is critical not only to their \ich)ry 
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but also to their own existence. Without civilian support, North Vietnamese armed 
forces were not able to survive, let alone to fight against such an enemy like 
America. So for their own existence, North Vietnam paid great attention to winning 
and maintaining the support from their people. 
To win the support from civilians, North Vietnam justified their way of war by 
the justness of their cause. North Vietnam argued that its cause of liberating and 
reuniting the country is just. Its war against America was a national liberation war. 
Thus, North Vietnam tried its best with anything at disposal to fulfil the just cause. 
And North Vietnam's way of war is inherited from its ancestors in the past with the 
long history of fighting against foreign invaders. And this is the only viable strategy 
for the weak against the strong. In other word, North Vietnam could not choose its 
way of fighting but there was only one option available- people's war- if it wanted 
to win the war and fulfil the just cause. We can see in the North Vietnam's 
justification that the jus ad bellum criteria override the jus in bello principles. 
To deliver these justifications and propaganda to civilian population, North 
Vietnam organized a Department of Civilian Mobilization, belonging to General 
Department of Politics of PA VN, to lead and supervise the job. The Department of 
Civilian Mobilization is a very important department in the General Department of 
Politics of North Vietnam People's Army. PA VN leaders requested that civilian 
mobilization is one of the everyday jobs of any army unit. The army, besides their 
fighting tasks, has political tasks of mobilizing the support of civilian population. 
Every army unit must implement the job of civilian mobilization whenever they 
contact with civilian population. With these organization and measures, during the 
war against America, North Vietnam could win and maintained support from wide 
range of people in the war. This support was crucial to the North Vietnam's tinal 
victory. 
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Answering the original question of how North Vietnam won the support of 
civilian population while their military strategy actually put the ciyilian liyes at risks 
clarifies one aspect in the North Vietnam war strategy that ha\e ne\'er been 
discussed in the Western literature before. This discussion by itself makes an 
original contribution to the Vietnam War literature. It contributes to lessening the 
imbalance between literature about the Vietnamese side and literature about 
America side in the war. By studying the Vietnamese strategy and tactics and its 
way to win support of civilian, the research makes the understanding about the war 
more balanced and to some extent help to understand the war in the American side 
more clearly. Moreover. studying North Vietnam's rule of engagement and its \\a) 
to win support from civilian also has implications for justification of the morality of 
North Vietnam's war against America, for judging America's morality in the \\ar 
and for the new lessons of Vietnam currently applied in America's wars of counter-
insurgency in Afghanistan and Iraq. 
7.2 Implications 
7.2.1 Implication for judging the morality of North Vietnam's war 
against America. 
The first implication of the research is that though North Vietnam's conduct in 
the war was not strictly consistent with the principles underpinning the la\\'s of war, 
its war against America can still be considered as just and moral. 
In terms of jus ad bellum, on balance North Vietnam's \\'ar \\'as just. As 
argued in chapter VI, North Vietnam government was legitimate authority. it got 
more support from Vietnamese people than South Vietnam goyernment. Using 
violent means to reunify the country was the last resort. North Vietnam had tried 
peaceful means but did not succeed. The cause of North Vietnam was just it was the 
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war for country reunification and self-detennination. This cause \\as proportionate 
to the war, given that Vietnamese people have strong sense of nationalism and when 
the war started, Vietnamese people had been living under foreign rule for centuries. 
In waging the war to reunify the country, North Vietnam had clear chance of 
success, and ultimately it won the war. Even though the war was not publicly 
declared, on balance it passed the criteria of jus ad bellum. 
In terms of jus in bello, though North Vietnam's conduct in the war \\as not 
strictly consistent with principles underpinning the laws of war, it was not 
unrestrained, it followed its own rule of engagement to protect civilian and 
minimize civilian casualties. As argued in chapter V & VI, in every day contact with 
civilian, People's Anny of Vietnam had to abide by the Ten Swear of People's 
Army, Twelve Disciplines in Relations with People etc. In fighting, North 
Vietnamese armed forces tried their best to protect civilian, minimize civilian 
casualties by such measures as sending civilian supporters out of battlefield before 
the battle begin, taking into account of the civilian living around in any battle 
planning etc. 
From the above arguments, on balance. North Vietnam's \\'ar against America 
can be considered as just. 
However, given that the war resulted in enonnous civilian casualties, there 
might be argument that North Vietnam's war was immoral. The Vietnam \\'ar did 
produce large number of civilian casualties, but these casualties cannot be blamed 
totally on North Vietnam or Vietnamese side of the war. If America did not 
intervene in Vietnam, it might not need a war for North Vietnam to reunify the 
country. Even if the war broke out between North and South Vietnam, and America 
did not help South Vietnam, the war would end very quickly and it would be much 
fewer civilian casualties. Richard Falk noted that 
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"If the war was allowed to reach an outcome on the basis of internal pia: of 
Vietnamese, or even South Vietnamese forces, there is little doubt that ~orth 
Vietnam and National Liberation Front would have long since succeeded. It IS 
the massive America military presence, including its great weapons superiority. 
that accentuates recourse to illegal practices by both sides" (1969, pA8S). 
So, America should bear much larger responsibility for the civilian casualties 
in the Vietnam War. Lawrence C. Petrowski shared this view. He recognized that 
not only America caused civilian casualties but North Vietnam and Vietcong also 
did. However, he noted that 
"It seems that the United States, in control of such maSSIve firepower and 
virtually unbeatable militarily speaking, would be bound to do much more than 
it has in preventing civilian casualties and destruction of civilian property in 
Vietnam, no matter what the actions of the enemy" (1969, p.499). 
So America's war in Vietnam was "doubly untenable" (Walzer, 2006). This 
point is closely related to the second implication of this research. 
7.2.2 Implication for judging the morality of American's war IU 
Vietnam. 
Studying North Vietnam's military strategy and its strategy to WIll support 
from civilian population can help to judge the morality of America's conduct in the 
war more accurately. 
In late 1960s, Paul Ramsey argued that America's war in Vietnam is morally 
justified. And it is not America, but North Vietnam's and Vietcong's armed forces 
should be blamed for the huge amount of civilian casualties. Ramsey argued that 
because North Vietnam's and Vietcong's armed forces did not distinguish 
themselves from civilians, thus they enlarged the legitimate targets and collateral 
damage that can be attacked by American am1ed forces. (Ramsey, 2002, p.504). 
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In late 1970s, Michael Walzer challenged this \iew of Paul Ramsey by the 
arguments that the Vietnam War is a war that "cannot be won and should not be 
won" (Walzer 2006. p.195). Walzer argued that the interminglement between North 
Vietnam and Vietcong armed forces reached the level called len!£' en mass£'. where 
guerrilla cannot be isolated from its people. The war right of the people were passed 
on to the guerrilla fighters. Thus the Vietnam War is no longer an anti-guerrilla war 
but it is an "anti-social war. a war against entire people" (Walzer. 2006, p.187). So 
the America's war in Vietnam is "doubly untenable" (Walzer. 2006, p.196). 
Michael Walzer's arguments based on the assumption that North Vietnam got 
support from their people for their military strategy. He himself stated that 
""The war right of the people would have were they rise en masse are passed on 
to the irregular fighters they support and protect- assuming that the support, at 
least, is voluntary". (Walzer, 2006, p.185). 
However. Michael Walzer himself did not investigate in details how North 
Vietnam and Vietcong won the support, let alone the voluntary support, from 
civilian. That is why Ang Chen Guan reasonably stated that 
"Too many premature judgments have been passed on America decision making 
and the conduct of the war without having given adequate consideration to 
understand how the war was actually perceived and conduct on the communist 
side" (Guan, 2003, p.2). 
My research helps to solve this gap in Walzer's arguments. My research points 
out the way North Vietnam got the support from wide range of population during its 
war against America. There was strong evidence that North Vietnam' s cause to 
reunify the country was just. North Vietnamese armed forces strictly abided by its 
rule of engagement during everyday contact with people and made strong effort to 
protect civilian lives and assets in the time of fighting. P A VN also established a 
specialized organization- the Department of Ciyilian Mobilisation- to carry out the 
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propaganda job and mobilize the support from civilian population. \Vith these 
strategies and measures, North Vietnam managed to win enough support for its 
armed forces to sustain and fight against such a powerful enemy like America. Thus 
the result of my research contributes to strengthening Michael Walzer's arguments 
and reaffirms that the America's war in Vietnam is the war "cannot be \\-on and 
should not be won". 
7.2.3 Implication for relearning the lessons of Vietnam- Petraeus 
Doctrine 
The third implication of the thesis is that the support of civilian population is 
crucial in winning an insurgent/counter-insurgent war. The thesis highlights that 
North Vietnam's armed forces won support from a substantial part of civilian 
population and thus was able to sustain and win the war against America c\'en 
though it was militarily weaker than America. This produces an important lesson for 
America: in order to win a counter-insurgency war, America must not let the 
insurgent forces to win support from people. America must focus its efforts in 
winning hearts and minds of people, care for people's lives and assets in its military 
operations. This is a main theme of Petraeus doctrine, currently applied in 
Afghanistan and Iraq. 
Before the America's involvement in Iraq in 2003, the lessons of Vietnam 
meant that the America should avoid getting involved in a long protracted insurgent 
war like the one in Vietnam. If they did enter the war, they must first satisfy a list of 
criteria which are very cautious. David Fitzgerald stated that "The lesson of 
Vietnam cautioned against any Army involvement in counter-insurgency" (2010, 
p.152). America's caution against involvement in long protracted \\ar is \\ell 
reflected in the Pmvell Doctrine. General Colin PO\\'ell, former Chaimlan of Joint 
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Chiefs of Staff, gave these criteria that must be satisfied before any troop 
commitment abroad. Put simply, Powell Doctrine caution against intervention 
unless (1) America has vital interest in the war and it is endangered (2) the 
objectives must be clear, (3) the US could bring overwhelming force to bear in the 
conflict, (4) Congressional and public support could be assured and (5) a clear exit 
strategy was in place. (Fitzgerald, 2010, p.152). 
However, now the American army has entered a new era of war. Wars are now 
no longer as defined in Powell doctrine as brief, decisive and infrequent. But 
according to the emerging Petraeus Doctrine the armed conflict will be "protracted, 
ambiguous and continuous-with the application of force becoming a lesser part of 
the soldier's repertoire" (Bacevich, 2008, p.3). To cope with the new strategic 
environment and to avoid repeating mistakes of the Vietnam War. America scholars 
return to Vietnam experience to relearn the lessons. The lessons of Vietnam that 
America military need to learn now are different from what they had learnt before, 
since the end of the war up until before Afghanistan war. What America should 
learn from Vietnam experience now is not caution against involvement in counter-
insurgency war but rather how to fight a counter-insurgency war effectively. Or 
more clearly, how to win a war like the one happened in Vietnam few decades ago. 
In other word, if previous lessons focused on when to intervene, now the lesson is 
what should be done once the American troops have already committed in the war. 
Fitzgerald stated that 
'"No longer was Vietnam held up as an example of why the US should not engag~ 
in counter-insurgency warfare, but it was meant for example of how to conduct 
counter-insurgency." (20 I O. p.159). 
Or Jonathan Schell also shares this idea that 
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""To most Americans. Vietnam taught one big lesson: 'Don't do it again'. To 
today's military. Vietnam has taught a host of little lessons. adding up to '00 it 
better'" (2010, p.5). 
The study of North Vietnam military strategy in Vietnam War re\eals the 
importance of winning the support from civilian population in a guerrilla and 
counterinsurgency/insurgency war. The North Vietnam's armed forces could not be 
compared with America's. they were much weaker. HO\veyer. North Vietnam 
always stressed the importance of the political tasks in the armed forces along with 
the military tasks. Among the political tasks, they paid special attention to winning 
and maintaining the support from wide range of civilian population. This strategy 
originated from the fact that North Vietnam's armed forces cannot liye without the 
support from civilian population. And this strategy proved to be right and very 
effective for the North Vietnam to win the war. 
General David Petraeus is current CIA Director. Previously, he was the 
Commander of International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and Commander of 
U.S. Forces Afghanistan (USFOR-A) since June 2010. Earlier, he was Commanding 
General, Multi-National Force - Iraq (MNF-I) from January 2007 to September 
2008. As commander of MNF-I, Petraeus oversaw all coalition forces in Iraq. 
During his tenure as commander of MNF-I, Petraeus helped to reverse the 
deterioration trend in the counterinsurgency war there. Iraq also is v ..-here he 
implemented the new counterinsurgency field manual FM3.24. also kno\\'n as 
Petraeus Doctrine. Petraeus has his academic background on Vietnam war. In 1987. 
he earned his PhD from Pinceton's Woodrow Wilson School \\ith a thesis titled 
.. The America Jlilitm)' and the Lessons ql rietnam: A Stud), oj .\!ili/ar)' fnflu(!17c(' 
and the Use C?l Force in the Post-T7etnal71 Era ". Thus, it is not surprise that his 
doctrine was "strongly influenced by the Vietnam" as admitted by Oayid Fitzgt:rald. 
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John A. Nag}, who is president of the Center for a New American Security and 
helped Petraeus write the counterinsurgency manual~ stated the main points of the 
Petraeus Doctrine as followed: 
"'Its key tenets are simple, but radical: Focus on protectin£ civilian over killin£ 
~ -
the enemy. Assume greater risk. Use minimum, not maximum force" (Nagl & 
Fick, 2009). 
These key tenets are clearly lessons learnt from Vietnam war. As Jonathan 
Schell, a researcher at The Nation Institute stated that 
"Petraeus's counterinsurgency manual, with all its talk of winning hearts and minds. is 
pure Vietnam". (Schell, 2010, p.5). 
Lately~ with his success in the counterinsurgency war in Iraq~ David Petraeus 
was nominated as the Commander of US and NATO forces in Afghanistan, after 
General Stanley McChrystal was sacked. After taking the new position in 
Afghanistan, on 2ih July 20 1 O~ General Petraeus issued new "Counterinsurgency 
Guidance" for troops under his command. This 24 point guidance based on the Field 
Manual 3-34 and also reflects the new lessons learnt from Vietnam. 
In the first guidance, Petraeus once again reaffirmed the decisive factor in a 
counterinsurgency war is winning the heart and mind of the people. He wrote that: 
"The decisive terrain is the human terrain. The people are the center of gra\·ity. 
Only by providing them security and earning their trust and confidence can the 
Afghan government and ISAF prevail". (Guidance 1) 
Throughout the guidance we can see the strong influence of the Vietnam 
experience. For example~ regarding the fighting, Petraeus ordered that 
"'Hunt the enemy aggressively, but use only the fire power needed to \\in a fight. 
We can't win \\'ithout fighting. but we also cannot kill or capture our way to 
victory. Moreover. if we kill civilians or damage their property in the course of 
our operations, we \yill create more enemies than our operations eliminate. That's 
exactly what the Taliban \yant. Don't fall into their trap." (Guidance 6). 
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In relations with the Afghan people, Petraeus ordered his troops to be kind, 
polite and show respect to them. He asked 
"Be a good guest. Treat the Afghan people and their property with respect. Think 
about how you drive, how you patrol, how you relate to people, and how you help 
the community. View your actions through the eyes of the Afghans. Alienating 
Afghan civilian sows the seed of our defeat. 
Build relationship, but not just with those \vho seek you out. Earn the people·s 
trust, talk to them, ask them questions and learn about their liyes. Inquire about 
social dynamics, friction, local histories, and grievances. Hear what they say. Be 
aware of other in the room and how their presence may affect the answers you get. 
Cross-check information and make sure you haw the full story. A void knee-jerk 
responses based on first impressions. Don't be a pawn in someone else·s game. 
Spend time, listen and drink lots of tea". (Guidance 11& 12) 
Generally, my thesis about the North Vietnam's military strategy and its \\ay 
to win support from wide range of civilian population in the Vietnam War reveals 
that the support from people is crucial to winning an insurgent/counter-insurgent 
war. Those who can win and maintain the support of people will eventually win the 
war, even though they may be militarily weaker. This is an important lesson of the 
Vietnam war that America is currently learning and applying in its wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan under the Petraeus Doctrine. 
In conclusion, North Vietnam's military strategy in the war against America 
was not consistent with the basic principles underpinning the laws of war but North 
Vietnam had its own rules of engagement to protect civilian and minimize ci\'ilian 
casualties and it managed to win and maintain enough ci\'ilian support to sustain and 
eventually win the war against America. Studying the North Vietnam's rule of 
engagement and its way of winning support from ci\'ilian population contributes to 
understanding more about the Vietnam war on the Vietnamese side and tills in a gap 
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in literature about the Vietnam War. an important event in the Cold war period in 
20th century. The thesis shows that though North Vietnam's conduct in the war was 
not strictly consistent with the principles underpinning laws of war, its \\'ar against 
America was not immoral. It also contributes to confirming the Walzer's arguments 
that America's war in Vietnam was "doubly untenable" because it \\'as .. the war 
cannot be won and should not be won" (Walzer. 2006, p.195). The thesis also 
highlights the lessons that the support of people is crucial in wining an 
insurgent/counter-insurgent war, so for the America to win the current counter-
insurgent wars, besides concentrating on military fighting, it should focus its effort 
on winning hearts and minds of people as noted in Petraeus doctrine. 
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